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In 1985, the film and television industries began a decade-long process of 
realignment. In this dissertation, I show how News Corp., primarily via its 
subsidiary, the Fox network, played a central role in redefining the relationship 
between motion picture studios and television distributors from 1985 to 1995. I 
analyze how the company successfully launched and expanded Fox Broadcasting 
by cultivating productive relationships with a variety of different stakeholders 
including advertisers, the creative community, independent television stations, 
regulators, cable operators, cable program services, and the press.  
This study uses trade publications and mainstream press reports to 
chronicle and analyze a period that has been understudied by scholars. Through 
the use of these resources, I describe the specific regulatory, economic and 
 vii
technological conditions enabling the emergence of a fourth network. This 
discussion is followed by an analysis of how Fox further shaped these conditions 
while also introducing a number of significant programming, marketing and 
distribution innovations to broadcasting. Through Fox’s heightened emphasis on 
targeting specific demographics, its aggressive pursuit of a brand identity and its 
development of niche-oriented television programming, the company redefined 
network television along with the larger media landscape.  Indeed, Fox, along 
with parent company News Corp., initiated a new era for media conglomerates. 
This era was marked by network-studio integration and the increased economic 
and marketing value of network television programming to entertainment 
companies. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
During the summer of 1995, a series of major media mergers and 
acquisitions took place. This “merger mania” started when Seagram purchased 
MCA-Universal in March.1 It accelerated in July, when Westinghouse bought 
CBS and Disney bought ABC. And it continued into August, when Time Warner 
acquired Turner Entertainment. Media analysts reported on these events with 
wonder and dismay. There was general agreement that something important was 
taking place; it just wasn’t clear precisely what. Variety editor-in-chief Peter Bart 
argued that these events indicated a “radical realignment” of Hollywood was 
underway.2 Media critic Neil Gabler contended that the entertainment industries 
were in the midst of a “revolution.”3 
Collectively, these deals were interpreted as reinforcing that “bigger was 
better” as far as media companies were concerned. As each deal was announced, 
their companies’ executives spoke of how the combinations would allow for 
easier expansion into new markets both at home and abroad. The Disney-ABC 
marriage, which received some of the most extensive media coverage, was 
represented as providing the template for the new media world of tomorrow. The 
merger would combine one of the top motion picture distributors and television 
producers in the world with the number one television network. Disney CEO 
Michael Eisner promised to create unparalleled synergies through the integration 
                                                 
1 So described in Kevin Maney, “Merger Mania Spreads to Disney World,” USA Today, 1 August 
1995, 1B;  
2 “Waiting for the Revolution,” Variety, 28 August-3 September 1995, 8, 77. 
3 “Revenge of the Studio System.” New York Times, 22 August 1995, A15. 
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of the two companies’ broadcast, cable, motion picture, radio, publishing and 
merchandising holdings.  
The Disney-ABC deal was seen as a particularly defining event for two 
key reasons. First, it was interpreted as an indication that a structural 
transformation of the media industries had begun. For decades, judicial and 
regulatory decisions had prevented motion picture producers and television 
distributors from being owned by one company. The financial interest and 
syndication rules (“fin-syn”) implemented by the FCC in the early 1970s created 
the most formidable structural barrier between the two entities. However, during 
the early 1990s, these rules gradually were eliminated. With these mergers, media 
companies were responding to the increased opportunities available to them for 
the first time. The second reason the Disney-ABC merger – along with the CBS-
Westinghouse merger – were seen as monumental was because, as one journalist 
put it, they reinforced “the notion that advertiser-supported network television 
may still be the surest bet in the ferocious, fast-changing media marketplace.”4 In 
other words, the networks had been portrayed as being on the brink of extinction 
for the last several years. Then, suddenly, one of the largest software producers in 
the world spent billions of dollars to show its confidence in the future of network 
television.  
The Disney-ABC deal was indeed a sign of a dramatic transformation of 
the media industries. However, it was a monumental event for different reasons 
than those pointed out by most media analysts either at the time or since. Rather 
                                                 
4 Warren Cohen and Katia Hetter, “Tomorrow’s Media Today,” U.S. News & World Report, 14 
August 1995, 47. 
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than initiating a new era in media conglomeration, the Disney-ABC merger 
marked the culmination of a decade-long process of industrial realignment. This 
transformation of the media industries actually had been set into motion a decade 
earlier, primarily through the efforts of one company: News Corp. 
In this dissertation, I argue that News Corp., primarily via its subsidiary, 
the Fox network, played a central role in redefining the structure, conduct and 
performance of the media industries. In 1985, News Corp. initiated a ten-year-
long process by which it altered the relationship between motion picture studios 
and television distributors. Prior to the emergence of Fox Broadcasting, broadcast 
networks and motion picture studios were owned by different companies. The 
motion picture studios produced the majority of television programming; the 
broadcast networks then distributed this programming. The FCC’s fin-syn rules 
ensured these companies remained separate. The turning point came in 1985, 
when News Corp. offered regulators something they had long desired: a fourth 
broadcast network. The prospect of having a competitive fourth network led the 
FCC to allow News Corp. to retain its recently purchased motion picture studio, 
Twentieth Century Fox, as well as acquire six Metromedia television stations.  
These two entities formed the base from which News Corp. launched America’s 
fourth television network, Fox Broadcasting, in 1986. Over the next decade, Fox 
proceeded to challenge long-standing regulations, redefine the relationship 
between program producers and distributors, and introduce numerous 
programming, marketing and distribution innovations to television. 
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Fox was not simply a “fourth network,” however. Rather, it was a new 
form of network, one which, in acknowledging the increasingly fragmented media 
environment, placed a heightened emphasis on targeting specific demographics, 
pursuing a brand identity, and developing niche-targeted programming. Through 
these tactics, Fox played a dominant role in heralding a new era for media 
conglomerates. This era was marked by network-studio integration and the 
increased economic and marketing value of network television programming to 
entertainment companies.  
The Fox motion picture studio continued to churn out the same kinds of 
big-budget “event pictures” produced by the other Hollywood studios. However, 
for Fox, the motion picture division became less and less central to the activities 
of the company. Instead, executives focused their energies on making Fox into the 
first vertically integrated media conglomerate focused predominantly on 
television production and distribution. Thus while the other studios focused on 
creating the next big-budget blockbuster, Fox produced niche-oriented television 
programming to funnel through its rapidly expanding distribution arms. Fox used 
demographically-targeted series such as The Simpsons and The X-Files as 
launching pads. Such shows became the means by which Fox and News Corp. 
could expand into a variety of additional markets including cable, satellite, 
merchandising, video games, and video, both in the U.S. and overseas.  In the 
process, such television franchises yielded the company more than one billion 
dollars each – amounts realized by only a select number of motion pictures.5  
                                                 
5 The Simpsons were described as such in Alec Foege, “Ay, Caramba! The Simpsons Heads Into 
Its 14th Year with No End in Sight,” Brandweek, 26 May 2003, 10-12. The X-Files was cited as 
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Other media conglomerates did not follow Fox’s lead until the mid-‘90s – at 
which point, one after another, they all frantically tried to catch up by creating or 
purchasing networks of their own. Fox got its head start and influenced the media 
landscape to the extent it was able to by responding to the distinct needs and 
desires of several different entities, including regulators, advertisers, independent 
television stations, and the creative community. The company attained the 
advantage it did by effectively exploiting existing technological, economic and 
regulatory conditions. Then, during the next decade, Fox-News Corp. proceeded 
to further influence such conditions.  
This study is framed by two major sets of events: By the sale of all three 
networks and the creation of Fox in 1985-86 and by the series of mergers that 
took place during the summer of 1995. In the process of covering this time span, I 
show that to study the emergence of Fox is to study the transformation of the 
media industries in a time of flux. From the moment of Fox’s creation to the 
moment it attained parity with the Big Three, television changed from being a 
three-network system to a multi-channel system with dozens of viewing options. 
Regulators slowly eliminated the policies preventing the integration of the film 
and television industries. Hollywood media companies shifted from focusing 
predominantly on the U.S. market to thinking globally and, in the process, often 
acquired new owners. As I demonstrate over the next several chapters, Fox and 
News Corp., under the leadership of its CEO, Rupert Murdoch, were at the 
forefront of all of these changes. On many occasions, they defined the terms by 
                                                                                                                                     
earning this amount in Katherine Monk and Cynthia Littleton, “X-Files Case Closes After Nine 
Seasons: Expenses Soared As Ratings Floundered,” Vancouver Sun , 18 January 2002, D10. 
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which these changes occurred.  For example, by developing niche-oriented 
product while the other networks were still thinking predominantly in terms of the 
“masses,” Fox showed new ways to profit from television programming and 
different means of conceptualizing network television. By crying “competition” 
and citing its underdog status to the FCC, Fox first circumvented and then 
ultimately led to the removal of numerous regulations. By acquiring the rights to 
the NFL, Fox set off a battle for affiliates the likes of which had not been seen in 
decades. By using Fox programming as the basis for launching new satellite and 
cable ventures in the U.S. and abroad, News Corp. became the first truly global 
media company. Meanwhile its competitors remained focused on expanding into 
new markets, predominantly through the distribution of motion picture product, 
and were therefore stalled in their efforts to realize their global ambitions.  
Fox demonstrated the viability – indeed, the centrality – of network 
television product to global media conglomerates. What’s more, the company did 
this at a time when most media analysts, including premier journalist-cum-media 
critic Ken Auletta, perceived network television to be on its way out.6 Of course, 
the network television which Fox created became something quite different from 
network television as it existed from the 1950s through the 1980s. Indeed, Fox 
played a leading role in ushering in what Michael Curtin calls the “neo-network” 
era – a time when media products targeted to mass audiences still existed, but 
were increasingly complemented by products geared toward more narrowly 
                                                 
6 The title of Auletta’s book nicely indicates the attitude held about the networks during the late 
1980s and early ‘90s: Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost Their Way (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1992). 
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defined groups.7 These demographic groups were identified and pursued based on 
their age, race, class, gender, ethnicity or some combination thereof. 
In spearheading television’s transformation to the neo-network era, Fox 
changed how the media industries operated. It did this in several ways. First, Fox 
showed the value of functioning as both a television producer and a distributor. 
To be profitable, a company had to produce many of the programs it broadcast, 
own several large television stations, and supervise a chain of affiliates with wide 
coverage across the country. As the years passed, Fox exploited its programming 
in other ways as well, including through its own cable channels in the U.S. and 
satellite operations in Europe, Asia and Latin America. 
The second way Fox changed how television operated was by reinforcing 
the importance of counter-programming to specific demographic groups. By no 
means did Fox invent the practice of counter-programming or create the niche-
targeted product. However, whereas other networks had typically programmed to 
specific niches for a limited number of time slots, Fox adopted the tactic across its 
entire schedule. Another distinction was that Fox’s niche-oriented series were 
typically directed to much narrower audiences than had been the niche-oriented 
series which appeared on the networks. Prior to Fox, a network was seen as 
narrowcasting in prime time if it targeted the 18-to-49 demographic group.8 Fox 
usually viewed the 18-to-49-year-old audience as too broad a demographic to 
target. Generally, the niches Fox pursued were much more narrowly defined, 
                                                 
7 Curtin, “On Edge: Culture Industries in the Neo-Network Era,” Making and Selling Culture, ed. 
Richard M. Ohmann (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1996), 181-
202. 
8 The networks had long targeted narrower audiences for daytime programming. Women and 
children were among the main groups pursued during different times of the day. 
 8
ranging from children to teenagers to African-Americans to at most, 18-to-34-
year-olds. These groups, and the programming developed for them, were selected 
based on executives’ conclusions that they were both under-served by the 
networks and highly desired by advertisers. Conveniently, such viewer-consumers 
were perceived by both media companies and advertisers as being the most 
willing to try new programs and by extension, the most willing to try new 
products. 
The third way Fox redefined network television was by demonstrating the 
importance of promoting itself as an alternative program service. Fox made 
“branding” into an art form, aggressively developing a clear image for itself and 
marketing its programs as different, distinctive and alternative to those which 
could be found on the networks. Fox’s marketers wanted viewers to believe their 
programs had “edge,” whereas the programs produced by the networks were 
homogeneous and interchangeable.9 This objective corresponded nicely with 
Fox’s goal of targeting younger viewers who were more open to new types of 
programming, fresh styles, and reformulated genres.  
Throughout this study, I show how Fox’s marketing, scheduling and 
programming practices altered the network television environment at the same 
time its distinctive structure affected the larger regulatory and industrial 
landscape. A key consequence of these efforts was that Fox provided the model 
for a new era of media conglomerates. In this new era, motion picture studios and 
television divisions would be part of the same companies. Network television 
                                                 
9 See Curtin, “On Edge,” for an extensive discussion of the implications of a media product 
having this characteristic. 
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programming would have a heightened importance and value to these companies’ 
expansion efforts and their bottom lines. As I demonstrate in the next section, 
very few studies have discussed the important impact Fox had on the practices 
and products of the contemporary media industries.  
 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
As influential as Fox has been, remarkably little has been written about the 
company and its impact on the contemporary media environment. There has been 
the occasional biography, chronicling the accomplishments of such “great men” 
as Rupert Murdoch and Barry Diller.10 There have been scores of essays and 
books analyzing Fox television series. However, most of these take the form of 
textual analyses or reception studies of popular Fox series such as The X-Files and 
The Simpsons. If the Fox network’s role is mentioned in these analyses, it is 
usually as an afterthought.  
Fox is similarly a side note in media industry analyses. Most such studies 
focus on the importance of big-budget motion pictures to media conglomerates 
during the 1980s and 1990s.11 Since no media conglomerate other than News 
                                                 
10 For example, see William Shawcross, Murdoch (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); 
Thomas Kiernan, Citizen Murdoch: The Unexpurgated Story of Rupert Murdoch – the World’s 
Most Powerful and Controversial Media Lord (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986); Neil Chenoweth, 
Rupert Murdoch: The Untold Story of The World’s Greatest Media Wizard (New York: Crown 
Business, 2001); George Mair, The Barry Diller Story: The Life and Times of America’s Greatest 
Entertainment Mogul (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997). 
11 For example, see Douglas Gomery, “Hollywood Corporate Business Practice and Periodizing 
Contemporary Film History,” Contemporary Hollywood Cinema, eds. Steve Neale and Murray 
Smith (London: Routledge, 1998), 47-57; Jon Lewis, “Following the Money in America’s 
Sunniest Company Town: Some Notes on the Political Economy of the Hollywood Blockbuster,” 
Movie Blockbusters, ed. Julian Stringer (London: Routledge, 2003), 61-71. The fact that such 
articles are located in books centered on the “movie” industry further indicates the continued 
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Corp. possessed both a television network and a motion picture studio until 1995, 
scholars do not seem to know what to do with the company. Its practices were 
exceptional at this time and as such, it could not be lumped easily with other 
conglomerates such as Time Warner, Sony-Columbia and Matsushita-Universal. 
The typical response seems to be to ignore – or overlook – News Corp./Fox’s 
contribution, rather than analyze its distinctiveness.  
Individuals studying the broadcasting environment seem equally 
bewildered as to how to deal with Fox. The manner in which Auletta discusses 
Fox in Three Blind Mice is representative of how media analysts solved this 
dilemma. Fox is lumped with cable programmers as a challenge to the dominance 
of the three-network system. It is portrayed as one in a multitude of forces leading 
to the demise of the Big Three. Such a depiction is problematic on two counts. 
First, it assumes the networks were dying, rather than merely being restructured to 
accommodate a changing media environment. Second, it misrepresents and 
indeed diminishes Fox’s influence on broadcast policy as well as television 
programming, marketing and distribution. As Megan Mullen points out in her 
study of the cable industry, original cable programming actually remained quite 
limited until the mid-1990s.12 By that point in time, Fox was airing nearly forty 
hours a week of original programming via its prime time schedule and its daytime 
children’s network. 
                                                                                                                                     
tendency of seeing big-budget motion pictures as the primary economic drivers for media 
conglomerates. 
12 Megan Mullen, The Rise of Cable Programming in the United States (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2003. 
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Part of the reason Auletta depicts Fox in the manner he does stems from 
the time in which he wrote his book. Three Blind Mice – like most of the studies 
which discuss Fox at all – was published in the early 1990s. This was long before 
Fox’s full impact and influence could be seen. Thus Fox is relegated to the 
margins of discussions of the networks in the same way it becomes a footnote in 
analyses of the practices of media conglomerates. What little scholarly literature 
there is about Fox takes the form of “fourth network studies.” These analyses, 
most of which were written in the early 1990s, focus on the specific economic and 
technological conditions enabling Fox to create a fourth network after a three-
network system had dominated for more than thirty years.13   
One of the most thorough of the “fourth network” essays comes from 
media economists Laurie Thomas and Barry R. Litman.14  Their essay, “Fox 
Broadcasting Company, Why Now? An Economic Study of the Rise of the Fourth 
Broadcast ‘Network,’” examines the “various barriers to entry and analyzes the 
conditions that paved the way for Fox to enter network broadcasting.”15 The 
authors provide a cursory look at Fox’s means of establishing a network identity 
through product differentiation. However, since the article was published in 1991 
                                                 
13 Most of these fourth network studies are unpublished theses. For example, see Timothy L. 
Cogshell, “A Study of Entry into Network Television Broadcasting: The Fox Broadcasting 
Company,” Masters Thesis (Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University, 1990); Jiunn-Liang Sheu, 
“Fox: The Making of a Fourth Television Broadcast Network,” (Fresno: California State 
University at Fresno, 1993); Joan Stuller, “Fox Broadcasting Company: A Fourth Network Entry 
Within the Broadcast Marketplace,” Masters Thesis (Northridge: California State University at 
Northridge, 1989); Kathleen Urbach, “The Fourth Network : Fox Broadcasting's Influence on 
Network Broadcasting,” (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992).  
14 Laurie Thomas and Barry R. Litman, “Fox Broadcasting Company, Why Now? An Economic 
Study of the Rise of the Fourth Broadcast ‘Network,’” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic 
Media 35, no. 2 (1991): 139-157. 
15 Ibid, 140. 
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– just four years after the network began its first broadcasts – many of the 
conclusions are tentative.  
Litman has written elsewhere about the economics of television networks 
and weblets in the 1980s and ‘90s and Fox’s place within this changing 
environment.16 His articles are typically written as introductory surveys, intended 
to give readers a general sense of the economic and political factors governing the 
contemporary media industries. He does not look closely at institutional culture 
nor does he consider the ways specific programs have had an impact on the 
development of the industry.  
In his book Outfoxed: The Inside Story of America’s Fourth Television 
Network, Alex Ben Block examines Fox’s corporate culture.17 In this 1991 book, 
former Hollywood Reporter journalist Block describes the management culture at 
Twentieth Century Fox as it transitioned from being a film studio owned by 
Marvin Davis to an entertainment division within Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. 
empire. He suggests how the clever strategizing of a small group of executives 
that included Barry Diller, Garth Ancier and Jamie Kellner contributed to the 
formation of the Fox network during 1985-1986. He also looks at how these 
executives interacted with their new corporate parent as well as how they went 
about developing their first television programs. Although the book takes gossipy 
                                                 
16 For example, see Litman, “Network Oligopoly Power: An Economic Analysis, Hollywood in 
the Age of Television, ed. Tino Balio (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 145-164; Litman, “The 
Economics of Television Networks: New Dimensions and New Alliances,” Media Economics: 
Theory and Practice, Alison Alexander, James Owers, and Rod Carveth, eds. (Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 131-150; Larry Collette and Litman, “The Peculiar 
Economics of New Broadcast Network Entry: The Case of United Paramount and Warner Bros.,” 
The Journal of Media Economics 10, no. 4 (1997): 3-22. 
17 Outfoxed (New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1991). 
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turns at times, it is nonetheless impressive in its depiction of the institutional 
culture of Fox in the 1980s.  
In spite of Block’s abundant interviews and years of observing boardroom 
interactions, the book is narrow in its scope. He provides little discussion of the 
circumstances within which Fox emerged.  After briefly clarifying the obstacles 
Fox overcame to become a network, he focuses primarily on the executive 
struggles over the direction specific shows should take and the clash between 
different personalities for control.18 He is not interested with the “bigger picture” 
such as the relationship between the Fox network and other Fox divisions (or 
other News Corp. divisions) or the ways that Fox impacted industry structure, 
government policies, or television programming. As with Thomas and Litman’s 
essay as well as Auletta’s book, Block’s analysis is partly limited due to its 
publication just four years after the network began broadcasting. However, part of 
the limitation is also due to the decision to look at Fox solely in terms of its 
importance in becoming the first successful “fourth network” in more than thirty 
years rather than thinking about how it changed the existing media landscape in 
the process. 
A similarly limited scope is present in Kristal Brent Zook’s book Color By 
Fox: The Fox Network and the Revolution in Black Television.19 The book is full 
of promise – Zook interviewed dozens of producers, directors and stars from 
several of Fox’s African-American shows. However, little evidence of these 
                                                 
18 Much of Block’s book focuses on the battle which took place between Fox executives and Joan 
Rivers’ staff over the direction of The Late Show with Joan Rivers.  
19 Zook, Color By Fox: The Fox Network and the Revolution in Black Television (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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interviews in present within the book. Zook’s book indicates the shortcomings of 
a strictly textually-based cultural studies orientation. In her focus on how color 
and caste, gender and sexuality, and political and social movements are addressed 
within Fox’s African-American texts, Zook stays focused almost solely on 
matters of representation. She has little interest in exploring how and why 
African-American programming found a place on Fox during the early 1990s.  
Further, there is a complete lack of institutional analysis present in any part of the 
book. The only associations made between any of the texts discussed and the 
“Fox” of the title is through their presence on the channel; she makes no attempt 
to draw connections between the various titles she analyzes and the institutional 
imperatives which factored into their broadcast on the network.  
Indeed, Zook’s lack of institutional analysis leads her to misrepresent the 
historical trajectory of the programming she discusses. She selectively focuses on 
the specific programs that support her ideological analyses, without ever 
discussing the full range of African-American programs that appeared on Fox. In 
addition, she suggests that Fox completely rejected African-American 
programming after 1994, when in fact two of the programs she analyzes at length, 
Martin and Living Single, remained on the network through 1996. Because Zook 
never discusses Fox’s entire prime-time schedule, she creates the mistaken 
impression that the network’s sole programming strategy during the early ‘90s 
involved pursuing the African-American audience. In fact, Fox executives were 
targeting a number of other distinct demographic groups (i.e., teens, 
twentysomethings) at this same time as well.   
 15
As the above examples illustrate, on very few occasions have scholars or 
journalists analyzed Fox as either industrial culture or cultural industry.20 There 
has been even less work analyzing the integration of networks and studios (Fox in 
1986, the WB and UPN in 1994, Disney-ABC and Time Warner-Turner in 1995, 
Viacom-CBS in 1999, NBC-Universal in 2004).21 What little research there has 
been on Fox or studio-network synergies – whether in scholarly literature or the 
mainstream press – has focused predominantly on specific landmark programs.  
In the case of scholarly literature, research on Fox programs has often 
resembled Zook’s work: Writers use a cultural studies perspective to frame their 
discussion of representations of gender, race, class, ethnicity and age in such Fox 
shows as Beverly Hills 90210, Ally McBeal or Married…with Children.22  
Ideological analyses of popular Fox programs are also common.23  Another 
favored approach involves exploring fan subcultures for particular series.24  Some 
                                                 
20 Eileen Meehan encourages approaching television as both “industrial culture and cultural 
industry” in “Conceptualizing Culture as Commodity: The Problem of Television,” Television: 
The Critical View, ed. Horace Newcomb, Fifth ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
563-572. 
21 Part of this is due to the relatively recent nature of these occurrences, but nonetheless analysis 
of these events remains limited.  
22 For examples, see C. Lusane, “Assessing the Disconnect between Black and White Television 
Audiences: The Race, Class and Gender Politics of Married…With Children,” The Journal of 
Popular Film and Television 27, no. 1 (1999): 12-21; E. Graham McKinley, Beverly Hills 90210: 
Television, Gender and Identity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Tracey 
Owens Patton, “Ally McBeal and Her Homies: The Reification of White Stereotypes of Other,” 
Journal of Black Studies 32, no. 2 (2001): 229-260. 
23 See John Edward Campbell, “Alien(ating) Ideology and the American Media: Apprehending 
the Alien Image in Television through The X-Files,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 4, 
no. 3 (2001): 327-347; Josh Ozersky, “TV’s Anti-Families: Married…With Malaise. ‘The 
Simpsons,’ ‘Married…with Children,’ and ‘Roseanne’ may not be as Liberating as they First 
Appear,” Tikkun 6, no. 1 (1991): 11-17.  
24 See S.R. Wakefield, “Your Sister in ‘St. Scully’: An Electronic Community of Female Fans of 
The X-Files,” The Journal of Popular Film and Television 29, no. 3 (2001): 130-137; Susan J. 
Clerc, “DDEB, GATB , MPPB, and Ratboy,” Deny All Knowledge: Reading the X-Files 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 36-51; Peter Parisi, “‘Black Bart’ Simpson: 
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shows such as The Simpsons and The X-Files also have spawned a great deal of 
critical commentary on their innovative styles or generic revisionism.25 Certainly 
Fox programs merit such analyses. However, these analyses could be enriched by 
being contextualized further and linked with key economic, political, industrial 
and technological developments.  
Given the limited amount of information analyzing the development of the 
Fox network, I have turned primarily to trade publications and popular press 
articles for information. In terms of the journalistic treatment of Fox, the trade 
press has regularly covered the interactions of the networks with the studios.  Any 
major business transactions or executive shifts merit news coverage by 
publications such as Broadcasting & Cable, Advertising Age and Daily Variety. I 
have reconstructed much of Fox’s institutional and programming history by 
analyzing these trade reports. The trades, as well as other publications such as 
Forbes, The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek are also helpful in tracking the 
growth and decline of programming developments, regulatory changes and 
corporate trends.  
In the process of looking at these materials to sketch a timeline of Fox’s 
relationship to the industry’s development, I have tried to remain conscious of the 
limitations of these resources. Many of their limitations coincide with the 
shortcomings described above in relation to Block’s book on Fox.  First, such 
                                                                                                                                     
Appropriation and Revitalization in Commodity Culture,” Journal of Popular Culture 27, no. 1 
(1993): 125-141. 
25 See Jan Delasara, PopLit, PopCult, and the X-Files (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 
2000); Kevin Glynn, Tabloid Culture: Trash Taste, Popular Power, and the Transformation of 
American Television (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Jason Mittell, “Cartoon Realism: 
Genre Mixing and the Cultural Life of The Simpsons,” The Velvet Light Trap 24, no. 6 (2001): 
743-793. 
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stories are subject to the public relations spin of the particular company or 
companies featured. Second, coverage of corporate growth and changes remains 
selective. Third, such sources often lack a sense of the “big picture” – of the long-
term historical trajectory for industry developments. Almost everything is “new” 
and “fresh” in these sources, and thus they must be approached with a degree of 
skepticism.  And fourth, due to space limitations, the articles rarely delve into 
much depth about their topics.  
In spite of their potential problems, these journalistic sources have enabled 
me to understand the key moments in the development of the Fox network as well 
as its network and studio competitors. I have responded to the challenges 
presented by these resources by surveying a wide range of trade publications and 
journalistic materials, cross-checking data whenever possible. As a means of 
further framing my analyses, I have turned to two bodies of scholarly literature: 
revisionist media industry histories and the New Hollywood. In referring to these 
two areas of research, I can contextualize my study within larger historical 
developments and relate my analysis to other scholarly traditions.  
 
REVISIONIST MEDIA HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The methods and assumptions I employ in this media industry history are 
drawn from approaches taken by scholars such as Michele Hilmes, Christopher 
Anderson, Tino Balio and William Boddy.26 These historians look at a variety of 
                                                 
26 See Christopher Anderson, Hollywood TV: The Studio System in the 1950s (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1994); Hollywood in the Age of Television, ed. Tino Balio (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990); William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and Its Critics (Urbana: 
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primary and secondary source materials, including trade journals, popular press 
articles, non-fiction books on important individuals and companies, scholarly 
work on the industry, publicly-released financial statements and business reports, 
and film and television programs. With the information culled from these 
materials, they analyze the relationship between the motion picture studios and 
television networks from their earliest days. Their research demonstrates the 
complex ways in which the studios and networks have been interconnected and 
interdependent from the outset. Whereas many traditional histories of the 
emergence and development of television have asserted that the relationship 
between the film and broadcasting industries has been one of conflict and 
competition, these scholars offer up a different and far more complicated 
perspective. As Hilmes observes, in effect summing up the goals of other 
revisionist historians,  
My primary assertion is that the film industry played a central role in the 
evolution of economic structures, program forms, and patterns of 
distribution in broadcasting, because Hollywood has functioned since the 
early 1920s as broadcasting’s alter ego, its main rival and contributor, the 
only other force unified and powerful enough to present a viable 
alternative definition to the uses made of the medium by established 
broadcast interests, yet a necessary contributor to broadcasting’s growth 
and success. The ongoing process of conflict, compromise and 
accommodation between the two has shaped the economic and expressive 
structures of both media.27 
In effect, she argues that the film industry did not simply fight the 
emergence of television “on principle” nor did it only grudgingly begin producing 
                                                                                                                                     
University of Illinois Press, 1990); Michele Hilmes, Hollywood and Broadcasting: From Radio to 
Cable (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).  
27 Hilmes, 1. 
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television programming after television had become a dominant presence in 
American households. Rather, specific judicial, regulatory, technological, 
industrial and political factors led the major motion picture studios to be 
marginalized during the early years of television, and encouraged the definition of 
television along the broadcasting model formulated by the radio industry, 
advertisers and regulators.  
Much of the research exploring the relationship between the film and 
television industries has been concerned with how and why they took the 
distinctive forms they did in the first place. For example, in Hollywood TV, 
Christopher Anderson discusses how motion picture studios and independent 
producers became the dominant suppliers of television programming to the 
networks during the 1950s. William Boddy also focuses on the 1950s, but frames 
his concerns somewhat differently. His emphasis is on how a number of different 
stakeholders – including networks, television critics, regulators, advertising 
agencies, Hollywood producers and writers – influenced the forms and styles of 
1950s television programming. As with Hilmes and Anderson, Boddy maintains 
that the three-network system as it existed from the 1950s through the 1970s “was 
not ‘natural’ or inevitable, but indeed the result of specific economic and political 
forces with complex determinants.”28 Hilmes’ work covers the broadest time 
frame, spanning from the formation of the radio business in the 1920s up through 
the 1980s and the studios’ investments in pay television. Her book concludes with 
a discussion of the prospects for Fox Broadcasting and speculation about the 
                                                 
28 Fifties Television, 8. 
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impact which deregulation will have on the continually evolving relationship 
between the networks and the studios.29  
This dissertation strives to apply both the methods and approaches taken 
by these scholars to a more recent time period. As with Hilmes, Boddy, and 
Anderson, my overarching concern is with exploring the shifting relationship 
between the motion picture studios and the television networks. However, 
whereas their focus is primarily on how and why the motion picture companies 
and networks carved out their own distinct territories in the television business 
from the 1950s to the mid-80s, I want to analyze how these two entities came 
together again from the mid-‘80s on.  
Though I am looking at a more contemporary time period, the approach I 
take is the same. One of the primary strengths of these studies comes from their 
effective incorporation and integration of several different analytical approaches. 
They borrow political economy’s concern with how modes of production and 
relations of production operate within a particular social system. They incorporate 
the media economist’s interest in measuring structure, conduct and performance 
to determine levels of competition and diversity within the marketplace. They 
integrate policy analysts’ attention to the impact of judicial and regulatory 
decisions in structuring media industries. And they draw from cultural studies’ 
perspective that culture is a terrain of struggle and contestation, a place where 
battles over how society is defined and controlled are played out through the texts 
and practices of everyday life. Yet while these different approaches inform the 
                                                 
29 Hilmes’ book was published in 1990 and thus could only speculate about many of the issues 
under examination in my dissertation. 
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analyses of these scholars, all of them are first and foremost media historians. 
Their primary concern, as well as my own, is in analyzing, organizing and 
interpreting the patterns and processes of the media industries. 
Along with the work of these revisionist television historians, there is 
another body of research which informs my research: New Hollywood literature. 
Developed out of the film studies tradition, New Hollywood literature frames the 
shifting structure and products of the media industries over the last three decades 
in fruitful ways in terms of my own project.  A short survey of how New 
Hollywood literature has contributed to media industry studies is instructive for a 
number of reasons: First, this survey allows me to explore the dominant ways 
Hollywood’s practices have been discussed in recent years. Second, it facilitates 
the analysis of changing industrial strategies within a historical context, and – 
along with the work of the revisionist historians discussed above – makes possible 
the exploration of the relationships between changing industry strategies and 
shifting technological, regulatory, political and socio-cultural conditions. Third, 
New Hollywood literature effectively foregrounds the relationship between 
industry contexts and media texts, between structure and style. Fourth, a survey of 
the central ideas in New Hollywood scholarship points to the shortcomings in this 
body of literature, and thus enables me to articulate some of the main 
contributions which this dissertation can make to media studies.  
New Hollywood scholarship has been a fertile area of research in the last 
fifteen years. While there are significant distinctions amongst New Hollywood 
scholars – especially in terms of the extent to which they accord attention to 
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media texts – there are also a number of common assumptions. New Hollywood 
writers including Tino Balio, Douglas Gomery, Thomas Schatz and Justin Wyatt 
argue that Hollywood product has undergone a dramatic transformation in the 
past thirty years.30 They see the Hollywood from the ‘20s to the ‘50s as a 
“unified” system, in which motion pictures studios were vertically integrated. 
During this time, a limited number of motion picture studios dominated the 
production, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures. For the most part, the 
audience generally was conceptualized as a “mass” by these major studios; 
movies were targeted to a national audience.  
These scholars see a combination of technological, socio-cultural, 
economic and regulatory forces leading to a transformation of the industry in the 
‘50s and ‘60s. Among the most significant factors were: the emergence of 
television as a competitive force; the 1948 Paramount decrees requiring the 
studios to divest themselves of their exhibition branches and cease their unfair 
distribution practices; a decline in movie theater attendance due to suburban 
migration and a renewed focus on the family (baby boom); and a domestic 
economic surge. Cumulatively these developments contributed to a number of 
shifts in the ways the studios did business from the 1950s through the 1970s. 
These adjustments include a reorientation by the studios as financing-and-
distribution entities; a gradual move toward participating in the television industry 
                                                 
30 Balio, “‘A Major Presence in All of the World's Important Markets’: The Globalization of 
Hollywood in the 1990s," Contemporary Hollywood Cinema, eds. Steve Neale and Murray Smith 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 58-73; Gomery, “Hollywood Corporate Business Practice and 
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as producers of telefilms; a focus on fewer but bigger and more expensive films 
keyed to an expanding world market; and, conversely, the increased drive toward 
targeting specific markets (especially youth) rather than the “masses” in total. As 
the industry continued to fragment during the ‘50s, a number of entities arose to 
fill the gaps, most prominently agent-packagers and independent production 
companies. 
New Hollywood is generally defined as beginning in full with the release 
of Jaws in 1975 – a development which came about at the same time as the 
launching of HBO via satellite, the emergence of the VCR into the marketplace 
and the premiere of “superstation” WTBS.31 It was during the mid-‘70s that the 
motion picture studios shifted their primary focus from releasing “star-genre” 
films targeted to general audiences to releasing “high-concept” films – movies 
described by Steven Spielberg as capable of being summed up in twenty-five 
words or less (e.g. Superman, Raiders of the Lost Ark). High-concept films were 
seen as fitting with the changing structures of media conglomerates.32 Whereas 
during the studio era of the 1920s through the ‘40s the studios functioned as 
vertically integrated enterprises with their activities centered around motion 
pictures, during the mid-to-late-‘60s, the studios underwent a transformation, 
becoming parts of larger conglomerates. As divisions within larger companies, 
these studios became increasingly driven to horizontally integrate, building 
relationships between their distribution operations and the other distribution 
                                                 
31 See Schatz, “The New Hollywood,” Film Theory Goes to the Movies. 
32 See Wyatt, for a detailed discussion of the aesthetic characteristics of high-concept films, as 
well as their vital role to the bottom line of media conglomerates. In High Concept: Movies and 
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divisions within their conglomerate parents. From the ‘60s through the ‘80s, the 
studios were transformed into divisions of an increasingly diversified, globalized 
“entertainment industry.” In this new role, film represented only one component 
of the vast conglomerates which held them.33 
Crucially, although the studios shifted their focus, they did not diminish 
their control over creating media content. On the contrary; as new technologies 
and new industries emerged, the studios accommodated them and attempted to 
develop “synergies” with various other divisions of their parent companies.  New 
Hollywood scholars traditionally have seen the high-concept “event” films as the 
drivers of their conglomerate parents, serving as the primary means by which the 
conglomerates exploited their various other entertainment-oriented divisions such 
as music, publishing, cable program services and theme parks. 
 As noted earlier, New Hollywood literature has a number of strengths, 
many of which fit well with the purposes of my project. The emphasis on “filmed 
entertainment” – and more specifically, movies and television programming, is a 
primary utility to the approach. Although media conglomerates over the last thirty 
years have differed in terms of their corporate structures and the composition of 
their divisions, entertainment product (as opposed to news, sports, and 
information services) generally has been a primary focus across the range of 
companies. This is the case because entertainment product has been found to have 
a longevity which other types of media products often lack. Also, as media 
conglomerates shift to structuring their activities around “software” (e.g., films, 
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York: The New York Press, 1997), 73-106. 
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television programs, etc.) as opposed to distribution channels, entertainment 
product becomes a primary means by which synergies between divisions can be 
developed.  
Despite these strengths, there are also a couple of important shortcomings 
in New Hollywood scholarship. These shortcomings in the scholarship are mainly 
a consequence of the New Hollywood literature falling behind industrial changes. 
Nonetheless, these limitations point to distinctions between my work and the 
previous work from a New Hollywood perspective. One deficiency of New 
Hollywood literature has been its overemphasis on the importance of high-
concept films and relative neglect of lower-budgeted “niche” films produced by 
such companies as Miramax, Fox Searchlight and Sony Pictures Classics. These 
are films such as Friday, Lost in Translation, Scary Movie and Y Tu Mamá 
También which are targeted to specific demographic groups such as Latinos, 
African-Americans, teenagers and gays/lesbians. 
Yet niche films are not the only media products passed over too quickly 
within the New Hollywood literature. Niche television programming also is 
accorded relatively little attention in this body of work. This leads to a larger 
limitation of New Hollywood criticism – namely, the continued assumption that 
motion pictures (and particularly high-concept motion pictures) serve as the 
primary economic, aesthetic and cultural drivers for media conglomerates. While 
motion picture studios historically have been the main focus of media 
conglomerates (many of them began with a motion picture and only recently 
expanded to television, after all), one of the principal arguments of this 
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dissertation is that we need to reconsider what are the primary sources of profit 
and power for contemporary media conglomerates. I will show that, with the rise 
of the Fox network from the mid-‘80s onward, media conglomerates have 
refocused themselves, increasingly investing more time, labor and money into 
television programming – and more specifically, niche-targeted television 
programming. Shows targeted at specific demographic groups – particularly 
children, teenagers, and African-Americans– have become of higher priority on 
the network program development slate.  
A central question then becomes how did media conglomerates reorient 
themselves toward niche television programming? By examining the move by 
these entities into purchasing and creating networks – a move begun with the 
entry of Fox – we begin to see the ways in which network television production 
and distribution became a priority for media companies, as well as how these 
niche-oriented “franchises” served the larger strategies of the parent companies.34  
In seeking to modify the terms by which this body of literature 
traditionally has been discussed, I also believe we must rethink how scholars have 
organized various events into specific periods or phases. Media industry history 
itself is a relatively new field, with most of the literature – including the work of 
Hilmes, Wyatt, Schatz, and Anderson – emerging from the 1980s onward. Robert 
                                                 
34 Schatz’s work is set apart through his discussion of “the franchise” as the ultimate New 
Hollywood product. While most New Hollywood analysts argue that New Hollywood is about 
much more than its films, Schatz takes this a step further by revealing exactly how and why films 
remain so central to the interests of the conglomerate parents. In other words, he makes clear – on 
the big-budget level in particular – how “the ideal movie today is not only a box-office smash but 
a two-hour promotion for a multi-media product line, designed with the structure of both the 
parent company and the diversified media marketplace in mind” (73-74). I want to extend this 
analysis of the franchise into my discussion of television product. For more on the importance of 
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C. Allen and Douglas Gomery were among the first to define this developing field 
within the context of the film studies tradition. 35 In Film History: Theory and 
Practice, Allen and Gomery explore the four traditional ways film history had 
been done up to that point: aesthetic, technological, economic and social. Their 
book concludes by arguing that the most effective film histories integrate more 
than one analytical framework.  
Allen and Gomery’s work was an important contribution not only because 
of its strong case for using a multi-dimensional approach in conducting historical 
research, but also because of its discussion of how to evaluate and interpret 
change over time. They encourage historians to focus on the interaction of 
“generative” (causal) mechanisms, evaluating the ways that various technological, 
social, regulatory, cultural, and aesthetic factors affected various events.36 These 
factors carry different degrees of influence over time; much of the historian’s 
work involves weighing the relative impact of the various forces at play.  
In the process of making these determinations, the historian makes 
decisions as to how to deal with the passage of time. One goal of my project is re-
thinking how the New Hollywood has been periodized. Periodization is a tricky 
task for the historian. They have to determine how large or short a period to deal 
with, and define how and why they elected to focus on that time frame. As Allen 
and Gomery note, the basis for choosing a particular time span can be arbitrary; 
for example, it can be based on decades or centuries.37 A study can be 
                                                 
35 Film History: Theory and Practice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). 
36 Ibid, 16. 
37 Ibid, 48. 
 28
strengthened by not simply analyzing one specific time period at random (e.g., 
1970-1979). 
Schatz provides one model for how to periodize New Hollywood. He 
identifies three phases (1946-1955, 1956-1965 and 1965-1975) leading up to the 
formation of the New Hollywood in 1975. He sees one phase ending and another 
beginning as the result of the intersection of several key developments including 
shifts in technology, changing studio production and distribution patterns, and 
particular “landmark” films.38 In other words, Schatz determined that the 
interaction of these several different forces caused a transformation in the content 
and structure of the media industries. New Hollywood “officially” began in 1975 
because 1) new technologies and new “delivery systems” took off at this time (the 
videocassette, HBO, WTBS); and 2) this was when Jaws was released, thereby 
heralding the arrival of new production and distribution methods. Jaws was also 
important, he argues, because it was a defining “supertext” – a film which 
continued to be reinvented both textually and industrially as it was reformulated 
across the different divisions of a vertically and horizontally integrated 
conglomerate.  
I wish to adapt this method of periodization for my own study. As with 
Schatz, I use the intersection of several key developments as the means by which 
to organize my study. However, the developments I wish to emphasize are not the 
same. While I agree with Schatz that the New Hollywood started in 1975 as the 
result of changes in technology, shifts in production and distribution patterns and 
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the release of specific landmark films, I see these developments being central to 
the definition of a first phase of New Hollywood. This first phase concluded and a 
second phase began in 1985. In this second phase, television – especially network 
television – grew increasingly important to the New Hollywood.  
This second phase got underway in 1985 with the implementation of a 
series of de-regulatory acts along with changes in the ownership and management 
of several motion picture studios and television networks.  What is worth noting 
at this point is that during this year there was a new policy enacted raising the 
number of radio and television stations a broadcaster could own from seven to 
twelve. This regulatory change played a large part in increasing the value of 
television stations and making broadcasters into attractive takeover targets. Before 
the rule had even become official, a series of major station sales occurred. 
Ultimately, during the course of 1985, all three networks changed owners. Over 
the next several years, they would proceed to come to terms with these new 
owners as well as with the increased competition they faced from video, cable, 
independent television stations and Fox. At the same time all three networks 
changed hands, News Corp. purchased the Twentieth Century Fox motion picture 
studio and a group of independent television stations. The independent stations 
served as the foundation for the formation of the Fox network. Meanwhile, the 
Fox production studio gradually developed into one of the new Fox network’s 
main suppliers.  
These events cumulatively set the next phase of New Hollywood in 
motion. This phase of New Hollywood was defined by the increased importance 
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of demographically-targeted television programming to media conglomerates. It 
was also marked by the studios’ heightened efforts to enter into the television 
distribution business. Fox was the primary entity motivating these changes in 
industry structure and television content. The company did so through the 
unprecedented relationships it established with the FCC, cable operators and 
programmers, independent television stations, the creative community, advertisers 
and other News Corp. divisions. Through these relationships, Fox transformed 
how motion picture studios and television networks interacted. Fox showed how 
to overcome the long-present studio-network divide, creating a model for the 
vertically integrated television company-cum-global media conglomerate of the 
‘90s in the process.  
The second phase of New Hollywood concluded and a third phase began 
in 1995 with the arrival of further deregulatory acts as well as additional changes 
in ownership and management at the motion picture studios and television 
networks. There were several different deregulatory developments at this time, 
including the repeal of the fin-syn rules and the elimination of the prime time 
access rules (PTAR) which prohibited the networks from broadcasting more than 
three hours per night of prime time programming. The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 had been approved by both the House and Senate by mid-1995 as well. 
One part of this act addressed broadcast ownership limits. This time around, 
television broadcasters were to be allowed to own stations reaching up to 35% of 
the country.  
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With these regulatory changes in sight, the aforementioned mergers and 
acquisitions took place. In forming these new combinations, many companies 
followed Fox’s lead. For example, CBS’s production and distribution holdings 
were substantially strengthened by linking up with Westinghouse. ABC became 
the first of the three networks to officially be joined with a motion picture studio. 
These events were significant because they occurred so quickly and with such 
frequency after a lengthy period during which Fox had the field all to itself. The 
1985-1995 period is so distinctive because of the extent to which Fox defined the 
terms of the television business and set precedents for how the industry would 
operate in the future. While other conglomerates forged ahead with their motion 
picture activities – as well as with their theme park, cable, merchandising and 
publishing efforts – Fox had a disproportionate influence on the television 
business. During the third phase of New Hollywood which began in 1995, the 
other studios and networks rushed to become the vertically and horizontally 
integrated global television powerhouse that Fox had already been for quite some 
time.  
In viewing the New Hollywood as consisting of a series of phases, we are 
able to shift the focus of this literature away from a film-centric perspective. We 
can see how, during the 1985-1995 period, network television was becoming – 
but had not yet become – central to the operations of media conglomerates. The 
process began with changes in regulation, and was quickly followed by changes 
in ownership at the networks and at Fox. These factors motivated the events 
which followed. However, these factors were structuring forces, not all-
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encompassing agents which defined the contours of the neo-network era. In other 
words, they did not dictate the precise form which television distribution, 
marketing and production took. As such, it is important to begin with a discussion 
of the regulatory and industrial context, but not to end there. To understand more 
precisely how the neo-network era took the form it did, it is essential to study the 
development of Fox and evaluate how it evolved in relation to the other networks 
and studios.  Prior to doing this however, I outline the key moments which 
defined the relations between the studios and the networks from high-network era 
of 1950s through the early 1980s.  
 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF NETWORK-STUDIO RELATIONS 
In analyzing and applying the work of revisionist historians such as 
Hilmes, Anderson, Boddy and Balio to my research project, several key 
developments stand out. As Balio describes, even before television sets were in 
any households, the film studios ventured into broadcasting in a variety of ways 
such as subscription television and theater television.39 Legal and regulatory 
roadblocks, as well as opposition from theatrical exhibitors, limited the ability of 
the motion picture studios to take on as substantial a role in the development of 
television as they would have liked.40  The studios faced yet another hurdle in 
their attempts to make inroads into television distribution in the form of the major 
radio networks, CBS and NBC, which rallied support from a variety of 
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stakeholders in order to shape television along the lines of the broadcasting model 
already in place.41  
Though the major film studios were unable to move into distribution in 
television’s early years, they nonetheless began producing programming for the 
new medium by the mid-‘50s. The big studios delayed their entry not so much 
because of a resistance to the medium per se but rather because they wanted to 
wait until it became cost-effective to create programming.42 By the late ‘50s, the 
major studios as well as several major independent producers were supplying 
telefilm programming to the networks in prime time, using television as a 
promotional tool through shows such as Disneyland, Warner Bros. Presents, and 
Twentieth Century-Fox Theatre, and selling pre-1948 feature films 
(predominantly) to independent stations and syndicators.43 MCA accelerated the 
integration of the film and television businesses when it formed Revue 
Productions in 1952, a production (and later distribution) entity focused primarily 
on developing star vehicles for such clients as Alfred Hitchcock and Ronald 
Reagan.44 The proceeds from Revue helped provide MCA with the means to 
purchase the Paramount library in 1958 and then the Universal City lot one year 
later.  
By the early ‘60s, the network-studio relationship entered into a mature 
state that changed relatively little for the next several years.45  The networks 
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functioned as financiers of television programming, dominating the industry by 
virtue of their status as distributors. The studios, meanwhile, produced much of 
the programming the networks aired (or co-produced the programming along with 
independent production companies such as Arena Productions, Daystar and 
Shamley Productions).46 Throughout the 1960s and into the early ‘70s, the 
networks remained in a position of dominance relative to the studios. During this 
period, they were the only major avenue for television distribution, aside from a 
handful of independent television stations and a public television station in major 
media markets. The networks used their leverage to demand a financial interest in 
the programming they chose to air.47 
In spite of the financial and programming conditions the networks placed 
upon the studios, the studios did not complain at this time. The studios’ 
involvement in telefilm during the late ‘60s, in fact, turned out to be the saving 
grace for many companies. At a time when the film industry was faced with a 
diminishing theatrical audience, runaway productions and challenges from 
independent distributors, TV promised a relatively steady income. According to 
Balio, telefilm production regularly provided more than 30% of the revenue for 
the motion picture studios throughout the ‘60s.48  On top of this income, by the 
late ‘60s, the studios also began to generate large sums from the sale of their 
                                                                                                                                     
several decades, Mark Alvey maintains that the situation was more complex. Alvey argues that the 
‘60s was not quite the “vast wasteland” that many scholars have argued, and what’s more, the 
major players in television production shifted quite frequently during the decade with a number of 
independent production companies exercising more influence than has been generally held. See 
Alvey, “The Independents: Rethinking the Television Studio System,” Television: The Critical 
View, ed. Horace Newcomb, Sixth ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34-51. 
46 Alvey, 39. 
47 Ibid, 37. 
48 Ibid. 
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motion picture blockbusters to the networks. In 1960, the studios resolved the 
contractual issues preventing them from selling post-1948 features to television; 
from that point on, the sale prices for big-name features continued to rise 
throughout the decade. By the late 1960s, the studios factored television airings 
for their features into their budgets, production decisions and income 
projections.49 The studios tried to supplement their feature film output through the 
production of made-for-TV movies and long-form series, areas that MCA-
Universal was once again the first to pursue.  
The emergence of television as an additional revenue stream for the 
studios’ features made them increasingly ripe for purchase by larger 
conglomerates.50  The studios were further vulnerable because of their struggles to 
compete in motion picture distribution. Indeed, following the purchase of 
Universal Pictures by MCA in 1962, a number of the studios were purchased later 
in the decade. Gulf + Western acquired Paramount in 1966, insurance and 
financial services company Transamerica Corporation purchased United Artists in 
1967, and funeral home-cum-car rental agency Kinney International bought 
Warner Bros. in 1969. This wave of purchases began a period of “loose 
conglomeration” for the entertainment industry – a period when the film studios 
were just one small part of a large, diverse corporate portfolio often filled with 
numerous non-media holdings.51 Once again, MCA-Universal remained unique in 
                                                 
49 William Lafferty, “Feature Films on Prime-Time Television,” Hollywood in the Age of 
Television, 248. 
50 Balio, “Introduction,” 40. 
51 For a more detailed discussion about the transition from “loose” to “tight” conglomeration, see 
Schatz, “The Return of the Studio System,” Conglomerates and the Media. 
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confining its investments almost solely to media properties. Other conglomerates 
did not replicate MCA-Universal’s “tight diversification” industrial organization 
strategy until the mid-‘80s.52 
In the early 1970s, these newly acquired studios briefly entered a crisis 
period – a crisis brought about partly due to the networks’ diminished investment 
in studio product.53 Yet just as the studios appeared to be at their greatest 
disadvantage in their relationship with the networks, a number of regulatory and 
technological developments set the stage for a dramatic shift in the studio-
network balance of power. The first turning point came when the FCC began an 
investigation into the networks’ business practices. By 1970, the networks’ 
control over the market was such that they were able to attain financial interest or 
syndication rights to 98% of their programming.54 In other words, program 
producers (e.g., the studios) had to give the networks a stake in the profits or 
distribution rights for reruns in other markets in order to ensure their 
programming reached the air.55  
To constrain the networks’ increasingly monopolistic power, the FCC 
established the financial interest and syndication rules. The rules, enacted in 1970 
and revised through a series of consent decrees between the networks and the 
Justice Department over the next decade, essentially prohibited the networks from 
having an ownership and subsequent syndication stake in the programming they 
                                                 
52 Schatz, Return, 88. 
53 Balio, “Introduction to Part II,” Hollywood in the Age of Television, 260. 
54 J. Fred MacDonald, One Nation Under Television: The Rise and Decline of Network TV (New 
York: Pantheon, 1990), 186. 
55 Jennifer Holt, “Vertical Vision: Deregulation, Industrial Economy and Prime-time Design,” 
Quality Popular Television: Cult TV, the Industry, and Fans, eds. Marc Jancovich and James 
Lyons (London: British Film Institute, 2003), 11-31. 
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aired. The ramifications of the so-called fin-syn rules were severe for the 
networks, prohibiting them from vertically integrating the production, sale and 
distribution of syndicated programming.56 The studios and independent producers 
– as well as independent television stations – benefited from the implementation 
of the fin-syn rules. The distinction between the studios and the networks 
remained intact from the ‘70s into the late ‘80s, at which point Fox initiated the 
process whereby the rules were challenged. In 1995, they were repealed 
altogether.57  
Even as the implementation of the fin-syn rules altered the balance of 
power between the studios and the networks, other developments further affected 
the status of the major entertainment industry players. The launching of HBO in 
1975 and Ted Turner’s WTBS as a cable “superstation” in 1976 jump-started the 
cable era and began the erosion of the network television audience.58 The network 
hegemony was further challenged with the introduction of the Betamax 
videocassette recorder to American consumers in 1976. Although neither cable 
nor video became substantial industry forces until the mid-‘80s, their introduction 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 By the time the fin-syn rules were repealed, their force had been eroded substantially, in large 
part due to Fox’s success at never operating as an official network as defined by the FCC. Thus 
Fox was able to operate as both a supplier and a distributor at a time when no other studios or 
networks could legally do so. As is discussed in more detail in chapter three, Fowler’s FCC 
intended to repeal fin-syn during the ‘80s but met with resistance at that time from the studios, 
which argued that the rules’ repeal would unfairly privilege the networks.  
58 Chapter two outlines the specific regulatory conditions which enabled cable channels such as 
HBO and WTBS to emerge.  
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into the marketplace promised new competition – as well as new legal headaches 
– for both the studios and the networks.59  
For the networks, cable and videocassettes – as well as the growing 
popularity of independent stations – posed a much more direct threat to their long-
standing authority. Already in a weakened financial position due to the fin-syn 
rules, the networks now faced the prospect of a 500-channel future that threatened 
to erode their viewer base – and with it, advertising revenues. The networks, in 
fact, found themselves in a position very similar to that of the studios after the 
Paramount decision in 1948. Already struggling due to multiple forces, they were 
under close scrutiny for their anti-competitive practices and, therefore, unable to 
effectively adjust to the changing marketplace. The studios, meanwhile, were in a 
more uncertain (albeit promising) position in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. As was 
the case with the emergence of television, the film companies wanted to be 
involved with these new technologies from the start. Yet once again, Hollywood 
was unable to set many of the terms of its involvement, at least in the early years 
of video and cable. The studios tried to take a proactive role with cable once they 
perceived it to be a viable market.60 As Hilmes observes, although legal and 
regulatory barriers prevented the studios from jointly acting as cable distributors 
in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, they nonetheless adapted quickly to the new 
                                                 
59 For a discussion of the networks’ and studios’ legal struggles to become involved in pay cable, 
see Hilmes, “Pay Television: Breaking the Broadcasting Bottleneck,” Hollywood in the Age of 
Television, 297-318 
60 In 1980, Columbia, Paramount, MCA, and Fox joined forces to form a pay-cable network called 
Premiere. Yet even before the channel’s launch, the Justice Department halted it on antitrust 
grounds. Similarly, in 1982 Paramount, MCA and Warner Bros. invested in Showtime and the 
Movie Channel, only to once again have the courts deem the enterprise to be anti-competitive; 
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technology in other ways, such as investment in cable distribution and cross-
ownership ventures with other media companies.61  
This brief overview of network-studio relations reinforces revisionist 
historians’ claims that the shape the film and television industries took was 
anything but natural and inevitable. Specific regulatory, legal and technological 
forces affected the ways the studios and the networks were involved and invested 
in television from the medium’s earliest days. This background is important 
because it provides a basis for understanding the changes in the structure, conduct 
and performance of the media industries during the 1980s and ‘90s. In addition, it 
offers a means by which I can frame my description of the development of Fox 
and demonstrate why this particular company played such a significant role in 
transforming the media environment. This context provides a starting point from 
which I can conduct my analysis of Fox’s influence on network-studio relations 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY: A CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
My study begins by explaining how and why the three-network system 
remained as it did for so long. Chapter two describes the technological, economic, 
and regulatory conditions which prevented the emergence of a fourth network for 
three decades. This description is followed by an analysis of the key regulatory 
                                                 
61 Hilmes describes the strategies employed by the studios throughout the ‘80s as including: 1) 
Cross-ownership ventures such as Tri-Star, in which Columbia, HBO and CBS jointly produced, 
distributed and exhibited films; 2) Package deals, in which film studios entered into contracts with 
one or another of the established pay-TV services; and  3) Investment in other aspects of cable 
distribution (e.g., Disney’s development of the Disney channel), “Pay Television,” 307.  
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developments which finally enabled the formation of Fox. Chapter three then 
discusses how and why all three networks changed ownership during 1985 and 
what the immediate consequences of these changes in ownership were. In 
addition, this chapter offers a brief history of both the Twentieth Century Fox 
studio and News Corp. After providing this background, I describe the process by 
which the two entities came together. The chapter also discusses the means by 
which the Fox network was assembled and explains why there were initially 
limited expectations for this new venture.  
In the conclusion of chapter three, I shift the focus away from regulatory 
and ownership issues and toward an investigation of Fox’s influence on the 
structure and content of the television industry. These issues remain the central 
focus throughout the remainder of the study. The four chapters which follow are 
broken down according to Fox’s changing status in relation to the networks, 
advertisers, independent television stations, program producers, regulators, 
syndicators, cable, and of course, the motion picture studios. The chapters take 
both a chronological as well as a thematic approach. Each chapter follows a 
particular time span, during the course of which I describe how Fox influenced 
television production, distribution and marketing practices in distinct ways. Every 
chapter begins and ends with a “landmark” programming development for Fox – a 
development which resonated far beyond Fox and affected the structure, practices 
and products of the industry as a whole. This development, in turn, carried the 
company into its next phase. By organizing my study in this fashion, I am able to 
emphasize the important role that programming practices and distribution 
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innovations had shaping the larger media environment. We can also see how such 
events influenced the regulatory shifts and changes in ownership which occurred 
during the mid-‘90s.   
The first discussion I provide of Fox programming comes at the 
conclusion of chapter three. Here I analyze how Fox’s earliest network offering, 
The Late Show with Joan Rivers, helped the company define its early 
relationships with advertisers, independent television stations and the press. I 
argue that, although the program was a failure in the ratings, it served important 
marketing and distribution functions for Fox. This analysis propels us into chapter 
four, which surveys the insecurity and uncertainty rampant throughout the media 
industries during the late 1980s. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
preparations being made for Fox’s prime time launch in April 1987. I explore 
Fox’s early ups and downs as it struggled to develop its early programming and 
define its image in relationship to the other networks. We then see how Fox was 
not the only company facing difficult times. While Fox was trying to establish 
itself as America’s fourth network, the long-term viability of the Big Three 
remained in doubt. Meanwhile, one by one the studios were falling into the hands 
of new (often foreign) owners. The increased interest in Hollywood from abroad 
spurred much discussion – and anxiety – about globalization and its possible 
consequences. The chapter concludes with Fox finally starting to regain its 
footing. The company’s improved fortunes came with the astounding ratings 
performance of Married…with Children and the premiere episode of The 
Simpsons in December 1989. 
 42
Chapter five focuses on Fox’s first boom period, a period brought about 
with the regular series premiere of The Simpsons in January 1990. I show how 
this one program served as the primary means by which Fox honed in on its target 
audience of 18-to-34-year-olds. In addition, The Simpsons helped Fox establish its 
early identity as the “alternative” or “guerrilla” program service. By exploiting the 
publicity attended upon The Simpsons, Fox was able to expand its schedule, 
increase its ratings, raise its advertising revenue, and increase its leverage with its 
affiliates. The economic boost Fox gained from The Simpsons is contrasted with 
the worsening financial crisis taking place throughout the film and television 
industries. While most entertainment companies – including News Corp. – were 
suffering, Fox continued to grow. Though the so-called “weblet” was increasingly 
being viewed as a legitimate competitor to the Big Three, the company persisted 
in using its image as an “underdog” to its advantage, particularly in the regulatory 
arena. I describe how, mainly due to Fox’s forceful campaigning, the FCC 
reconsidered repealing the fin-syn rules at this time. The chapter concludes with 
an evaluation of the implications of several milestones, including The Simpsons’ 
defeat of The Cosby Show in the ratings for the first time, the Fox television 
stations’ withdrawal from the independent station trade organization, and the 
resignation of Fox Filmed Entertainment president Barry Diller. 
Chapter six begins with Fox trying to regroup after Diller’s departure in 
March of 1992. I describe how, with Diller gone, Murdoch focused more attention 
on Fox. One of his primary desires was to expand Fox’s audience to 18-to-49-
year-olds. A series of setbacks and disappointments ensued as executives tried to 
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broaden the company’s demographic profile. Several programming efforts failed 
miserably during this time, including a news service and numerous prime time 
dramas. Warner Bros. and Paramount’s decision to develop “fifth” networks of 
their own provided Fox with more headaches. These studios were not the only 
ones with expansion efforts in the works. In fact, though Fox’s difficulties 
continued, the rest of the entertainment industry was on the rebound. I illustrate 
how, with a degree of economic and managerial stability returning to the media 
business once more, rumors of possible studio-network combinations begin to 
circulate. These rumors heightened as the economy improved and it became clear 
that new FCC chair Reed Hundt planned to continue the deregulatory thrust of his 
predecessors. In contrast, Fox remained in a time of crisis. The company’s 
situation was worsened by the short-lived but extremely expensive failure of The 
Chevy Chase Show in November 1993. 
Chapter seven starts with a description of the series of aggressive (and 
expensive) steps Murdoch took to make Fox an equal to the established networks. 
This time, however, the company takes a different path to become a “full-service” 
network. This path involved purchasing the rights to an NFL franchise which had 
been with CBS for 38 years. In addition, Fox “stole” several network affiliates 
from all of the networks. I analyze the wide-ranging implications of these deals on 
Fox’s relationship with the networks, affiliates, studios, regulators and 
advertisers. I also explore what the football franchise meant to Fox and its image 
– and contrast the value of this franchise with two popular Fox prime time 
entertainment franchises, The Simpsons and The X-Files. In evaluating the value 
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of each of these shows to Fox, I show how the company influenced network 
television’s program formats, marketing practices and distribution strategies. I 
also illustrate how Fox exploited its status as producer and distributor of 
entertainment programming during a time when no other company was able to do 
so. This discussion provides further means for understanding the string of mergers 
and acquisitions which occurred during 1995. These mergers, in turn, propelled 
the industry into its next phase of development – a phase marked by the marriage 
and expansion of the other networks and studios.  
As this overview indicates, in many ways Fox was in front of its network 
and studio competitors. Over the course of the next several chapters, I describe 
how Fox, and its parent, News Corp., repeatedly remained ahead of everyone else. 
Fox was ahead of the networks in terms of its schedule-wide pursuit of specific 
demographic groups. It was ahead of the studios by having a television production 
and distribution entity under one roof. It was ahead of regulators by undermining 
fin-syn, PTAR and ownership limits. On top of this, the program service re-
introduced animation to prime time and re-invented reality programming. Even 
this partial list of Fox’s accomplishments reinforces the value of my approach, an 
approach which emphasizes the interplay of economic, political, cultural, 
regulatory, and technological conditions on the evolution of both Fox and the 
media industries as a whole. My attempt to integrate these various forces into this 
historical narrative distinguishes my research from previous work which has been 
done on Fox. Prior to analyzing Fox’s impact on the larger media environment, 
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however, I must first describe the conditions which enabled it to form in the first 
place. 
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Chapter Two: Stumbling Toward a Fourth Network, 1955 – 1985 
A combination of regulatory, economic and technological factors created 
and sustained a three-network system for more than thirty years. These forces 
helped the entrenched broadcast networks become more powerful at the same 
time they prevented viable competitors from forming. As discussed in the last 
chapter, the studios remained confined primarily to providing television 
programming for the nearly all-powerful network distributors. Yet the studios 
were not the only ones beholden to the networks during this lengthy time frame. 
In fact, the “Big Three,” as they were often called in trade publications, had 
leverage over several other entities as well, including advertisers and their 
affiliates. 
This chapter begins with a survey of the structural conditions which led to 
the long-term dominance of the three-network system. A variety of factors, 
including a regulatory policy of localism, the high cost associated with creating a 
national network, and the limited diffusion of cable, sustained these conditions 
into the late 1970s. I describe how the few companies which dared to try 
launching a “fourth network” quickly became victim to insurmountable 
regulatory, technological and economic hurdles. An occasional judicial 
intervention or regulatory decision was not nearly enough to change these 
conditions. The networks thus continued to function according to essentially the 
same terms as they had for decades, remaining secure in their status as America’s 
mass medium through the 1970s. Between them, the three networks attracted 
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nearly 90% of the viewing audience.62 The remaining 10% of viewers turned to 
independent television stations and public television stations. 
After explaining why the three-network system remained in place for as 
long as it did, I describe how and why this structure began to change during the 
early 1980s. This transformation occurred due to the growing deregulatory 
orientation of the FCC, the gradual elimination of several technological barriers, 
and the increased authority of a number of players in the television business, 
including independent television stations, cable operators, syndicators, and 
advertisers. One of the main ways these different entities exploited their greater 
market power during the 1980s was in creating “ad hoc” networks. Independent 
television stations, syndicators, advertisers and, occasionally, cable operators 
united through such efforts to air original programming. I illustrate the many 
different forms these ventures took during late 1970s and early ‘80s and show 
why they marked an important transitional moment in terms of the status of 
network television. Through this description, we can see that the infrastructure 
required to develop a viable long-term fourth network venture was not yet 
present.  
With the appointment of Mark Fowler as chairman of the FCC in 1981, 
this infrastructure did emerge. I outline how the implementation of Fowler’s 
deregulatory philosophy led to a boom period for the broadcasting business. Over 
the course of this boom period came an exponential growth in the number of 
independent stations, an explosion in syndicated product and the rapid diffusion 
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of cable. However, one group remained unable to benefit from this deregulatory 
atmosphere to the extent they wished: the motion picture studios. I show how 
effective lobbying from broadcasters enabled them to keep fin-syn in place and 
remain in a dominant position relative to the studios for the time being.  
There are two main goals in this chapter: First, I identify the major 
stakeholders in the television business and their status through the mid-1980s. 
Each of these stakeholders - studios, regulators, advertisers, independent 
television stations, syndicators and cable – had a particular set of goals and 
desires. By the mid-‘80s, each had taken different steps toward challenging the 
networks’ hegemony with limited success. This leads to the second goal, which 
involves describing the ways these different entities united in their efforts to 
create a competitive fourth network.  This chapter provides a basis for 
understanding how and why the development of the Fox network – or any other 
fourth network – was not possible until the mid-1980s. In addition, this chapter 
will help me show the extent to which Fox’s initial success was based on its 
ability to serve the distinct interests of the different stakeholders which arose in 






A SERIES OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE FCC AND THE CREATION 
OF A THREE-NETWORK SYSTEM 
The use of different definitions [of a network] results from the fact that the 
Commission’s network rules do not embody a coherent, overall policy 
toward network behavior, but rather a disparate collection of separate 
provisions, each enacted to deal with a specific ‘abuse’ and written only 
with the goal of changing the behavior of those already identified as 
engaged in the practice to be corrected. 
   Stanley Besen, et al, Misregulating Television63 
As the passage above suggests, the FCC – the chief regulator of broadcast 
behavior – struggled for years over how to define a network effectively. 
“Network” has meant different things at different times depending on what entity 
(or entities) were being regulated and why. James Walker and Douglas Fergason 
provide one useful definition, describing a network as “an interconnected chain of 
broadcast stations that receive programming simultaneously.”64 The words 
“interconnected” and “simultaneously” are most pertinent to the discussion of 
why historically only three broadcast networks have existed. Through the mid-
1970s, the networks were “interconnected” through their use of AT&T telephone 
lines. For years, the high cost of interconnection functioned as a primary barrier 
preventing the creation of a new “fourth” network.  
The matter of “simultaneity” is also important in defining a network; this 
characteristic serves as the primary means of distinction between network and 
syndicated programming. Networks are able to procure substantially higher rates 
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eds., Misregulating Television: Network Dominance and the FCC, (Chicago: The University of 
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from advertisers by guaranteeing the transmission of their programming to a 
certain number of stations across the country during a fixed day and time. From 
1948 through 1985, the networks were restricted to owning no more than seven 
stations.65 These stations were called O&Os, short for owned-and-operated 
stations. The rest of their station base came from affiliates with whom they 
contracted based on their market size and reach. For network television’s first 
three decades, the audience assumed to be reached by the networks was a “mass” 
audience, since three networks represented approximately 90% of the viewing 
audience.  
Cumulatively, the expense of renting AT&T lines, paying compensation to 
affiliates and airing programming at a fixed time across the U.S. served as 
substantial barriers to entry to the network business. As Thomas and Litman note, 
the networks’ vertical integration and economies of scale – along with 
government policies – supported a network oligopoly which remained relatively 
unchanged for 30 years.66  The government justified its policies with a “scarcity” 
rationale; in other words, the broadcast spectrum was limited to a fixed number of 
frequencies, and therefore, it was the government’s responsibility to monitor 
broadcast licenses and ensure that the “public interest” was being served by a 
determinate number of stations.  
                                                 
65 The first restriction on broadcast ownership was imposed in 1940, when networks were limited 
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Though government policies and “the interplay of physics and economics” 
led to a three-network system, the FCC and the Justice Department nevertheless 
sought to contain the power of the networks.67  As discussed in chapter one, a 
primary means by which these government bodies restrained the networks was by 
reinforcing a division between network-distributors and motion picture studio-
producers. This became necessary because, by the mid-1960s, the networks had 
solidified their power to the point where they were able to demand a financial 
interest in most of the programming coming from their suppliers. As a result of 
this dominance, the Justice Department initiated an anti-trust suit against the 
networks which culminated in a series of consent decrees. According to the terms 
of these decrees (which were signed by CBS and NBC in 1978 and ABC in 1980), 
the networks were limited to two-and-a-half hours of primetime production a 
week.68  
The FCC placed its own set of restrictions on the networks in the early 
1970s. In 1972, the Commission passed the financial-interest-and-syndication 
rules (“fin-syn”) and the prime time access rules (“PTAR”). In designing these 
rules – which would do much to dictate the terms by which Fox developed during 
the late 1980s and early ‘90s – the FCC generated a new definition of what 
constituted a network. The commission defined it as an entity which provided 
fifteen or more hours per week of programming to at least 25 affiliates in ten or 
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more states.69  Whether this definition applied only to the existing three networks 
or was meant to include any and all ‘developing’ networks led to much debate 
between regulators, producers, the networks and independent television stations 
during the ‘80s and ‘90s.  
Long before the implementation of fin-syn and PTAR, a variety of 
businesses attempted to create ‘fourth networks.’ In fact, there were four networks 
during the earliest days of broadcasting. By 1948, ABC, CBS, NBC and DuMont 
were all competitors in the network business. However, the system as it was 
regulated at that time could accommodate no more than three networks. CBS and 
NBC were able to thrive early on due largely to the economic security they had 
gained via their radio networks. ABC and DuMont struggled to stay afloat for 
several years, with DuMont finally succumbing in 1955.  From 1955 through 
1975, very few businesses attempted to develop a fourth viable network. One such 
effort came from an Ohio Warehouse owner, Daniel Overmyer, who in 1966-67 
developed the United Network. This venture, which lasted less than a month, 
consisted of a two-hour program feed to 125 stations from Las Vegas.70 The high 
cost of AT&T line interconnection charges led to United Network’s demise. 
Exploring the numerous factors which prevented the successful formation 
of a fourth network from 1955 to 1985 is important, as it provides a means of 
underscoring the complex and dramatic shifts which occurred during the late ‘80s 
in terms of regulation, technology, and industry practice. The FCC commissioned 
                                                 
69 Occasional exemptions were permitted, as was the case with the Christian Broadcasting 
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a number of studies over the years in an effort to understand why the three 
network system had remained in place for so long. The most extensive of these 
studies was completed in 1980 by the FCC’s Network Inquiry Special Staff. A 
group of researchers led by Stanley M. Besen, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, A. 
Richard Metzger, Jr. and John R. Woodbury later published an analysis of this 
study.71 These authors drew from the research of the Network Inquiry Special 
Staff to conclude that fourth network attempts failed due to three key reasons: 
First, the aforementioned AT&T land lines proved cost-prohibitive. Companies 
seeking to create a network could pay either “part-time” or “full-time” 
interconnection rates. Though in theory this should have worked to the benefit of 
any newcomer, in practice it served the interests of the established networks. This 
was the case because it cost the exact same amount to interconnect for an hour 
(part-time) as it did to interconnect for the entire day (full-time).72 
 FCC restrictions on program services were a second reason a fourth 
network was unable to emerge. Specifically, the prohibitions against cable system 
signal importation, as well as the inability for broadcasters to develop subscription 
television, prevented alternative types of program services from developing. Thus, 
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FCC policies not only prevented the formation of additional “free” (advertiser-
supported) networks, but also limited other forms of television as well. Third, and 
perhaps most detrimental to the formation of a fourth network in the early days of 
television, were the FCC policies on spectrum management. In 1952, the FCC 
issued its Sixth Report and Order. This order was beneficial in ending the four-
year freeze on the development of new stations by providing a “master allotment 
plan” assigning frequencies for 2,053 existing or potential stations.73 However, 
although second and (sometimes) third channels now could emerge in larger 
communities, the allotment plan effectively prevented a fourth or fifth network.   
This was the case because of the FCC’s policy of “localism,” which attempted to 
ensure that each U.S. community (except the most remote locations) would be 
able to have at least one broadcast station. This policy in effect compelled the 
FCC to limit the number of stations available to larger cities. Even though smaller 
towns could have a transmitter, often no station would be established there 
because of the perception that it would not reach a large enough number of 
viewers. This problem was further compounded by the decision to allow both 
VHF and UHF bands in the same market. Because set manufacturers were not 
required to have UHF tuners at the time of the issuing of the order, channels 2-13 
became the only desirable channels to the networks for several years.74 These 
disadvantages contributed to what many media analysts have called a “two-and-a-
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half-network system.”75 In this system, CBS and NBC typically secured the two 
stronger VHF affiliates, while relative newcomer ABC was left with the UHF 
station. This inequality remained in place through the mid-1970s, at which point 
ABC was finally able to strengthen its affiliate line-up through the acquisition of 
additional stations and the increased diffusion of television sets with UHF 
receivers.76 
In addition to these three limitations outlined by Besen, Krattenmaker, 
Metzger and Woodbury, two additional factors served as obstacles to the 
emergence of a fourth network. The first involved the station ownership cap. If 
there were no ownership restrictions, companies might have tried to make a fourth 
network profitable by increasing the value of their O&Os in major markets rather 
than (or in addition to) seeking advertising revenue from their ability to provide 
national coverage. However, the FCC limit of seven O&Os per network was too 
low to make such ventures profitable. The second obstacle involved station sales. 
As a means of encouraging the operation of television stations in the “public 
interest,” the FCC codified a “three-year rule” in 1962. This rule required station 
owners to hold onto a station for a minimum of three years. In effect this limited 
the purchasing and selling of stations for large profits. This rule helped to 
encourage stability in the broadcast business; it also discouraged the financial 
community from viewing station ownership as a worthwhile investment. Since 
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stations couldn’t rapidly be bought and sold for a tidy sum, there was little 
incentive for investors to supply the necessary capital to develop a fourth 
network. Developing a new network was already cost-prohibitive; along with the 
aforementioned expenses associated with renting AT&T lines and compensating 
affiliates, other start-up costs included marketing and publicity expenses and 
overhead costs. The lack of short term returns proved to be yet one more 
disincentive for investors considering forming a fourth network. In addition, a 
new service had to pay for programming in the form of license fees. The 
networks’ audience size and distribution reach enabled provided them with the 
means of generating substantial advertising revenues. These revenues, in turn, 
could be directed toward expensive programming with high production values. 
Few new ventures could afford to pay to pay the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
demanded by the motion picture studios and top independent producers. 
Due to these economic, regulatory and technological constraints, the three 
networks remained the only networks for over thirty years. However, starting in 
the mid-‘70s, some tentative steps began to be taken by regulators and the courts 
toward encouraging alternatives to the three-network system. In 1972, the FCC 
issued the Cable Television Report and Order. Although several substantive 
restrictions remained, this order marked a step forward for the cable industry as it 
enabled local franchises to import distant signals via microwave relay.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the order indicated the emergence of a more favorable attitude 
by regulators toward cable. The courts further contributed to the growth of cable. 
A landmark decision occurred in 1974, when “superstations” were ruled to be 
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legal. On several other occasions during the late ‘70s, the courts found in favor of 
cable, providing that industry with an additional boost.77 Perhaps the most 
significant event of the ‘70s in terms of cable television took place in 1975, when 
HBO shifted from microwave relay to satellite and thereby immediately expanded 
its reach from the East Coast to the entire nation. As Strover notes, the national 
launch of HBO was important in two ways: First, HBO experienced substantial 
savings by avoiding AT&T’s lines and using a satellite feed.78 Second, the 
growing popularity of HBO demonstrated the existence of a demand for new 
program services.  
Even as several new pay cable channels and superstations were launched, 
a number of companies began to put out feelers to determine if the marketplace 
was ready for additional broadcast networks. With satellite now a viable 
alternative to AT&T’s lines – and with UHF receivable television sets at last 
widely diffused – two of the major barriers to fourth network entry suddenly 
diminished.  The greater availability of UHF television receivers facilitated the 
growth of several new television stations. These “independents,” which were 
unaffiliated with the networks, slowly rose in numbers during the 1970s. In 1972 
there were 73 such stations; by 1980 they totaled 120.79  
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As such, several “ad hoc” networks were announced and a few even aired 
programming for a limited time during the late ‘70s.  During 1977-78, advertising 
firm Ogilvy and Mather considered (and later dropped) plans to place Gothic 
horror tales and adaptations of Gothic novels during weekdays on a combination 
of independents and network affiliates.80 At the same time, two ad hoc networks 
were successfully launched: In 1976, a group of stations began “Operation Prime 
Time” (OPT). OPT aired a handful of mini-series each year with MCA supplying 
much of its product.81 In October 1978, the SFM Holiday Network began 
broadcasting family-oriented movies; by the mid-‘80s, this seasonal network 
covered 91% of U.S. television households and featured approximately eleven 
movies a year (all aired in conjunction with major holidays).82 Both of these 
endeavors continued operating into the mid-‘80s.  
One of the more ambitious plans was developed by Barry Diller during his 
tenure as president at Paramount Pictures in the late ‘70s. At this time, Paramount 
seriously considered launching a fourth network; the studio had already declared 
itself “ready to start prepping the first episodes of [a new version of] Star Trek 
and a two hour made-for-television movie.”83 The service was intended to operate 
for three hours a week year-round. However, by the fall of 1977, Paramount 
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announced the indefinite postponement of the enterprise; a representative 
described the primary reason for the “delay” as being a lack of national 
advertising support.84 By the time this new network was called off, Paramount 
had signed up independent VHF stations in all major markets.85 
Gaining the necessary advertising support was certainly one of the major 
hurdles faced by fourth network planners during the late ‘70s. However, the 
ambitious fourth network entrepreneur encountered additional stumbling blocks. 
There was still not sufficient regulatory support for a fourth network. In addition, 
the infrastructure to develop such a network, including a satisfactory number of 
independent stations, did not yet exist. However, at the beginning of the 1980s, a 
shift in the philosophies of both investors and regulators would lead to a dramatic 
transformation in the broadcast industry. The appointment of Mark Fowler to the 
FCC marked the starting point in a new era for that commission – as well as for 
the three-network system. 
 
MARK FOWLER’S FCC AND REAGAN-ERA DEREGULATION 
“I pledge myself to take deregulation to the limits of existing law.” 
   FCC Chair Mark Fowler, 198286 
“Let’s remember that turning a good healthy profit reflects the public 
interest.” 
   FCC Chair Mark Fowler, 198387 
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Although the FCC under Mark Fowler (1981-1987) is often credited with 
initiating the deregulation of communications, in fact the process was already well 
underway by the time he came into office in May 1981. The FCC under the 
guidance of its previous chairman, Charles Ferris (1977-1981), had already begun 
to reduce the regulations on the media industries, especially cable and radio.88 
Fowler’s FCC was distinctive not so much in its drive toward deregulation as in 
the zeal with which he espoused his philosophies to the press and public. To 
Fowler, deregulation was a mission. From his first days in office he made it his 
objective to remove as many regulations as possible. While his seven-year tenure 
at the FCC was remarkable for a number of reasons to be discussed shortly, the 
crowning achievement of his chairmanship was his ability to transform the 
rationale for the FCC’s practices and processes. Prior to Fowler’s arrival, the FCC 
had operated according to a “public interest” mandate. However vague and 
malleable that mandate may have been over the decades, it nonetheless was the 
dominant means by which the Commission justified its policies. Fowler, however, 
rejected the notion that the FCC should operate in the public interest altogether. 
He wholeheartedly espoused a “marketplace” philosophy toward regulation.89 In 
Fowler’s mind, the commission should be removed from this marketplace.90 He 
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believed the FCC should function as no more than what he termed an “electronic 
traffic cop” and the market – not the government – should determine the 
“winners” and “losers.”91  For Fowler, the only circumstances (besides purely 
technical matters) in which the government ought to become involved were in 
cases of ‘anticompetitive conduct.’ In these instances, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Justice Department – or private parties – would turn to antitrust 
laws.92  
Fowler made his objectives clear from his first days as chair. Within 
weeks of taking office, he announced his plans to overhaul the FCC. He 
proclaimed early on that “every rule and regulation will be open to question, with 
the aim to eliminate government as a nuisance.”93 He frequently emphasized his 
allegiance to the man who appointed him, President Ronald Reagan.94 He quickly 
laid out a set of “key goals” as well. Foremost was his desire to create an 
“unregulated” marketplace.95 Initially the Fowler-led FCC was surprisingly slow 
in implementing its policy of “unregulation” – even coming under fire by the 
Democratic-led House in November 1981 for its inaction.96 However, the 
Commission made up for lost time in the following year. Whereas the regulatory 
changes in 1981 consisted primarily of lessening paperwork requirements for 
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broadcasters (by simplifying licensing procedures, discontinuing the requirement 
for collection of programming data and so on), in 1982 the FCC began to 
eliminate a number of substantive regulations. The first major broadcasting-
related regulation to go was the three-year anti-trafficking rule. After being on the 
books for twenty years, the Commission repealed the rule. Broadcasters now 
could buy and sell stations as they pleased.  
The elimination of the three-year rule came at a time when the attitude of 
the financial community toward broadcast properties already was undergoing a 
transformation. Ferrell argues that around the late ‘70s, television stations 
increasingly came to be seen as “inevitably profitable, largely recession-proof 
businesses that [could] be resold at very substantial profits.”97 This attitude led 
leveraged buyers and corporate raiders to purchase older stations or create new 
ones (a process made simpler due to the increasing use of satellite feeds and cable 
as well as the proliferation of UHF-equipped television sets).98 Their investment 
was made still easier as a result of the FCC’s repeal of the financial showings 
requirement. Station trading – in both volume and dollar amounts – soared as a 
result of deregulation and the increased interest of Wall Street in television 
stations. Throughout the ‘80s, stations sold for higher and higher sums.99 
Although the FCC’s repeal of the three-year rule passed with relatively 
little protest from the various sectors of the communications industry and 
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Congress, the repeal of fin-syn would not prove to be as easy.100 By summer of 
1982, Fowler began to speak seriously about eliminating fin-syn.  By early 1983, 
the Commission had begun sifting through comments from a variety of parties 
regarding the rules.101  By this point, the different stakeholders had established 
their positions: The networks and their affiliates represented the strongest group 
in favor of repeal. Advertisers, television producers, independent television 
stations, public interest groups and the motion picture studios opposed the 
elimination of the rules. The networks were supported in their position by the 
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission. The Justice 
Department – which had only finalized its consent decree with ABC two years 
prior - declared its willingness to modify the decrees depending on the case made 
by the FCC.102 The primary condition issued by the Justice Department was that 
the networks be prohibited from “warehousing” product (meaning holding onto 
the rights to syndicated product, thereby preventing independent stations from 
having access to some of the most desirable network programming).103  Thus in 
the course of only a few years, the Justice Department had reversed its attitude 
toward the networks and their market power. Consequently, in January 1983, the 
office issued a statement declaring “the rules do not promote, and to some degree 
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may retard competition in production, and in no way reduce whatever market 
power the networks may have as buyers of programs.”104  
The networks provided evidence to suggest the rules had not accomplished 
what they had been designed to do – namely, increase competition in the 
marketplace. According to CBS, before the rules were adopted, there were 60 
suppliers of prime time entertainment (during the ’69-70 season). However, by 
the ’81-’82 season, there remained only 41 suppliers. According to the network, 
market consolidation had taken place in spite of the implementation of the 
rules.105 NBC concurred, noting that the rise in independent television stations, 
which some parties claimed had occurred due to the implementation of the rules, 
was actually due to a general economic upswing, improved advertising conditions 
and the additional broadcasting possibilities enabled by the growth of cable, 
satellite and UHF stations.106  
The opposition had its own set of counterarguments. Independent 
television stations argued that the supply of syndicated programming increased as 
a result of the rules. These stations held that they subsequently had a greater 
number of programming options and were able to increase their audience shares 
as a result. Advertisers concurred, contending that the additional channels (which 
offered a wide array of syndicated fare) provided them with alternative sites to 
promote their products. Public interest groups feared the removal of the rules 
would lead the networks to once again wield too much authority in the 
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marketplace. Independent producers – who in 1982 produced approximately 29 ½ 
hours per week of network programming – claimed they would suffer substantial 
losses if the networks were once again allowed to have a significant financial 
stake in programming.107 
The most vocal and well organized protests came from the motion picture 
studios via their lobbying organization, the Motion Picture Association of 
America. As the producers of nearly half of the syndicated fare on television – a 
market which, at the time, generated more than $800 million annually – the six 
major studios had reason for concern.108 They recognized that, should the rules be 
repealed, they would be hit the hardest.109 Statistics certainly bore out such 
beliefs: Prior to the implementation of the rules in 1972, the networks had a 
financial interest in 93% of television programming; in 1982, this number had 
decreased to 13%.110  
Determining precisely what the rules had accomplished was not an easy 
task. A number of developments, including the emergence of new technologies 
and larger economic shifts, had occurred in tandem with the implementation of 
the rules. However, at a minimum, it was clear the rules had forced the networks 
to dissociate themselves from the syndication business. Further, it was certain that 
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the networks’ departure from the syndication business had opened the door for the 
studios, enabling them to generate a large sum of profits from this business. In the 
years between the enactment of the rules and the debate about their elimination, 
the studios had come to increasingly depend on this syndication income – 
especially since they were faced with ever-rising costs to produce and distribute 
motion pictures. At the time that the repeal of the rules began to be discussed, the 
studios had already been thwarted in several attempts to move into other media 
businesses. For example, in 1980, the courts issued a last-minute injunction 
against Columbia, Paramount, MCA and Fox right before they launched a new 
pay-cable channel, Premiere. The venture was halted due to its perceived antitrust 
implications. Two years later, the Department of Justice prohibited Paramount, 
MCA and Warner Bros. from investing in Showtime and The Movie Channel for 
similar reasons.111  
The studios’ inability to expand into additional markets made them even 
more committed to retaining their dominance in existing businesses. Under the 
leadership of MPAA chairman Jack Valenti initiated a crusade against the repeal 
of fin-syn. Through the spring and summer of 1983, the FCC debated the utility of 
the rules. Meanwhile, in August ’83, the FCC announced a proposal to remove all 
financial restraints placed upon the networks. In addition, the networks were to be 
permitted to syndicate any programming they did not air and to be given the right 
to syndicate all of their programming overseas.112 The Justice Department 
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supported the proposal and stated its intent to release the networks from the 
consent decrees if the policy changes were adopted. 113 Following the 
announcement, industry trade papers debated its implications. “The Chairman 
Wins a Big One,” wrote Broadcasting following the announcement.114 Variety 
was more skeptical, declaring: “Nets Lose FCC Compromise.”115  This 
publication argued that the networks ultimately had lost the battle over fin-syn if 
they remained unable to syndicate primetime programming in the U.S.  The 
studios, however, felt otherwise. In their view, a victory – or even a compromise – 
was unacceptable.  
Even as the trade papers assumed the rule change was a done deal – 
predicting “betting line: the webs by a nose” – the studios continued to campaign 
with the press, Congress and the President.116  In October 1983, a month before a 
final decision on the rules was to be issued, a firestorm erupted when reports 
surfaced that President Reagan had been “briefed” by Fowler.117 Although both 
parties denied any impropriety, shortly after the meeting, Fowler informed 
Congress of his plan to put any action on fin-syn “on hold” until May ’84.118 In 
the interim, he hoped the networks and Hollywood would try to negotiate a 
settlement.119 
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The Reagan meeting proved to be a turning point in Fowler’s 
chairmanship. In observing the impact of the meeting, Broadcasting wrote that 
the President had in effect cut “off the knees of his own chairman.”120 This claim 
was true on two counts. First, the Chairman’s efforts to repeal fin-syn – and 
thereby achieve one of his most substantial deregulatory acts – were derailed. 
Fowler did not bring up fin-syn in May ’84. In fact, he never again returned to the 
issue. In December 1984, he admitted defeat on the matter once and for all, 
announcing he simply “did not have the stomach” to deal with it again.121 At that 
time, he spoke of another lesson he had learned during the course of the battle 
over fin-syn: “Resentment against them [the networks] runs much deeper than 
imagined, and can be exploited easily by Hollywood…”122 
The second consequence of Fowler’s failure to repeal fin-syn was more 
far-reaching. Upon admitting defeat, his fervor for deregulation came ever-more 
under examination from both Congress and the media industry. With the repeal of 
the three-year rule, for example, the station business took off. Buyers willingly 
paid exorbitant prices for ownership of broadcast properties. As stations were 
bought and sold more and more quickly, some broadcasters began to express 
some concern that deregulation had gone too far. As Ferrell observes, by the mid-
‘80s, it became clear that “regulated broadcasting was a kind of oligopolists’ 
heaven.”123 Once broadcasters began to see that marketplace forces worked 
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against them as often (if not more often) than they worked for them, they added 
their names to the growing number of entities calling for the FCC to slow its 
deregulatory actions. As the ‘80s proceeded, and broadcasters (including the 
networks) grew victim to takeovers, their enthusiasm for deregulation, with the 
exception of the repeal of fin-syn, would continue to wane. 
While broadcasters began to express doubts about the effectiveness of 
deregulation, both the House and Senate increasingly questioned the scope of the 
FCC’s authority. Fowler’s brazen speechifying and failure to consult with 
representatives prior to issuing new regulations caused him to alienate himself 
and the Commission from many representatives. For example, in early 1985, 
following Fowler’s announcement of his desire to repeal the Fairness Doctrine, 
members of Congress opined that the FCC lacked the authority to take such an 
action.124 By early ’85, Congress was regularly composing bills designed to 
increase its oversight of the Commission. However, before Congress began to 
clamp down on the FCC, Fowler accomplished several other significant 
deregulatory feats. The broadcast regulations altered included the removal of 
regional ownership restrictions, an increase in attribution levels allowing media 
companies to own up to 5% of a corporation before being considered an owner, 
and the removal of commercial time regulations.125 As Broadcasting observed in 
February 1985, “all in all, the Fowler FCC has addressed more than 250 mass 
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media items and reviewed, changed or deleted 89% of the agency's some 900 
mass media rules. In the process, the commission estimates that it has reduced the 
broadcast industry's paperwork burden from 33.5 million hours to about six 
million.”126 By late 1985, Fowler publicly acknowledged the extent of his 
influence at the FCC, declaring “the things that I really wanted to accomplish as 
chairman, I feel that I by and large have."127  
The final major achievement of the FCC during Fowler’s tenure involved 
an increase in the multiple ownership limits from seven to twelve. The debate 
over adjusting the station ownership limits in many ways paralleled the debate 
over the repeal of fin-syn. Once again, it played out as a battle between the 
studios and the networks, with each side disparaging the motivations of the other 
to the FCC, the Congress and the press. Both sets of regulations were fought over, 
negotiated and resolved along the same time span, with the primary difference 
being that the FCC succeeded in altering the ownership rules. The Commission’s 
ability to accomplish this reveals much about the shifting power relationships and 
rhetorical plays made by the networks and the studios.  
The FCC officially raised the ownership limits from 7-7-7 (AM-FM-TV 
stations) to 12-12-12 in late July 1984.128 As originally designed by the FCC, all 
ownership limits would be removed after 1990. The rationale behind the decision 
was that it would contribute to the formation of new group station owners which, 
in turn, might enable the formation of additional ad hoc networks – and perhaps 
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even a fourth network.129  The increased ownership cap promised to help the 
networks by enabling them to have a larger number of O&Os, which were among 
the most lucrative sources of profit for broadcasters. However, the networks also 
perceived that the new limits could provide them with additional competition in 
the form of new networks.  
Many of the parties displeased by the prospect of the repeal of fin-syn 
were satisfied with the increased ownership cap: Independent stations recognized 
the potential for increased market power; advertisers saw the opportunity for 
another avenue to sell their goods. The studios, however, were highly dissatisfied. 
On yet another occasion they declared war on the FCC’s decision. Again they 
represented the move in the press as an anticompetitive act contrived by the 
power-hungry networks.  Once more Jack Valenti appeared front and center for 
the studios and administered powerful rhetorical blows. Even as Fowler declared 
he would no longer “straitjacket” broadcasters, Valenti turned to Congress and 
asked who was in control – the elected officials or the outspoken 
commissioner.130 The MPAA president dismissed any claims that the policy 
would serve anyone’s interests but the networks’. At the prospect of a fourth 
network being created as a consequence of the raised caps, he declared, “the 
chessboard is already filled…there are no more VHF licenses in the top 100 
markets…they’re gone forever.”131  
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Thus the studios’ public relation abilities and lobbying skills enabled them 
to transform a policy designed to increase competition to the networks into a 
policy engineered by the scheming networks. Largely as a result of the studios’ 
protests, the 12-12-12 rule was reworked to become a hybrid ownership 
cap/percentage cap policy (with various breaks provided for UHF stations and 
minority groups).132 The final formulation of the act – passed in late December 
1984 and effective April 2, 1985 – allowed for ownership of up to 12 stations or 
25% national coverage (whichever came first).133  The sunset provision was 
jettisoned entirely.  
Though most of Valenti’s fears did not come to fruition, one did come true 
– though not in the way he anticipated it would. Upon the announcement of the 
new ownership caps, the MPAA President blasted the policy change, arguing, 
“what is about to happen at the FCC is in a way a back door repudiation of the 
financial interest and syndication rules.”134 From Valenti’s perspective, the raised 
limits provided the networks with greater bargaining power against the studios.  
With larger station groups, the networks had more strength to negotiate terms or 
reject deals. It seemed likely that economies of scale worked in the networks’ 
favor, enabling station groups to produce and distribute more of their own 
programming.  
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In fact, the raised limits did provide a means of undermining the financial 
interest and syndication rules by enabling the emergence of stronger station 
groups. However, the station groups strengthened more immediately were the 
independents. The independent Metromedia stations were one such station group 
which expanded due to the regulatory change.  In 1985, this group of stations 
became the Fox O&Os and functioned as a primary source of revenue for the new 
network. Fox, in turn, used its status as a fourth network and additional source of 
competition to the “Big Three” to receive waivers from fin-syn. As will be 
discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, Fox’s exemption from fin-syn did 
open the door for the networks to argue for the repeal of the rules.  
From the perspective of Valenti and the studios in the mid-‘80s, the repeal 
of fin-syn would cause them extreme economic hardship. In point of fact, they 
may very well have suffered if the rules were repealed at that time. However, 
because Fox – as both a nascent network and an established studio – effectively 
circumvented the rules, the company was able to adjust the balance of power 
between the networks and the studios and facilitate a marriage between television 
distributors and producers. Once Fox defined the terms of this relationship, other 
studio-networks were able to emerge as well. Thus, the raised ownership limits 
marked an important step in the ultimate repeal of fin-syn and the development of 
horizontally integrated conglomerates which held both studios and networks. The 
path toward their repeal would be a long one and one entered primarily via the 
“back door,” resulting mainly from actions taken by the Fox network. However, 
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before such transformations occurred, a number of changes in the broadcast 
industry had to take place.  
 
NEW HIGHS FOR THE BROADCAST BUSINESS 
The real threat to network affiliates may not be the pay media, but the 
independent stations that have been able to counterprogram the nets and 
grab a bigger and bigger share of the advertising dollars… 
   Broadcasting, 1984135 
Ad hoc networks are proliferating, first-run programing is increasing by 
leaps and bounds each year; networks openly admit that independents post 
a greater threat to network audience erosion than pay cable; a ‘bias’ 
against independents by ad agencies has mostly disappeared, and a 
majority of independent operators predict their growth will outpace the 
overall television industry average… 
   Broadcasting, 1986136 
Perhaps one of the most substantial oversights in contemporary media 
industry studies has been the failure to recognize the economic, cultural and 
industrial importance of independent stations. Although cable garnered much of 
the press, independent stations attracted more eyeballs – and money – during the 
‘80s. Further, in terms of programming, independent television topped cable in 
presenting both the most desirable syndicated fare as well as original 
programming with the highest production values.137 No sector of broadcasting 
experienced more growth during the late 1970s and early ‘80s than the 
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independent television station business. The rise of UHF receivers, the increased 
reliance on satellite transmission and the expansion of cable provided the 
technological means for these stations to develop. Increased television 
expenditures by advertisers, combined with their growing desire to combat the 
networks’ rising prices, fueled the rapid rise in the number of independent 
stations.138 The investment community’s identification of independent stations as 
a potential growth sector supplied an additional financial impetus.  
The number of independent television stations increased substantially in a 
relatively short period of time. Whereas in 1970 there were 82 independent 
stations, by 1983 the number had risen to 197.139 By 1984, independent stations 
increased again to 214 and covered 82% of the country.140  Within a few years, 
independent stations had gone from being perceived by advertisers and producers 
as low-end, last resort dumping grounds to being identified as a prime site for 
programming.141 The shift in attitude began during the early ‘80s, and was 
stimulated in large part by the results of the Burke Study. This study, presented in 
1981 to the independents’ trade group, the Association of Independent Television 
Stations (INTV), reported that “any belief that independent television stations 
provide a less valuable commercial environment compared to affiliate station 
news and prime-time programming is an unsupported bias.”142 
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By this time, advertisers were turning to independent televisions in 
growing numbers. With the networks’ ad rates rising much more quickly than the 
rate of inflation, advertisers viewed independents as a viable alternative to 
promote their products.143 By 1984, 24% of the $9.3 billion annually spent on 
advertisements went to independent stations.144 From 1980 to 1985, independent 
stations garnered an additional 8% of the total television advertising market 
(rising from 20% in 1980 to 28% in 1985).145 By the mid-80s, independents 
cumulatively attracted approximately the same number of viewers as each 
network. What’s more, the viewers on independent television stations were 
starting to be considered as more valuable than many network viewers. At the 
same time the independent television business was expanding, the advertising 
industry was also undergoing a transformation, shifting its emphasis from mass 
sales to targeted marketing.146 The most desirable target audiences were the young 
and the upscale – precisely the groups found to watch more independent 
television.147 
A cycle developed by the early ‘80s whereby, as independent stations 
became more valuable assets, they improved their program offerings to attract 
more desirable (and larger) audiences. The upgraded programming, in turn, drew 
                                                 
143 According to Broadcasting, by 1982, the cost of advertising sales rose 194% from 1972, while 
the Consumer Price Index rose 132%. See “Latest Foe of Repeal: ANA,” Broadcasting, 24 
January 1983, 36. 
144 “Land Fires,” 9 January 1985. 
145 Gabor and Hawkins cited in Thomas and Litman, 148. 
146 Joseph Turow discusses this at length in Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New 
Media World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). See p. 19 for the beginning of this 
discussion.  
147 “Bullish Outlook for Independents,” Broadcasting, 24 January 1983, 71-72. Also see “Blair 
Study Queries Advertising World,” Broadcasting, 5 August 1985, 55-56. 
 77
more advertising dollars, thereby increasing the value of the stations still more. 
The growth rate was stunning: Independent station billings circa 1976 amounted 
to $600 million; in1980, they broke the $1 billion mark for the first time.148 Three 
years later, they surpassed the $2 billion mark.149 In 1982, Metromedia stock (of 
which the Metromedia independent stations were one of the largest holdings) 
surged past $200 on the NYSE, becoming the highest priced stock on the 
exchange.150 In the same month, the FCC approved Metromedia’s purchase of 
ABC affiliate WCBV-TV in Boston for $220 million – in a deal Broadcasting 
described was the “richest single-station trade of all-time.”151   
 Programming demand followed a similar trajectory, with prices rapidly 
escalating during the first half of the ‘80s. Whereas independents increased their 
demand for programming 22% from 1975 to 1978, between 1978 and 1981 
demand grew 82%.152 Then, between 1981 and 1984, it rose another 74%.153  At 
that point, the 214 independent stations in operation accounted for 50% of the 
more than $1 billion U.S. stations spent on syndicated programs (versus the 40% 
of that total spent by network affiliates).154 Cable purchased the remaining 10% – 
a factor once again demonstrating the dramatically stronger market power of 
independent stations to cable programmers at that time. Cable penetration, in fact, 
remained relatively low throughout the early 1980s in spite of the attention 
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provided to it in the media. As of 1982, cable reached 23.7 million homes and 
29% of U.S. television sets.155 
The syndication divisions of the motion picture studios were among the 
prime beneficiaries of these increased programming expenditures by independent 
television stations. The surge in independent station numbers, combined with the 
expanding desire by these stations for higher-quality programming, enabled 
syndicators to charge premium prices for their programming.156 By 1984, a 
paucity of appealing off-network re-runs motivated program suppliers to develop 
more first-run syndicated product.157 Among the first-run programs favored by 
independent stations were animated children’s programs (He-Man and the 
Masters of the Universe) and game shows (The New Tic-Tac Dough). In addition, 
independent stations acquired more initial broadcast rights to theatrical films as 
the networks began to focus on scheduling made-for-television movies.158 Rights 
to local sports games also became increasingly important to independents.159 
The ascendance of independent television stations, along with the rapid 
diffusion of VCRs and the rising number of cable subscribers, began to affect the 
networks during the late ‘70s.  Network shares declined for the first time in 1978 
from 89% to 76%.160 Approximately half of those “disappearing” viewers turned 
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to independent stations.161 At the same time, the networks’ experienced an 
additional strain as suppliers continued to demand higher license fees.162  
In recent years, narratives have abounded about how the networks “lost 
their way” during the mid-‘80s (the most well-known being Auletta’s Three Blind 
Mice, which chronicles the networks’ sale to larger entities). It is indeed the case 
that the networks were challenged with new competition and were out-lobbied by 
the studios on Capitol Hill.  However, their fortunes were not nearly as grim as 
they have often been portrayed in the journalistic and academic discourses of the 
last decade. In fact, prior to the wave of network mergers and acquisitions in 
1985-86, the outlook for the network business seemed relatively rosy. It was only 
after the Big Three changed hands that the networks came upon difficult times (as 
chapter three discusses in more detail). Thus, though the networks experienced a 
decline in viewership, they continued to attain record advertising sales.163 Profits 
were also up: whereas the networks reported a cumulative profit of $50 million in 
1970, in 1980 they earned more than $325 million.164 In 1984, the combination of 
the Olympics and the Presidential election led Broadcasting to report another 
“robust year for business.” 165 Largely as a result of these events, the networks 
projected a 20% increase in income during the year.166 
In sum, during the first half of the ‘80s, broadcasting remained a good – 
albeit rapidly changing – business to be in. Money flowed freely for both the 
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networks and independent stations. Broadcasters generally continued to see 
deregulation as a positive development; up to this point, whatever instability had 
been generated as a result of policy changes worked to their benefit. With 
networking retaining its promise – and with independent stations becoming more 
ambitious in terms of size and scheduling strategies – a variety of different 
entities started to think about more seriously about creating new networks. By the 
beginning of 1985, the convergence of several economic, regulatory and 
technological conditions compelled a variety of different companies to take 
preliminary steps toward developing ad hoc networks. 
 
FALSE STOPS AND STARTS: MOMENTUM BUILDS FOR A FOURTH NETWORK 
Fueled by advertisers’ fears of skyrocketing network rates in '84, 
conversations are said to be under way at every major film studio, just 
about every major group broadcaster with a history of investing in original 
programing and at least one advertising agency toward establishing a 
regularly scheduled prime time alternative to the three major networks. 
Attempts to create a fourth network are anything but new, but participants 
and outside observers alike are predicting that the time is coming, 
probably in 1984, when the economics will finally be right… 
   Broadcasting, 1983167 
Advertisers, stations groups and motion picture studios – as well as a few 
media moguls –all made moves toward developing a fourth network between 
1982 and 1984. Some of the ventures under consideration were more “ad hoc” 
than others. Several entities explicitly tried to distance themselves from the 
“fourth network” label and the connotations which came with it. Each company 
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had different motivations for considering the launch of a new network. 
Advertisers saw a network of their own creation as a means for them to combat 
rising network advertising rates. Group owners saw a new network as a way to 
add value to their stations. With the ownership cap now at twelve, stations had a 
good chance of at least breaking even by producing and distributing shows to 
their own O&Os; any additional income generated by syndicating programming 
to other markets would be an added bonus. Motion picture studios, of course, had 
long wanted to vertically integrate by distributing their product to television. 
Nearly every major studio made arrangements to create a network, although the 
size and scope of each plan varied.  
Among advertising firms, McCann Erickson’s efforts to create an ad hoc 
network gained the most press coverage.168 In terms of station groups, many of 
the largest owners of independent stations formulated fourth network plans. 
Metromedia announced its intention of using its stations – along with any willing 
network affiliates – to run movies which had not previously aired on the networks 
during Saturday and Sunday nights.169 Group owners Tribune, Taft, Gaylord and 
Chris-Craft similarly combined to air theatrical films.170 When Metromedia and 
Taft’s initial schemes failed to get underway, they joined forces in 1984 with 
Hearst, Gannett, and Storer Communications to create the “New Program Group.” 
This collective, designed to produce and distribute original first-run 
programming, was created in response to the diminishing supply (and escalating 
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costs) of off-network series.171 The first show produced by the New Program 
Group through this venture was Small Wonder (1985-1989), a sitcom about a 
family with a robot “daughter.” Shortly thereafter, Tribune shifted from its earlier 
arrangement with Taft, Gaylord and Chris-Craft to team up with syndicator 
Viacom in the creation of “TV Net.” This union’s relatively modest goal was to 
offer stations twelve previously unaired theatrical films for barter syndication.172 
Meanwhile, SFM Entertainment and media representative Seltel announced the 
“Television Premiere Network” to produce adaptations of Fredrick Forsyth 
stories. At the same time, Petry Television formed the “Media Sales Corporation” 
to create mini-series and holiday-themed documentaries.173  
For the movie studios, a “fourth network” served primarily as a means of 
securing an additional outlet for theatrical product which was no longer in 
demand by the networks. Paramount, still under Barry Diller’s supervision in the 
early ‘80s, had the most ambitious blueprint for a fourth network – although once 
again the plan failed to take off. The studio revived a variation of the idea which 
had been in development several years earlier.174 Once again, Paramount hoped to 
start with a three-hour block of prime-time in which it could schedule a 60-minute 
series and a motion picture. The aims of Warner Bros., MGM-UA, Orion and 
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MCA were less grandiose.175 MCA successfully embarked on its “Debut 
Network” with a screening of Dr. Detroit; MGM-UA got underway with Clash of 
the Titans.176 Embassy Communications (the television-oriented sister company 
to Columbia Pictures) had one of the most fruitful efforts with its “Embassy Night 
at the Movies.” During the 1983-84 season, Embassy scored a 13.2 cumulative 
rating with showings of such films as Escape from New York, The Howling and 
Take This Job and Shove It.177 
As the examples above indicate, the time had apparently come for a fourth 
network. A number of different entities had varying degrees of success with such 
endeavors. Yet none of these undertakings produced a viable enterprise. The 
company which ultimately accomplished what no others had been able to was 
News Corp., under the auspices of its Twentieth Century-Fox subsidiary. As the 
following chapter describes in detail, Fox had several economic, regulatory and 
industrial advantages working for it from the outset.  From being funded by a 
parent company with deep pockets to assembling a team of well-connected 
executives to effectively building support from a wide range of interest groups, 
Fox simultaneously nurtured its image as established insider and renegade 
outsider. In the process, the company led the way in redefining the relationship 
between network-distributors and studio-producers.  
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Chapter Three: Developing a New Network, March 1985 – 
January 1987 
It's not just that the ownership of television stations and groups is 
changing: it's that it's changing so fast. Never has the broadcasting 
industry seen such a flurry of major acquisitions, mergers and spin-offs as 
it has over the last few months. Or such prices.  
   Broadcasting, 1985178 
1985 was a year of unforeseen events. Few would have imagined a year in 
which two networks would be sold and a third undergo major financial 
restructuring to fend off a hostile takeover - indeed, even the idea that a 
network could change hands barely seemed plausible 12 months ago. It 
was truly a year during which the old order changeth, yielding place to 
new…   
   Broadcasting, 1985179 
 
In early 1985, the television industry was at a high point.  Independents 
were peaking in terms of income, station value and program quality. The 
syndication market was raking in money as a result of the rising demand from 
new independents and basic cable channels. Stronger station groups were 
emerging and forming consortia through which to finance and produce their own 
programming. Initial steps were being taken toward forming ad hoc or part-time 
networks. In spite of growing competition, the networks were still riding high as 
well. The advertising revenues for the Big Three continued to swell, more than 
compensating for the increased license fees charged by program producers.  
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However, the substantial changes which occurred during the early 1980s 
would be nothing compared to the events which would take place during the 
decade’s second half. In early 1985, the impact of deregulation – combined with 
the diffusion of video and cable - began to impinge on the well-being of both the 
established networks and independent stations.  The first hint of a new order for 
broadcasters came in March 1985 with the announcement of the “cash merger” of 
Cap Cities and ABC for $3.5 million.180 Before the year was over, both CBS and 
NBC changed owners as well. These new owners brought with them different 
ways of doing business. Indeed, in the wake of these transactions, the networks 
entered a crisis period as divisions were eliminated, assets were sold, and 
employees were laid off.  Few in the industry or press anticipated the difficulties 
the networks would experience in the process of being restructured. 
Even fewer could have predicted that a fourth network was what Rupert 
Murdoch had in mind when he purchased the Twentieth Century Fox studio and 
the Metromedia independent television station group during this same eventful 
year. However, Murdoch and his chief lieutenant, Barry Diller had grand plans in 
mind from the outset: They wanted to create a fourth broadcast network. In 
developing this “weblet,” as it was labeled in the trades, Murdoch and Diller 
exploited several industry developments to the best of its advantage.  This 
included taking advantage of advertisers’ desire for an alternate venue for selling 
their products, offering independent broadcast outlets a chance to increase the 
value of their stations exponentially, and promising program producers greater 
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creative freedom than they could find at the established networks. All of these 
moves would be accomplished with the blessing of the FCC, which saw in the 
Fox network an opportunity for increased competition in the broadcast industry.  
In this chapter, I describe how the nascent Fox Broadcasting Company 
presented itself as an outsider and an underdog to certain groups such as the press 
and the FCC while, at the same time, representing itself as an established industry 
veteran to others entities such as the public, advertisers and the creative 
community. Indeed, Fox altered its identity to suit its particular need at a given 
time. These efforts served the company well; Fox effectively found a way to 
operate as both a program producer and broadcast distributor while the other 
networks and studios remained bound to the restraints imposed by the financial 
interest and syndication rules. In the process, the company quietly initiated a new 
era for the media industries. 
This chapter contrasts the wave of consolidation which occurred at the 
established networks, with the means by which Fox began to consolidate support 
from a variety of disparate factions such as advertisers, independent television 
stations, the creative community, the press, and regulators. I begin by providing a 
sense of the media industries of the mid-1980s in general, and the broadcast 
industry in particular. I provide this background as a means of contextualizing 
how and why the Fox network took the shape it did. This information is followed 
by a brief history of both Twentieth-Century Fox (TCF) and its new owner, News 
Corp. I describe the perceived value of the Fox network to both its studio parent 
(TCF) and corporate parent (News Corp.). After providing the “backstory” behind 
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TCF and News Corp., I explore the key strategies used in the creation of the Fox 
network. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the fall 1986 launch of Fox’s 
first program, The Late Show Starring Joan Rivers. In this analysis, I challenge 
previous claims that the show was a complete failure for Fox. Instead, I argue that 
although the series itself may have been a failure, it served several larger 
functions for Fox. Most significantly, it offered a relatively low cost means by 
which Fox could generate press, establish its brand name with the public, and 
assemble its affiliate roster.  
 
THE MEDIA INDUSTRIES IN A TIME OF CHANGE 
The frenzy of mergers and acquisitions among media companies, along 
with speculation of hostile takeovers of CBS and the proposed friendly 
takeover of ABC by Capital Cities Communications, has pushed the stock 
prices and trading activity of several Fifth Estate companies to record 
levels over the past several weeks. In the process, owners and investors of 
Fifth Estate companies have seen the industry undergo the kind of 
convulsions previously thought limited to oil concerns and multinational 
conglomerates.... The result, they say, is a fundamental - and perhaps 
permanent - change in the way these companies are viewed by the 
investment community…  
   Broadcasting, 1985181 
The media industries were in a transitional period in the mid-1980s. 
During this time, media conglomerates were concluding their decades-long 
process of divesting themselves of non-entertainment holdings. Companies such 
as Gulf + Western (parent to Paramount) and Kinney International (parent to 
Warner Bros.) were increasingly focusing on building up their media-oriented 
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assets.  Among the key divisions of these ever-more “integrated” conglomerates 
were publishing, music, television production, and motion picture distribution. 
The precise composition of these 1980s-era media conglomerates varied. 
However, conglomerates did remain noticeably absent from the network business 
as a result of the previously noted regulatory constraints (most conspicuously, fin-
syn).182  
Though regulators continued to oppose the integration of networks and 
motion picture studios, they grew more permissive about the entry of media 
companies into the cable business as the decade wore on. During the early ‘80s, 
the Justice Department intervened in the studios’ efforts to invest in cable via 
Premiere and Showtime/The Movie Channel. However, in late 1982, the Justice 
Department began to change its tune toward studio-cable alliances.  As Holt 
notes, the turning point came when CBS, Time (through its HBO subsidiary) and 
Coca-Cola (owner of Columbia Pictures) united to form a new motion picture 
distribution company, Tri-Star.183 In this joint venture, Columbia handled 
theatrical distribution, HBO attained pay-cable rights and CBS had broadcast 
network rights to motion pictures. In the same way the judiciary permitted 
conglomerates to move into cable production and distribution as the ‘80s wore on, 
it similarly allowed them to vertically integrate (once again) into owning 
exhibition outlets. Subsequently, MCA (Universal) invested in the Cineplex 
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Odeon chain while Coca-Cola bought into the Loews theaters during the mid-
‘80s.184  
At the same time that the corporate structures of conglomerates were 
changing, there was also a great deal of turnover taking place in these companies’ 
executive suites. A chain reaction began in 1984 when Paramount president Barry 
Diller left the company after a successful ten-year reign to become CEO of 
Fox.185 Shortly thereafter, Diller’s second and third-in-command, Michael Eisner 
and Jeffrey Katzenberg, departed for Disney. A game of musical chairs among the 
studios followed, with Disney, Paramount, and Fox experiencing the most 
extensive management shifts at this time.186 
The turmoil in the executive suites was paralleled by (and a function of) 
the growing uncertainty in the motion picture business. The stakes involved in 
producing and distributing motion pictures were rising rapidly as the studios 
increasingly relied on releasing high-concept “event” films.  Although movies 
such as Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981), Flashdance (1983), and Back to the 
Future (1985) brought in large sums at the box office, they also cost the studios 
more to finance and market. As quickly as one such mega-hit could make a 
company a darling in the trades, a failure could as easily destroy a company’s 
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bottom line for the year (if not longer, as the havoc wrought by Heaven’s Gate 
[1980] on United Artists made abundantly clear).187  
While the studios were experiencing more extreme ups and downs, the 
same was not the case for the cable industry. Rather, during the mid-‘80s, the 
cable business began a lengthy period of expansion. This growth was fueled by 
Congress’s passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act in October 1984.188  
This act deregulated cable rates and diminished the uncertainty of franchise 
renewals for cable operators.189 In the wake of its implementation, the cable 
industry underwent a period of consolidation and expansion. A combination of 
regulatory security and increased market penetration (up from 22% in 1980 to 
48% in 1986) led to the launch of a number of new program services as well as an 
increased investment by programmers in original fare.190 Much of the original 
cable programming of the mid-‘80s had relatively low production values (formats 
in favor included travelogues, talent shows, instructional programs and musical 
showcases).191 Yet such ventures at least indicated initial efforts on the part of the 
cable industry to offer more than recycled product from the studios and 
syndicators.  This is not to say that “recycled” (e.g., syndicated) product lost value 
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to cable programmers. In fact, as the cable industry’s market penetration and 
financial resources increased, it began to siphon off more syndicated fare from 
networks and independent stations.  By the mid-‘80s, cable channels were paying 
competitive prices for both hour-long dramas and theatrical motion pictures 
(though most sitcoms still remained out of their price range).192  
Cable may have been coming on strong, but through the early ‘80s 
program producers and syndicators still preferred to turn to broadcasters due to 
their still greater industrial influence and economic power.  However, in mid-
March, 1985 the status of broadcasting – and particularly, network television – 
suddenly changed dramatically. It was at this moment that Cap Cities announced 
its deal with ABC, initiating what Broadcasting later called “A Year Like No 
Other for the Fifth Estate.”193 When all was said and done, the transactional value 
of the mergers, sales and acquisitions for the year amounted to more than $30 
billion.194 
In the wake of the Cap Cities-ABC deal, a string of major mergers – and 
attempted mergers – followed in rapid succession. The consequences of the 
substantial regulatory and economic shifts of the past several years were finally 
starting to be seen. As one journalist noted, from the Cap Cities-ABC merger 
emerged “the possibility that media companies are no longer isolated from the 
fray of the rough-and-tumble world of Wall Street’s financial players.”195  The 
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truth behind this statement became even more apparent in mid-April 1985, when 
Ted Turner made a hostile bid for CBS. Whereas the Cap Cities-ABC 
arrangement was monumental in marking the first time a television network 
changed hands, Turner’s bid was important in signaling the first occasion in 
which an individual or company had attempted to purchase a television network 
which was not for sale. This event – more than any other at this time – called into 
question the continued viability of a “public interest” mandate for broadcasters. 
Many politicians who had previously remained silent as the FCC plowed forward 
with its marketplace philosophy were suddenly called to attention. In response, 
the “Network Acquisition Control Act” began to circulate in the Senate.196 
Ultimately neither the Act nor Turner’s pursuit of CBS succeeded.197 However, 
both efforts helped to crystallize what had not previously been clear: As one 
industry observer noted, the Turner bid demonstrated that broadcast stocks (and, 
in particular, the networks’ stocks) were “attractive takeover targets.”198 
Month after month during the mid-‘80s, newspapers announced (or 
reported rumors of) another such multi-billion-dollar takeover. In May 1985, TCF 
owners Murdoch and Davis successfully bid $1.5 billion for the Metromedia 
stations (to be discussed in more detail below). In September 1985, reports 
circulated of an RCA-MCA combination (which ultimately led nowhere).199 In 
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November 1985, Laurence Tisch became a major investor in CBS. The “Tiffany 
network” encouraged the self-described “friendly” investor, Tisch, to invest as a 
means of protecting itself from additional hostile bids such as Turner’s.200 Less 
than a year later, this so-called friendly arrangement would become less so; by the 
end of 1986, Tisch had engineered a takeover of the company and a shake-up at 
the top levels of management.201 
In November 1985, the FCC approved both the Cap Cities-ABC and the 
News Corp.-Metromedia deals. These deals – which were the first and second 
largest transfers of ownership in broadcast history – were eclipsed by an even 
bigger merger in December.202 The last major ownership change for 1985 
involved General Electric purchasing RCA (including its NBC subsidiary) for 
$6.28 billion.203 With this, “the largest transaction in U.S. history involving non-
oil companies,” all three networks had obtained new owners in the span of a 
single year.204 
Although the Big Three changed hands in 1985, it was not until 1986 that 
the ownership changes took effect. When they did, the changes were significant. 
Suddenly the rules by which the networks had operated for more than thirty years 
                                                 
200 For an extensive discussion of the machinations behind this deal as well as the other network 
mergers and acquisitions, see Auletta, Three Blind Mice. 
201 Whether CBS was “officially” taken over by Tisch or not would become a matter of some 
debate by regulators, Congress and the press during the late ‘80s. For a contemporary report of the 
management churn, see “CBS Shake-Up: Wyman Out, Tisch In, Paley Back,” Broadcasting, 15 
September 1985, 39-40. 
202They are discussed as such in “A $5.5 Billion Day at the FCC,” Variety, 20 November 1985, 
85. 
203 Kevin Goldman, “No Word Yet on NBC Spinoffs; GE & RCA Execs Mum on Regs that May 
Force Station Sales,” Variety, 18 December 1985, 41. 
204 Ibid. At the least (depending on the CBS arrangement is labeled), all three networks had new 
management and lead investors.  
 94
seemed to be out of fashion. The networks were now part of much larger 
conglomerates – conglomerates which placed an increased demand on the bottom 
line. These new owners were, for the most part, trained in other industries besides 
show business and had minimal experience (and interest) in programming 
practices.205 As Auletta describes in detail, with the new owners came a new 
corporate culture. These owners were more concerned with “trimming the fat” 
than they were with retaining large news crews, high production values or large 
layers of management. Over the course of 1986, these new conglomerate owners 
eliminated scores of positions and laid off countless staff members. In January, 
Cap Cities eliminated 1000 jobs; in July, CBS cut 700.206 In total, 2500 positions 
– or approximately 10% of the total work force – were eliminated by the end of 
1986.207   
Even as the networks faced pressures from within via their new owners, 
they encountered additional external pressures as well. Unexpectedly, the 
networks had retained a high level of profitability during the first half of the 
1980s in spite of increased competition from cable, video and independent 
television stations. This was largely a result of the networks’ continued ability to 
extract ever-greater sums from advertisers. However, during 1985, a general 
economic downturn began to affect the broadcast business in general and the 
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networks in particular.208 Advertisers started to cut back on their broadcast 
expenditures for the first time since 1971.209 Overall advertising dollars were 
down 3.5%; prime time dollars were down 2.2%.210 Meanwhile, license fees 
continued to rise. In 1985, for example, approximately two-thirds of the networks’ 
budgets were allocated for programming costs.211 It seemed as if the networks 
were being attacked from all sides.  
Thus, even as the Big Three were under greater scrutiny for their business 
practices from their new parent companies, they were facing diminishing returns 
as a result of worsening economic conditions. The networks’ struggles paralleled 
the difficulties encountered by broadcasters in general. As one journalist 
observed: 
1986 will best be remembered as the year television show business came 
down to earth, and as with its cable cousin two years earlier, blue sky 
prophets made way for pragmatists, realists and hard-nosed businessmen. 
All three networks were under new management, and layoffs touched 
nearly every corner of the industry - networks, stations, studios - 
dependent upon lean advertising revenues. 'Lean and mean' became the 
new buzzwords in broadcasting...212  
Different entities were affected by advertising cutbacks and a generally 
weakened economy in different ways: Station values began to rise a little more 
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slowly. Program producers haggled a little more with the networks over license 
fees. Increasingly producers were forced to deficit finance larger sums of their 
programs. With the syndication market already reaching saturation point, 
independents and affiliates alike became more selective in terms of the product 
they acquired. When they did purchase programming, they often spent less.  
Although independent stations were among the least affected by the economic 
downturn (in part due to their ability to serve as a key alternate venue for 
advertisers), they nonetheless were forced to engage in some belt tightening as 
well. Cumulatively, declining conditions caused all of these entities to heighten 
their search for ways to cut costs and increase the value of their products – 
whether the “product” at issue was television stations, programming or consumer 
goods. 
Given this cost conscious environment, it might seem odd that anyone 
would consider starting a new program service at this time. However, a group of 
executives led by Rupert Murdoch and Barry Diller identified ways in which 
several different groups were being underserved. They offered these different 
entities – entities which included advertisers, independent television stations and 
program producers – a way to save money, make money or some combination 
thereof.  The means by which these groups could accomplish this was by 
associating with the Fox network.  
This new network came about when News Corp. combined the Twentieth 
Century Fox studios with the Metromedia television stations.  As I will show in 
the section which follows, Fox was one of the least likely sources for a television 
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network during the mid-1980s. At the time News Corp. purchased Fox, many of 
the company’s most valuable assets had been sold off by owner-investor Marvin 
Davis. The studio’s prospects looked grim and there was little indication it would 
emerge out of these doldrums any time soon. As such, there was even less of a 
reason to believe that Fox would shortly provide an innovative template for the 
media company of the future. Before I delve into how the Fox network came 
about, however, it is important to provide an overview of the history of Twentieth 
Century Fox. In showing how this company ended up in such dire circumstances 
by the mid-‘80s, we can see why its evolution during the latter part of the decade 
was particularly remarkable.  
 
THE RISE AND FALL… AND RISE OF A MEDIA CONGLOMERATE: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF FOX 
In many ways, to review of the history of Twentieth Century-Fox is to 
review the history of the motion picture industry over the last century. For the 
most part, the key points in the development of Fox parallel the defining moments 
of the studio era and New Hollywood.213 Fox, like many of the other major 
studios, was founded by a working-class Eastern European emigrant. An early 
turning point came in 1925, when Fox became a public corporation, which it 
remained for more than five decades.  Fox operated as a mid-sized studio through 
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the late ‘20s, at which point it briefly gained an advantage by moving into sound 
ahead of many of its competitors.  Throughout the late 1920s, Fox continued to 
grow, increasing its investment in theaters to become second in size only to the 
Paramount-Publix chain.214 Fox’s rapid expansion, which initially seemed a wise 
move, ended up working to the company’s detriment due to the 1929 stock market 
crash and subsequent economic depression. The company’s financial woes led to 
a management shakeup and resulted in William Fox’s departure from the business 
in 1930. At this point, Fox went into receivership and, after a series of ups and 
downs, slowly recovered from its economic crisis.  
By the mid-‘30s, Fox was a “vast multinational operation” with 42 
subsidiaries and a hand in production, distribution and exhibition around the 
world.215 In addition, the company had investments in Broadway plays, music 
publishing and newsreels. In 1935, Fox president Sidney Kent sought to improve 
the quality of Fox’s films. Thus, he approached Joseph Schenck and Darryl 
Zanuck, the heads of the production company Twentieth Century Pictures, with a 
merger proposal. The combined enterprise became Twentieth Century-Fox.  
Through the rest of the ‘30s, Schenck served as chair and Kent served as president 
on the East Coast while Zanuck oversaw production on the West Coast. Stability 
reigned until 1941, when Schenck went to jail and Kent died of a heart attack. At 
this point, Fox Metropolitan Theaters head Spyros Skouras was promoted by the 
board of directors to run the company. For the next twenty years – in what proved 
to be one of the most stable studio-era management structures – Skouras and 
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Zanuck divided up control of Fox, with Skouras managing business affairs and 
Zanuck continuing to oversee the production process. As a result of Zanuck’s 
supervision, Fox cultivated a strong roster of talent. Among the individuals under 
contract with the company during the studio era were Shirley Temple, Sonja 
Henie, Betty Grable, Alice Faye and Tyrone Power. During the post-World War 
II period, Zanuck shifted the studio’s emphasis, focusing on making more films 
with strong social themes. Among Fox’s biggest hits during this time were 
Gentleman’s Agreement (1947), The Snake Pit (1948), and Pinky (1949).  
Fox’s status continued to improve during the 1940s. At its high point, the 
company employed over 4,000 people. However, Fox’s fortunes – along with the 
rest of the “Big Five” studios – declined in the late 1940s, as the company was 
forced to divest itself of its theaters as a result of the 1948 Paramount decrees. In 
1951, Fox spun off its theaters; in 1952 the company initiated its first round of 
layoffs. Additional layoffs ensued as the motion picture industry faced growing 
competition from post-war social, cultural and economic changes. Among the 
most threatening sources of competition, of course, was television. Like the other 
major studios, Fox responded to television’s growing popularity in a variety of 
ways. Early on, Fox tried to invest in television distribution, attempting to 
purchase the ABC network in 1948.216 The company also invested in theater 
television during the ‘40s in partnership with General Precision Corporation of 
America.217 Once it became apparent (due to antitrust concerns) that television 
distribution was not a viable option for major motion picture companies, Fox 
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focused on producing series programming. The studio got off to a bumpy start 
with such shows as The Twentieth Century-Fox Hour (1955-57), My Friend 
Flicka (1956-57), Adventures in Paradise (1959-62) and Five Fingers (1959-60). 
Only The Many Loves of Dobie Gillis (1959-63) was a modest success.218  
Meanwhile, Fox’s theatrical film division attempted to differentiate itself 
from television with the use of the widescreen “CinemaScope” process. Fox 
released the first CinemaScope film, The Robe, in 1953. In addition to the 
CinemaScope films, the studio derived some of its biggest hits during the ‘50s 
through its contract with Marilyn Monroe (her Fox-produced films included 
Monkey Business [1952], Niagara [1953] and The Seven-Year Itch [1955]). Yet 
the widescreen films and Monroe features were not enough to keep the company 
in the black. Thus followed a series of management changes during the mid-‘50s 
and early ‘60s, leading to Zanuck’s departure (and later, his return and 
replacement of Skouras). When Zanuck returned in 1962, he continued to increase 
the studio’s focus on big-budget spectacles. This tactic – a common one for the 
studios during the ‘60s – produced mixed results. Although The Sound of Music 
(1965) was a hit for Fox, Cleopatra (1963), Dr. Doolittle (1967), Star! (1968), 
and Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970) all bombed at the box office. Cumulatively, the 
failure of these films placed the studio in a precarious financial state.  
Television took up the slack as the film division became increasingly 
unreliable. By the mid-‘60s, Fox had hit series on all three networks and some of 
the shows were beginning to go into syndication. The studio averaged five 
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network hours per week at this time, thereby producing what amounted to 
approximately 100 features per year.219 One of the Fox properties which proved to 
be most valuable was M*A*S*H. Even as the feature film version (1970) helped 
initiate a turn-around for the motion picture division, the innovative television 
version (1972-1983) became the most profitable series until The Cosby Show 
(1984-1992).220   
Alas, the financial windfall from M*A*S*H came too late to be any help 
for Darryl Zanuck (and his son Richard, who had previously joined him in 
running the company). Due in large part to the failures of the theatrical film 
division, Fox entered a period of retrenchment during the late ‘60s. Stock prices 
sank lower and lower; in 1970 alone, losses totaled $77.4 million.221 Zanuck 
departed Fox at the end of 1970 amidst an increasingly public battle between 
stockholders and the board of directors.222 When the dust settled, Dennis Stanfill 
took the top spot at the company. In fall 1971, Stanfill appointed Gordon Stulberg 
to run the production side of the company. Stulberg continued the studio’s move 
away from big-budget productions. With a few notable exceptions (i.e., disaster 
films such as The Poseidon Adventure [1973] and The Towering Inferno [1974]), 
Stulberg proved to be highly risk-averse. He opted for co-productions and 
negative pick-ups whenever possible. For example, The Towering Inferno was a 
                                                 
219 Solomon, 158. 
220 The film version of M*A*S*H – produced at a fraction of the cost of the musical spectacles – 
earned more at the box office than Dr. Doolittle, Star! and Tora! Tora! Tora! combined, according 
to Solomon. The television version of M*A*S*H, in turn, earned several hundred million dollars in 
syndication by the mid-80s, according to Variety in “Viacom Taking Firstrun Route with The 
Cos,” 22 October 1986, 451.  
221 Solomon, 165. 
222 Ibid, 167-170. 
 102
co-production with Warner Bros., thereby limiting Fox’s ability to reap the full 
benefit of the film’s success. Thus, even as Fox films such as The Towering 
Inferno and Young Frankenstein were at the top of the box office charts in winter 
1975, Stanfill dismissed Stulberg.223 
In January 1976, Stanfill promoted Alan Ladd, Jr. to vice president of 
worldwide production. Ladd brought in Jay Kanter and Gareth Wigan from 
outside the studio to help with production activities. Although the Ladd team’s 
early film slate had mixed results, in 1977 they hit the jackpot with the release of 
Star Wars. They followed this film with a number of additional critical and box 
office successes including High Anxiety (1977), An Unmarried Woman (1978), 
All That Jazz (1979) and Norma Rae (1979). The Ladd trio’s winning streak 
motivated them to seek additional financial compensation.  When they were 
denied this, they left the company, causing instability in the executive suites 
which continued through Barry Diller’s arrival at Fox in 1984.  
Even as the feature film division re-entered a rocky period during the early 
‘80s, Stanfill faced additional problems. His primary concern pertained to the 
continued status of Fox as a public company.  Over the course of the ’70s, Stanfill 
had been the key figure guiding Fox into additional businesses and building up 
the company’s assets. Fox continued to diversify its holdings throughout the 
decade; its investments as of 1980 included a 63-acre lot in Los Angeles, a film 
processing lab, three television stations, movie theaters in Australia and New 
Zealand, a Coca-Cola bottling plant, and luxury resorts in Aspen and Pebble 
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Beach.224  At this point, executives realized that the company was worth 
approximately three to four times its stock price.225 As such, Stanfill and his 
COO, Alan Hirschfield, began to initiate a leveraged buyout by the management. 
However, by January 1981, it became clear that they would be unable to find the 
necessary financing. By the time reports of the failed buyout were public, Stanfill 
and Hirschfield were at odds and the studio was perceived to be “at play” by Wall 
Street.226 
The company was sold shortly thereafter to Marvin Davis, a billionaire 
who had made most of his money from the oil business and real estate 
investments.227 In March 1981, Davis announced his plan to purchase Fox and 
take it private for approximately $700 million.228 In arranging the financing, 
Davis relied on techniques commonly employed in the oil business – namely, 
looking extensively to outside investors for money.229 One of his primary sources 
of funding came from commodities trader Marc Rich, who agreed to put up half 
of the money for the company but leave voting control to Davis.230 Another 
source of money came from the broadcaster Chris-Craft, an entity which already 
owned approximately 20% of Fox.231 Chris-Craft made a deal whereby it would 
                                                 
224 Block, Outfoxed, 11. 
225 Ibid, 11-12. 
226 Ibid, 14. 
227 Block discusses Davis’s purchase and ownership of Fox at length; the information provided 
here is for primarily for context.  
228 Geri Fabrikant, “Oilman in $700-Mil 20th-Fox Buyout Bid: TV Spinoff Plan; Chris-Craft 
Ally,” Variety, 25 February 1981, 3, 36. Also see Tina Daniell, “Fox Board, Stanfill Welcome 
Davis Takeover Offer and TV Spinoff; Trade Asks about Hirschfield,” Variety, 4 March 1981, 3, 
31. 
229 Solomon, 193. 
230 Block, 19. 
231 “Maverick Oilman Bids to Buy Fox,” Broadcasting, 2 March 1981, 82. 
 104
surrender its investment in Fox under the condition that Davis would spin-off the 
television stations.232 When all was said and done, Davis assumed complete 
ownership (and about $1 billion in debt) while only investing about $50 million of 
his own money.233  Although a significant move in its own right, Davis’s ability to 
take Fox private was important for another reason: Specifically, Fox became the 
first major studio to be controlled by an individual since Kirk Kerkorian in the 
early 1970s.234  
In taking the company private, Davis assured Stanfill and the board of 
directors that he would take a “hands off” approach to the company.235 According 
to Aubrey Solomon, “Davis appeared to be exactly the rescuer Stanfill needed to 
keep Fox out of hostile hands which might loot the company and sell off its assets 
for a quick profit.”236 Upon the announcement of the deal, Stanfill publicly spoke 
of his confidence in Davis, stating that he was “going to pour a lot of money into 
[the] company, he’s determined to make it number one.”237 Stanfill wasn’t around 
long enough to see how wrong he was. Weeks after Davis officially assumed 
control of Fox in June 1981, Stanfill was forced out and Hirschfield moved up to 
the top spot. By December, Davis began to part with the very assets which Stanfill 
had struggled to build up over the last several years.238 Among the items sold off 
were the Coca-Cola franchise, the theaters, Fox’s record company and its music 
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publishing division.239  For the most part, the proceeds from these sales went to 
Davis and Rich. Although some money was used to repay bank debts, Davis and 
Rich systematically shifted most of their financial obligations onto the studio. As 
a consequence, according to Block, “by the end of 1984, the studio was deeply in 
debt, but Davis and Rich had made out very nicely. They had gotten all of their 
purchase money out of Fox, eliminated their personal debts, and pocketed 
millions in profits.”240 
The extent to which Davis was liquidating Fox’s assets was not 
immediately apparent to either the press or the industry. In part this was because 
the filmed entertainment division continued to perform well through 1983. Fox 
was producing considerable revenue from a variety of sources at this time. 
Although there had been another executive shake-up in mid-1983 (with Joe 
Wizan replacing Sherry Lansing as head of production), the studio thrived 
throughout the calendar year. Return of the Jedi, Porkys II: The Next Day, Mr. 
Mom and The Verdict helped Fox earn the title of “domestic market champ” for 
1983.241 At this time, the feature film division still contributed the bulk of the 
company’s total revenues (with 53%).242 However, the television division also 
was performing nicely. Having secured twelve pilot deals for 1983, Fox TV led 
all the studios in production.243 With M*A*S*H contributing large sums from its 
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syndicated run, the television division generated 23% of the company’s total 
revenues.244 Added income came from a recently-formed alliance between CBS 
and Fox. This home video arrangement brought in tens of millions of dollars more 
for the studio.245 
Unfortunately, Fox took a downturn in 1984, particularly in terms of its 
feature film division. Although the company had a handful of hits – including 
Romancing the Stone, Revenge of the Nerds and Bachelor Party – there were a 
disproportionate number of box office failures. While Unfaithfully Yours, 
Dreamscape and Six Pack were moderate disappointments, the Sylvester Stallone-
Dolly Parton comedy Rhinestone was an expensive embarrassment.246 By the 
summer of 1984, journalists began to place the studio and its executives under 
closer scrutiny. It was at this point Davis realized something had to be done to try 
to save the studio – or, at least, keep it treading water until he could unload it.247 
The first step toward reviving Fox (at least temporarily) involved replacing 
Hirschfield with a new executive. Fortunately for Davis, there was one such 
individual interested in changing jobs at just this moment: Paramount Pictures 
president Barry Diller. With the hiring of Diller, Davis was able to buy time by 
extending some of the company’s loan agreements.248  
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Diller had built quite a reputation for himself in Hollywood as a savvy 
businessman, a skillful programmer and a top-rate assembler of executive talent. 
After beginning his career at the William Morris agency, Diller spent several 
years at ABC. At that network, he helped establish the made-for-television movie 
and mini-series as important television formats.249 After remaining at ABC from 
1966 to 1974, Diller moved on to Paramount, where he oversaw its film and 
television activities for the next decade. Paramount thrived under his supervision. 
Even as the television division produced one hit after another (i.e., Laverne and 
Shirley, Taxi, Family Ties and Cheers), the feature film division financed 
numerous critical and commercial successes. Among the biggest hits released by 
the Diller “team” (which also included Michael Eisner and Jeffrey Katzenberg) 
were Saturday Night Fever (1977), Grease (1978), Star Trek (1979), Raiders of 
the Lost Ark (1981), 48 Hours (1982), and Terms of Endearment (1983). By 1984, 
as a consequence of the company’s numerous hits, Diller had become 
Hollywood’s highest paid executive.250 Yet all was not rosy at Paramount for 
Diller. He increasingly clashed with the newly-appointed head of Paramount’s 
parent company, Martin Davis. As such, Diller began to look elsewhere for 
employment.  
It was at this time that Marvin Davis (of no relation to Martin Davis) 
approached Diller with an attractive offer. In addition to a salary in excess of $2.5 
million, Diller was offered part ownership in the studio.251 He also negotiated a 
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clause in his contract which restricted Davis from having contact with Fox staff 
“in such a manner as shall derogate, limit or interfere with Diller.”252  Diller was 
prepared for a studio awash in red ink: Upon getting to Fox in September 1984, 
the trades reported the company had $89 million in net losses for the fiscal year 
just completed.253 Yet, when he arrived, it still seemed that a restructuring would 
put the studio back on track. Thus he immediately began using the relationships 
he had formed at Paramount to rebuild Fox’s executive and creative ranks. In 
October, Diller appointed formerly Paramount-based producer Lawrence Gordon 
(Paternity, 48 Hours) as head of production.254 Soon thereafter, he encouraged 
writer-director-producer James L. Brooks’ (Taxi, Terms of Endearment) to move 
his production company from Paramount to Fox.255 
Though Diller was able to rapidly re-build Fox’s executive roster, he had 
much more difficulty strengthening the company’s financial resources.  It was 
only a matter of weeks before what had initially seemed to be an ideal 
arrangement proved to be anything but.256  As Diller observed to Block, “the truth 
of the matter is that I found out…that the company was not only technically 
bankrupt, but that on the following February 11 the company literally would run 
out of its last resource, its last penny.”257 More stunning to Diller was that Davis 
seemed unwilling to do anything to help. Rather than putting some of the income 
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from the various asset sales into Fox, he continued to take money out.  While 
Diller was responsible for some of the company’s financial hardship – upon 
arrival at Fox, he wrote off many of the film and television projects in 
development for a total cost of $40 million – Davis was largely to blame for the 
company’s woes.258 Yet Diller’s continued pleas for financial assistance led 
nowhere. He could not even turn to “silent partner” Marc Rich, for Rich had fled 
the country under investigation for tax evasion, and Davis had subsequently 
assumed control over Rich’s share of the company for the bargain-basement price 
of $116 million.259   
With Davis repeatedly refusing requests for more cash, Diller employed a 
variety of other measures to try to save the company. He cut costs through 
employee layoffs and reduced budgets across the board. He informed the SEC in 
November 1984 that the company planned to raise much-needed operating money 
through either a debt or preferred stock offering.260 He brought in a bevy of new 
executives, including respected attorney Jonathan Dolgen, to handle the 
company’s finances.261 Amidst all of these efforts, the company’s problems – and 
the growing conflicts between Diller and Davis – became increasingly public. For 
example, in December 1984, Variety declared “Fox’ Earnings Plummeted in ’84 
but Davis Lined Other Pocket.”262 
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Frustrated and running out of options, Diller (and his lawyers) once again 
approached Davis in early 1985. Davis finally agreed to provide Diller with $50 
million – the amount generated as a dividend from the CBS/Fox venture.263 Davis 
also helped the company attain a $400 million line of credit.264  Diller, however, 
knew this would not be nearly enough. He thus prepared to sue Davis for breach 
of contract and fraud. In spite of the mounting conflicts between Diller and Davis, 
Diller was determined to save Fox – even if it meant he would be engaged in a 
lengthy legal battle. According to Block, Diller issued an ultimatum to Davis: 
“You either make an agreement to sell the company, or I sue you for fraud. 
Because I have no choice. I’m in this company hook, line, and sinker.”265  
Having already more than made his money back from Fox, Davis was 
prepared to sell off part – but not all – of the company. At this point, his bankers 
led him to someone willing to buy a half ownership in the company: News Corp. 
head Rupert Murdoch. In the next section, I explain how Murdoch came to see a 
Hollywood studio – and eventually, Fox – as the starting point from which he 
could build a global empire.  This section provides an overview of Murdoch’s 
previous efforts to build a media conglomerate centered on publishing.  I then 
describe how, during the late 1970s and early ‘80s, he gradually shifted his focus 
away from Britain and Australia and toward the United States. Though he entered 
the American market as a publishing baron, it didn’t take long for him to pursue 
the position of media mogul. Yet though he may have been interested in 
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Hollywood, Hollywood was not as interested in him – at least immediately. His 
advances toward Warner Bros. were spurned, but Fox proved much more 
receptive. After exploring the process by which Murdoch assumed complete 
ownership of the Fox, I describe the steps he took to rebuild it in the wake of what 
Variety called Marvin Davis’s “commercial and artistic rape of a venerable 
motion picture entity.”266 
 
ASSEMBLING AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EMPIRE: RUPERT MURDOCH AND 
NEWS CORP. 
The name Rupert Murdoch elicits a variety of reactions from journalists, 
media executives and scholars. His right-leaning politics, his reputation as a 
hands-on leader and his multi-billion dollar “impulse buys” have garnered him a 
great deal of press over the years. In addition, his ruthless business tactics as well 
as his dedication to keeping his business “in the family” have led him to be 
compared to real-life press baron William Randolph Hearst and reel-life character 
Charles Foster Kane.267 Murdoch is as often cited when discussing the continued 
validity of the “great man theory” as his company, News Corp., is used to 
demonstrate the “globalizing” tendencies of contemporary media organizations.268 
The pages which follow offer a somewhat different perspective. I suggest 
how both Rupert Murdoch and his company are far more complicated objects of 
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study than such labels and descriptions suggest. Murdoch has not existed in a 
bubble; rather, he has continually responded to larger economic, social, 
technological and cultural conditions. Further, while at times he has exerted an 
influence on Fox’s business practices, the company’s development and expansion 
were due to the efforts of a number of individuals and came in response to a 
variety of larger forces. Similarly, though News Corp. was often at the head of the 
pack in terms of its entry into new markets and new regions of the world, the 
company did not become a pioneering global force as early as it has been 
portrayed by many journalists and academics. In the next several chapters, I show 
how News Corp., through the mid-‘90s, confined most of its activities to the 
English-speaking world.269  By extension, I argue that in qualifying News Corp.’s 
“global” activities, we can also challenge the sometimes grandiose statements 
made by many media analysts about the globalizing tendencies of the 
entertainment industries during the ‘80s and ‘90s. 
In order to demonstrate these points, it is important first to provide a bit of 
background on Murdoch and his company. Born in Australia in March 1931, 
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Keith Rupert Murdoch was raised in a newspaper publishing family.270 Upon his 
father’s death, Murdoch inherited a handful of Australian newspapers. He 
returned from school in England to join News Limited as a publisher in 1953. 
During most of the ‘50s and ‘60s, Murdoch remained focused on building up the 
company’s publishing base in Australia. His first expansion beyond Australia 
occurred in 1963, when he invested in a Hong Kong magazine publisher and a 
New Zealand newspaper.271  
It was during the late ‘60s that Murdoch began to expand his publishing 
activities abroad. He focused his energies on England initially, buying into the 
News of the World and the Sun. His investment in these papers earned him a great 
deal of money as well as the reputation as a lowbrow, “down-market” publisher. 
Due to his active involvement with the News of the World he acquired the name 
the “Dirty Digger.” This title was given to him by Private Eye magazine 
following the News of the World’s aggressive coverage of British government 
official John Profumo’s affair with call girl Christine Keeler.272 
In 1973, Murdoch entered the American market for the first time with his 
purchase of the San Antonio Express and News. During this year he also moved 
his family from London, which had been their primary residence for several years, 
to New York City. From this point on, the United States would be his main home, 
although he would retain properties in the UK and Australia. He believed that in 
order to be a major media player, it was crucial to build up his U.S. 
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investments.273 He followed up on this belief by spending much of the ‘70s 
acquiring magazines and newspapers in the U.S. In 1974 he launched the National 
Star; in 1976 he purchased the New York Post, New York magazine and the 
Village Voice.  
In the wake of this series of New York-based purchases, he was featured 
on the covers of both Time and Newsweek.274 The Time cover of January 17, 1977 
depicted Murdoch as King Kong, towering over the New York City skyline. In 
large print, Time declared “Extra!!! Aussie Press Lord Terrifies Gotham.” As this 
cover indicates, Murdoch was already being widely represented as a menacing 
media baron who traded in the sensationalistic. His notoriety in the U.S. 
continued to increase during the 1970s and early ‘80s as he assumed control of a 
number of additional major-market U.S. papers, including the Boston Herald and 
the Chicago Sun-Times.  At the same time, he added to his U.K. holdings, 
purchasing the London Times and Sunday Times in 1981. During the ‘80s, he 
regularly used his British papers to build support for Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and her policies. Such tactics only added to his reputation as a right-
wing propagandist, especially in Britain.  
As was the case with many large conglomerates of the ‘60s and ‘70s, 
News Corp.’s holdings were not limited to publishing. Rather, the company held 
an interest in a variety of other industries, including aircraft, oil, bauxite, wool 
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and gambling.275  Regardless of the ways he grew the company, he always made 
sure to retain control over it. His financial advisers helped him establish a 
complicated (some might say labyrinthine) corporate structure designed to keep 
him and his family in power. Thus by the late ‘70s, through his family’s holding 
company, Cruden, he held approximately 40% of Australia’s News Limited, 
which owned 49.3% of Britain’s News International.276 These two companies, in 
turn, owned the News America publishing company. 
During the early ‘80s, Murdoch began to make his first investments in 
audio-visual media.277 In 1981, he collaborated with producer Robert Stigwood to 
produce the Australian historical drama, Gallipoli. At about the same moment, he 
thought seriously for the first time about buying a Hollywood studio. According 
to Block,  
Murdoch had come close to buying a share of Fox once before. During the 
period when Dennis Stanfill was looking for someone to help him do a 
leveraged buyout, some bankers had approached Murdoch about taking 
40% interest. Murdoch had been interested, but Stanfill had seemed 
hesitant to give up so much control. Murdoch had studied the situation in 
some detail and liked the prospect, but before he could act, Davis had 
arrived and made his preemptive bid.278 
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These first tentative gestures toward entering into the entertainment 
business were followed by a much more extensive investment in satellite 
distribution shortly thereafter. In 1982, Murdoch invested in Sky Channel, a start-
up satellite venture which aspired to broadcast programming across Europe.279 He 
followed this with an investment of $75 million in direct broadcast satellites 
(DBS) for the American market.280 This money was to be used to develop 
“Skyband,” a five-channel, low-power nationwide (U.S.) satellite service. In an 
attempt to build up his programming base for his satellite operations, he bid 
unsuccessfully for the pay cable channel Showtime in August 1983.281 This initial 
effort to build an American satellite business was short-lived.282 In November 
1983, he put DBS on hold, paying $12.7 million to get out of his contract for the 
lease of the satellite transponders.283 Among the reasons News Corp. cited for 
pulling out of the venture were “difficulty in procuring programming and home 
earth stations and the insufficient power of its broadcast satellite, SBS III.”284   
Following the failure of his DBS venture, Murdoch attempted to remedy 
one of the primary problems he faced – namely, his insufficient supply of 
programming – by investing in a Hollywood studio. This time, Warner Bros. was 
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his target. In early December 1983, he purchased 6.7% of the Warners stock, 
WCI.285 He stated the primary reason behind his investment as being his interest 
in the Warner Bros. film library and studio.286 Warners’ chair Steven Ross 
perceived this investment as the first step toward a hostile takeover and reacted 
accordingly. At the end of December, WCI announced plans to merge with the 
Chris-Craft station group in what was widely perceived to be an attempt to fight 
off Murdoch.287 (FCC regulations prohibited foreigners – which Murdoch was at 
the time – from owning U.S. television stations.)  Shortly thereafter, Murdoch 
declared his plan to increase his ownership stake in WCI to up to 49.9% (in fact, 
the highest level he got up to was 8.5%).288 In addition, Murdoch took WCI to 
court in an effort to halt its merger with Chris-Craft. One journalist described the 
WCI-News Corp. brouhaha as “the most dramatic takeover battle in the 
communications industry in some time.”289 
Ultimately, Murdoch gave up on his pursuit for Warners. In March 1984, 
WCI bought out his share. Though he emerged from the arrangement without 
ownership of a studio, he did earn $40 million in profit – a 31% gain on his 
investment.290 Following the failed bid for Warners, Wall Street anticipated 
another bid by Murdoch for a studio. Consequently, the stock prices for at least 
two studios fluctuated substantially during late March.291 In fact, Murdoch did not 
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immediately pursue another studio. About a year passed before he made his next 
bid. This time, Fox was his target. In March 1985, Murdoch bought half of Fox 
for $250 million – thereby paying more than double the amount Marvin Davis had 
paid for Marc Rich’s half.292 Of this $250 million, $132 million went to Fox’s 
motion picture arm.293 The cash infusion from News Corp. effectively paid off 
TCF’s bank debt and significantly reduced Marvin Davis’s debt.294 
In spite of Murdoch’s recent pursuit of Warners, the announcement 
“caught the industry by surprise.”295 Given Murdoch and Davis’s strong 
personalities and distinctive management styles, few industry analysts believed 
they would share control of Fox for long.  As Time noted soon after the news 
went public, “No one expects either Davis or Murdoch to be content with half 
control. Most predict that the eventual winner will be Murdoch, who has long 
hankered for a movie company to provide films for his TV holdings outside the 
U.S.”296 
In fact, less than six months later, Murdoch did assume complete control 
over Fox. The means by which he obtained total ownership of the company was 
through his purchase of the Metromedia independent station group – the group of 
television stations which would soon become the base from which the Fox 
television network was developed. Murdoch began discussing purchasing these 
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stations with their owner, John Kluge, in March 1985 – in other words, before his 
initial investment in Fox even had been finalized.297  
Murdoch, Diller and Kluge first met as a group on March 24, 1985 at a 
cocktail party and began preliminary discussions about the stations at that time.298 
Murdoch had met Kluge before; in fact, he had been part of the venture capital 
group which helped finance Kluge’s move to take Metromedia private in 1983.299 
Kluge had taken the company private in anticipation of selling off the television 
stations. Diller’s successor at Paramount, Frank Mancuso, was among the 
interested buyers.300 However, Murdoch – with Diller’s encouragement – acted 
first.  
At the beginning of May 1985, Murdoch announced his purchase of six 
Metromedia television stations for the “seller’s price” of $1.55 billion.301 Coming 
as it did less than six weeks after the announcement of the ABC-Cap Cities 
merger, the deal added to an already-frenzied atmosphere in the broadcast station 
business. The sum advanced by Murdoch amounted to fifteen times cash flow, 
leading to speculation that he had overpaid.302 While this may have been the case, 
Murdoch recognized that the station group was a unique asset. As he observed a 
couple of years after the transaction, “In my mind, I should have paid less, but I 
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knew that I was paying a premium of $200 million-300 million for the chance to 
get all those cities together in one hit. It was a unique opportunity to buy them 
together rather than on a stand-alone basis.”303  
With this one transaction, Murdoch became the owner of the fifth largest 
station group in the U.S. covering 18.105% of the country.304 Following this deal, 
News Corp. controlled 93 publishing, broadcasting and other operations with 
assets of $4.7 billion and annual revenue of $2.6 billion.305 According to Murdoch 
biographer William Shawcross, News Corp.’s holdings now reached a quarter of 
the world’s English-speaking population.306 
Although Marvin Davis was present for the public announcement of the 
purchase of the Metromedia stations, it soon became apparent that he was not 
interested in taking the company in the same direction as Murdoch. Murdoch was 
willing to pay top dollar to grow Fox; Davis, meanwhile, preferred paying bargain 
basement prices and selling off the company’s assets for a profit. Thus during the 
summer of 1985, Davis told Murdoch he wanted out. He felt the prices being paid 
were too high – and further, he wasn’t “having fun” owning a studio anymore.307 
In September, Murdoch paid $325 million to buy Davis’s remaining half.308 
Although Davis had put in more than $700 million in 1981 for half ownership of 
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the company, by no means did he lose money on the investment. As one trade 
writer noted, the Fox which Murdoch purchased was a “much leaner 
entertainment company” than it had been when Davis came into the picture.309 In 
less than five years, Davis had sold off several of the company’s holdings. What’s 
more, he was believed to have cleared more than $500 million in profit during 
that time – not counting the money he diverted into his holding company during 
the course of his ownership.310 
With Davis out of the picture, Murdoch began to restructure the company, 
cutting staff and adding assets. In fall 1985, 300 of Fox’s 1500 employees were 
laid off.311 In spite of the smaller staff, Murdoch continued to add to his 
company’s holdings. Most significantly, he purchased Metromedia’s production 
arm, a division responsible for such programming as the top-rated Dynasty and 
the first-run sitcom Small Wonder.312 Murdoch then combined Metromedia 
Productions with Fox’s holdings, and created a new company, called Fox, Inc.313  
Diller was placed in charge of Fox, Inc.’s three principal divisions: The television 
and motion picture production and distribution arm, 20th Century Fox Film Corp. 
(which now included Metromedia Productions); the Metromedia television 
stations, which were now called the Fox Station Group; and a new, as-yet-
undefined entity, called the Fox Television Network.314 The form which the Fox 
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Television Network would take in terms of structure, programming and staff 
would be defined over the course of the next several years. The next section 
discusses the initial development of the Fox Network, and examines the ways in 
which this new network took shape due to News Corp. and Fox executives’ 
responses to and negotiations with a variety of entities including regulators, 
independent television stations, advertisers, industry executives and program 
producers.  
 
CREATING A “FOURTH” NETWORK 
The FCC will encourage it; Rupert Murdoch has appointed a president for 
it, and despite substantial skepticism, it may happen, possibly losing tens 
or hundreds of millions of dollars initially. The 'it' is a fourth television 
network, a much talked about opportunity to leverage corporate identity, 
capture more of the estimated $8.3 billion in spot and other national 
television advertising dollars spent outside the existing broadcast networks 
and, its backers hope, even to overtake ABC, CBS and NBC… 
    Broadcasting, 1986315 
Kellner sought to distinguish FBC from first-run syndication, arguing that 
such programing suffers from inadequate national promotion, no 'day-and-
date exposure' and a lack of sophisticated development. 'We are going to 
be much more in the business that the three networks are in,' said Kellner, 
but he added: 'It's not really a fourth network. We are a company that 
fulfills the needs of four interested groups: viewers, advertisers, producers 
and stations… 
   Broadcasting, 1986316 
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Murdoch paid such a high price for the Metromedia stations that he had to 
find a way to further increase their value. The sensible solution involved turning 
these independent stations into O&Os, which would then function as the core of a 
new nationwide television network. A number of necessary ‘external’ factors 
enabling the creation of a network had already fallen into place: As was outlined 
in chapter two, by the mid-‘80s, the regulatory and industrial environment had 
become increasingly supportive of a fourth network.  
Along with the aforementioned factors needed to start a fourth network, 
the venture had to be supported by a deep-pocketed, well-positioned media 
company. The founder of this new network had to have enough money to 
compensate affiliates, pay competitive license fees for programming, and hire 
experienced executives. Further, the company had to be willing to sustain losses 
in the tens of millions of dollars – possibly for several years – while the network 
built up its distribution system and established a large enough viewership to 
attract significant advertising money.  
Fox, under Murdoch’s ownership and Diller’s leadership, fit the bill on all 
counts. Murdoch’s previous investments in publishing had made him amenable to 
making long-term commitments. As one journalist observed, “starting a national 
newspaper could cost Mr. Murdoch far more than [the $30 million to $50 million 
he expected to lose in the first year of launching a new network]”.317 For Murdoch 
the investment was well worth it because it would enable him to become more 
involved in the American market and, at the same time, help him build up his 
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supply of programming for future satellite ventures around the world.318 
Meanwhile, Diller had the chance to realize his long-held goal of creating a fourth 
network. Diller was now in charge of the perfect company to accomplish this feat 
– namely, a motion picture studio which already had an established reputation as 
well as a long-standing relationship with the creative community. This time, he 
also had what he had lacked before – a boss willing to take considerable financial 
risks in order to realize a long-term investment. 
Although the Fox network started out with these advantages, its executives 
still had to serve and respond to a variety of interests in order to pull of this 
endeavor. Advertisers, independent stations, program producers, and regulators 
each had their own set of demands and desires. Fox’s successful launch was in 
large part due to its executives’ skill at demonstrating how the network would 
serve each of these entities’ individual needs. 
Regulators were the first major group which had to be satisfied in order 
for Murdoch to proceed. News Corp. and Fox executives repeatedly uttered the 
mantra of “competition” to get what they wanted out of the FCC and Congress. 
The deregulatory-minded FCC represented a minimal challenge at best; after all, 
one of the major objectives of the Commission over the last several years had 
been to encourage an environment in which a fourth network could emerge. The 
increase in station ownership limits and the repeal of the anti-trafficking rule had 
been undertaken with the hope that new sources of competition would emerge.319 
Until Fox emerged as a potential network, exactly the opposite had taken place: 
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smaller stations had been squeezed out and the industry had further consolidated. 
Thus it was likely to be music to the commissioners’ ears when they heard 
Murdoch promise he would bring money in for additional programming.320 Diller, 
meanwhile, tried to squelch any concerns about concentration by declaring they 
“had no plans to operate as a vertically integrated company.”321 When Murdoch 
was asked about potential difficulties he could face as a result of the (still-extant) 
fin-syn rules, he reportedly responded, “Don’t worry about it. We’ll change it or 
something else will happen by then.”322 As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, this did in fact prove to be the case. 
Given this encouraging regulatory environment, Murdoch and company 
did not have much difficulty attaining the Metromedia stations. One obstacle 
faced by Murdoch – which could have been a considerable one if he had been 
operating in a different regulatory and political environment – was his status as an 
Australian citizen. FCC regulations prohibited foreigners from owning more than 
20% of a broadcast license directly.323 In order to circumvent this regulation, 
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Murdoch declared he would become an U.S. citizen. Although the normal waiting 
period for citizenship ranged from three to five years, Murdoch became an 
American less than six months later.324 The speed with which the FCC granted 
Murdoch his citizenship was telling. Indeed, it foreshadowed the extent to which 
the commission bent over backwards for him and his company. Any request for a 
waiver or a reevaluation of a long-standing regulation would be granted with 
haste and typically in favor of Fox or News Corp. 
The only other significant hurdle Murdoch had to overcome was the 
Commission’s cross-ownership rule. Under this guideline, a company could not 
own a newspaper and television station in the same city. The FCC readily issued a 
two-year waiver allowing Murdoch to keep both his TV stations and newspapers 
in Chicago and New York City.325 Some members of Congress – who were 
already beginning to clamp down on Fowler’s FCC – were unsettled by the ease 
with which he received waivers for the Chicago Sun-Times and the New York 
Post.326  However, the commission had no intention of provide News Corp. with 
road blocks now or any time in the future. 
As soon as regulators approved the Metromedia purchase, Fox began to 
court independent television stations. Recognizing that the support of these 
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stations (i.e., future affiliates) was crucial to the success of a fourth network, 
Murdoch made the first “official” statement regarding the formation of Fox at 
their annual trade convention (INTV) in January 1986. The timing of the 
announcement could not have been better: After several boom years, 
independents were beginning to hit a rough patch. In an attempt to realize the 
inflated prices for which they had been purchased, independents were placed in a 
bidding war with each other for programming. As one writer noted, a vicious 
cycle was emerging of “improperly structured financing, overly optimistic 
projections and overly generous purchasing.”327 
The tumultuous period being entered into by independents worked in 
Fox’s favor. In many major markets, Fox had several independents to choose 
from; by this time, independents numbered close to 300 and covered 86% of the 
country.328 There were at least two independents in every market up to number 67 
– and by that point, a potential network could cover 75% of the country.329 
Traditionally, advertisers required 70% penetration in order to purchase 
commercial time on a nationwide basis.330 Thus, a network covering the U.S. was 
clearly viable by this time – and what’s more, it was an attractive proposition, 
especially according to the terms outlined by Fox executives, who began to 
actively pursue affiliates during the summer of 1986. 
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In pitching the venture (which newly-appointed Fox president Jamie 
Kellner strategically described in press conferences not as a network but as a 
“satellite-delivered national program service for independent stations”), 
independents were presented with an enticing package:331  First, Fox guaranteed 
“quality” (read: high production value) programming at no cost to independents. 
In exchange for providing this programming “free” of charge, Fox would receive 
the lion’s share of independents’ advertising time. Although Fox requested a 
substantial amount of advertising time, it was far less than that taken by the Big 
Three. Fox affiliates would be allowed to keep six thirty-second spots for each 
prime time hour – nearly double the amount provided to network affiliates.332 
Second, Fox offered compensation payments equivalent to those offered by the 
established networks.333  In return, Fox asked prospective affiliates for a 
minimum two-year commitment as well as day-and-date airing of the company’s 
programming.334 Third, the new venture promised to start its prime-time 
programming on weekends so as not to interfere with independents’ established 
(and already paid-for) “stripped” weekday programs.335 Fox executives felt it was 
important to have two consecutive days available for their initial prime-time 
launch in order to allow for cross-promotion between the nights.336 As such, a 
Saturday-Sunday schedule was the logical choice. While independents would be 
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335 “Stripping” a show means airing it five days a week, Monday through Friday.  
336 “Charting the Future,” Broadcasting, 37.  
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expected to give up Sundays – the nights with the highest “HUTs” (households 
using television) – they would not have to interrupt their established weekday 
line-up, at least initially. Meanwhile, losing Saturdays was no great sacrifice for 
independents as this night had the lowest HUTs.337  
Regardless of what nights Fox planned on premiering its programming, a 
number of major companies were prepared to advertise.  Whereas Diller’s earlier 
efforts at developing a fourth network at Paramount had been halted due to lack of 
advertiser support, the ad market had now expanded substantially. By 1986, total 
expenditures on television advertisements stood at $7.6 billion – nearly three 
times the sum spent a decade before.338 In spite of the significantly larger amounts 
being allocated for advertisements, companies were eager to find alternate outlets 
through which to sell their products. This was particularly the case due to the rise 
in the Big Three’s ad rates – which, as noted previously, continued to ascend in 
spite of declining network ratings and shares. Advertisers were already turning to 
independents due to their ability to attract the most desirable viewers; a study in 
late 1985 found that independents outranked network affiliates in a number of 
important demographic groups. Independents attracted 19% more women in the 
18-49 range, 19% more women in the 25-54 range, 23% more men in the 18-49 
range and 17% more men ages 25-54.339 With independents already out-
performing the networks in several key areas, a new network seemed likely to 
bring in even larger numbers – and, in all likelihood, at a lesser rate to that 
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charged by the networks. Thus, attracting advertiser interest early on was not a 
difficult task for Fox’s staff. 
In gathering support from the creative community, Fox had to tread far 
more carefully.  An especially resistant group proved to be the motion picture 
studios. In spite of Fox executives’ assurances that they wouldn’t buy from 
themselves (i.e.., both produce and distribute programming), the other studios 
looked upon Fox’s new endeavor with skepticism.340 As noted earlier, the 
networks and studios had long since staked out their positions and roles on the 
fin-syn rules and PTAR; meanwhile, Fox’s place in relation to these regulations 
was not clearly articulated at this point. Although there was little Fox could do to 
encourage the studios to provide programming, executives took several steps to 
attract the support of independent producers. Guarantees were made that 
producers would have creative freedom and less executive interference. In place 
of a Standards and Practices division, Kellner stated “there [would] be a good, 
solid base of common sense.”341 Along with the possibility of more artistic 
autonomy, Fox promised deals on par with – and sometimes better than – what 
could be found at the networks. Fox planned to pay the “going rate” for license 
fees - $350,000 per half-hour and $950,000 per hour.342 Such sums were 
intriguing to many independents which were already battling with network 
executives over license fee reductions. Meanwhile, Fox’s stipulation that all 
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programs be broadcast across the country at the same date and time reassured 
producers this wasn’t just another experiment in syndication.343  
The potentially innovative nature of this enterprise also became one of the 
means by which Murdoch and Diller recruited executives. In filling their 
executive roster, Murdoch and Diller had two overarching goals: Keep the staff 
“lean,” thereby preventing Fox from being plagued by the layers of bureaucracy 
(and overhead) which existed at the Big Three; and hire “hungry” mid-level 
managers who were attracted to the “start-up” nature of the project and eager for 
the chance to have significant administrative input and move up quickly through 
the ranks.344 Several programmers were recruited from NBC while much of the 
sales force was hired away from ABC.345 Among the earliest and most important 
hires were advertising and affiliate relations executive David Johnson (from 
ABC), senior vice president and head of programming Garth Ancier (from NBC), 
and executive vice president Kevin Wendle (also from NBC).346 
Cumulatively, Murdoch and Diller had relatively little difficulty attracting 
skilled executives as well as building up support from a variety of stakeholders 
including advertisers, independent television stations, regulators and the creative 
community. However, there were a few groups which continued to look 
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skeptically upon the new venture. The reason for concern from the established 
networks on regulatory and competitive grounds is relatively apparent. As noted 
above, many of the major studios objected for similar reasons. Syndicators also 
viewed this new program service with wariness.347  Up through the mid-‘80s, 
syndicators had been among the primary beneficiaries of the expansion of the 
television marketplace. Emerging cable channels and independent stations had 
needed product and syndicators had provided it in the form of both re-runs (i.e., 
recycled sitcoms, dramas and motion pictures) and original programming. Now 
Fox was threatening to take away some of this business.  
On the surface it seemed to be the best of times for syndicators: For 
example, the trade papers trumpeted record sales of more than a half-billion 
dollars for The Cosby Show, which was sold into syndication in 1986.348 
Unfortunately, the success of a select number of shows belied increasingly 
difficulties in the syndication business. Most significantly, several boom years 
had led many syndicators to over-produce. Dozens of companies had appeared 
and created shows first-run syndication during the early 1980s. Unfortunately, 
demand far exceeded supply. The situation was made worse because many 
independent stations had overextended themselves and were now starting to 
default on their payments for programming.349  
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What all of this meant was that Fox was preparing to launch into what 
many syndicators perceived to be an already contracting market. Fox executives’ 
claim that they would be airing programming during those time periods which 
historically had been neglected by syndicators was received with doubt in many 
quarters.350 As would become apparent over the course of the next several years, 
many of the apprehensions expressed by syndicators – as well as the studios and 
networks – would prove to be justified. However, before Fox could become the 
highly competitive, vertically-integrated force which these entities feared, it 
would first have to assemble its affiliate base, attract substantial advertising 
support and launch a reliable program schedule. The next section explores 
precisely how Fox took some of these preliminary steps. In addition, I examine 
the press discourses surrounding the program service and its first venture, The 
Late Show Starring Joan Rivers. I demonstrate how, although the program itself 
was a disappointment, it nonetheless served valuable marketing and distribution 
functions for the company.  
 
A RATINGS FAILURE, A BRANDING SUCCESS: THE LATE SHOW STARRING 
JOAN RIVERS 
Only a few days ago, the ambitious plans of Rupert Murdoch and 20th 
Century Fox chairman-CEO Barry Diller to create a fourth television 
network were being dismissed by almost every expert as fantastic folly. 
But following the revelation last week that the Fox Broadcasting Co. will 
begin a phased-rollout of a fourth network in March of 1987 the heads of 
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Hollywood studios, major television station groups and big budget 
advertisers immediately started lining up behind the network... 
Advertising Age, May 1986351  
The initial response by the press and media industry to Rupert Murdoch’s 
January 1986 announcement about the creation of a new network was one of 
skepticism. After all, seemingly dozens of companies had previously spoken of 
their plans to create “fourth networks” only to have such ventures dissolve over a 
matter of months (if they launched at all). However, the attitude of the press and 
the media industry changed dramatically in May 1986, when Barry Diller and 
Jamie Kellner brought journalists together for the Fox network’s official 
launch.352 Although Kellner outlined the network’s objectives and programming 
plans, his speech in and of itself did not provide the new service with instant 
legitimacy.353 That legitimacy, rather, came from the presence of one additional 
person at the event: Joan Rivers. Rivers was in attendance to announce her 
commitment to host a five-day-a-week late night talk show for Fox. She had 
agreed to give up her guest hosting responsibilities for The Tonight Show with 
Johnny Carson in exchange for a three-year, $15 million dollar paycheck and an 
opportunity to have her own program.354  
Block argues “The Rivers announcement had impact beyond Fox’s hopes. 
It gave the new entity instant credibility and, for the first time, a real public 
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profile.”355 Suddenly Fox went from being represented as just another ad hoc 
effort to being depicted as the first viable attempt at a fourth network in more than 
thirty years. In his book, Block provides extensive detail about the creation – and 
rapid demise - of Rivers’ program, The Late Show. Through interviews with 
numerous Fox executives, Late Show staff and Rivers herself, Block writes at 
length about the conflicts between business imperatives and creative desires – 
conflicts which he believes led to a disastrous first year for Fox and a short-lived 
run for The Late Show. He depicts a network that often seemed to develop in spite 
– rather than because – of the decisions made by its executives.  
There is no need to reproduce that discussion here. I have a different 
perspective on Fox’s first six months of operation (which is the time prior to the 
launch of Fox’s prime time schedule). While it is true that Rivers’ show itself was 
a failure, the show was not an unmitigated disaster for Fox. Rather, during its 
brief time on the air, it achieved two important objectives for Fox.  First, it 
enabled the company to begin the lengthy process of establishing a clear identity 
– or “brand” – with the public. More specifically, the show gained the attention 
and awareness of the kinds of viewers which Fox would continue to cultivate over 
the next several years. Second, it demonstrated Fox’s financial commitment, 
thereby generating regular journalistic coverage. The hiring of Rivers stimulated a 
degree and kind of treatment by the press which had not been provided to prior 
fourth network efforts. This coverage, in turn, had the long-term effect of helping 
Fox be taken more seriously by the public and the industry.  
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Everything seemed to happen at an accelerated pace following the May 
1986 public launch at which Rivers was present.   By the end of May, Fox had 
lined up its first affiliates. A number of independent station groups signed on 
early, including Cox, Meredith, Malrite and Outlet.356 By August, Fox had cleared 
80% of the country for its programming, and had affiliate representation in all but 
two of the top-30 markets.357 Also by this time, the first sponsors had agreed to 
advertise on The Late Show. Bristol-Myers became the first to sign on, but was 
soon followed by several other prominent companies, including General Foods, 
JC Penney, Ralston Purina, Sears-Roebuck, American Motors Corp., and Johnson 
& Johnson.358 The going rate for a spot on the show ranged from $10,000 to 
$22,000 – a discount of approximately 20% from the sum charged by the 
networks for the same time period.359 Perhaps most compelling was a deal struck 
in October 1986 between Gillette and News Corp. Through this arrangement, 
News Corp. (via ad agency BBDO) sold Gillette advertising space as a package 
for News Corp.’s Fox, Network Ten (Australia) and Sky Channel (Western 
Europe).360 This deal proved to be both a first for a media conglomerate as well as 
an indication of Murdoch’s long-term objectives for his various television 
holdings.361 
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While the affiliate roster and advertising base were being built up, Fox 
prepared for the October premiere of Rivers’ show. Over the summer, 
construction began on an office and new studio at KTTV in Hollywood. More 
than $2 million was spent on creating a 420-seat studio designed according to 
Rivers’ specifications.362 Meanwhile, Rivers lined up her initial guests. This 
proved to be a more difficult task than anticipated due to the rumors circulating 
that anyone appearing on The Late Show would not be allowed on The Tonight 
Show.363 Nonetheless, the show started as planned on October 9, 1986. At the 
time of the first broadcast, Fox had lined up 98 affiliates.364 Early guests included 
David Lee Roth, Cher, Pee-Wee Herman and Elton John.   
Although the show received a lukewarm response from critics, initially its 
prospects seemed promising. The ratings for the first week averaged out to a 4.2 – 
more than three times what they had been on independent stations prior to The 
Late Show’s premiere.365  Journalists, however, were not looking at how previous 
shows had performed in The Late Show’s time slot. Rather, the yardstick by 
which the press measured success was how the show performed compared to The 
Tonight Show. Fox executives were unable to convince journalists that their 
competition was local newscasts rather than Carson’s program (even though The 
Late Show only went head-to-head with The Tonight Show in three markets).366  If 
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journalists weren’t writing about how more than twice as many people viewed 
The Tonight Show over The Late Show, then they were noting the rapid drop-off 
the show experienced in ratings after its first week. By late October, ratings had 
dropped to about 2.5 (though the number of affiliates was now up to 99).367  Into 
January 1987, Diller publicly continued to support the program, saying that Fox 
would stay with the show even if the ratings didn’t improve.368  
By this point, Fox had spent approximately $3.4 million promoting The 
Late Show.369 This was a relatively minor sum considering companies regularly 
spent in excess of $500,000 to produce a single prime time television program. 
Unfortunately, the show’s production costs were not equally low. Week after 
week, The Late Show went over budget.370 At the same time, conflicts emerged 
between Rivers’ production team and Fox executives about the direction the show 
should take. Thus, less than a month after Diller publicly declared his support, 
Fox took control of the show.371 Fox executives were placed in charge and the 
original producers were fired in February 1987. 
Although The Late Show was a failure for Fox as a television program, it 
was successful in other ways which were less readily apparent (and much less 
frequently commented upon). First, the program was an important means by 
which Fox quickly established itself with the press. As note above, Rivers’ 
appearance at the May 1986 press conference provided Fox with instant 
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legitimacy. Numerous articles appeared from that time through the premiere of 
The Late Show in October 1986 which evaluated what precisely constituted a 
network – and to what extent Fox operated as one. This would be an ongoing 
point of debate over the next decade, as assorted News Corp. purchases and 
various Fox television programs functioned as discursive sites over which 
regulators, journalists, critics and industry executives reconsidered how networks 
previously had been – and continued to be – defined. 
Second, The Late Show served as an effective promotional tool for Fox. It 
became a way for the nascent network to build an identity for itself with both the 
press and public. Its presence on stations five-nights-a-week helped to brand the 
show itself as well as the network-to-be. It marked the first in a series of steps 
taken by Fox to establish itself as a regular television presence. What’s more, it 
helped Fox develop a particular image for itself and its programs – an image as a 
younger, hipper alternative to the Big Three. While the ratings were not as high as 
Fox executives had hoped they would be, two-thirds of the program’s viewers 
were women between the ages of 18 and 34 – one of the demographic groups 
which were most highly pursued by advertisers.372 Thus, The Late Show served as 
the launching pad from which Fox began the lengthy and challenging process of 
branding itself and its shows with some of the most desirable viewers. With 
awareness high among key demographic groups, Fox executives could now 
proceed to their next challenge – implementing the prime-time schedule. 
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Chapter Four: Staking a Claim on Prime Time, February 1987 – 
December 1989 
The continued existence of the Fox network is far from guaranteed and an 
evaluation of its performance could come before the end of the next 
broadcast season. That statement came from the incipient network’s parent 
company, News Corp. …  
   Broadcasting, June 1988373 
Fox, a disaster two years ago, has metamorphosed into a race horse. 
Ratings surged 66% February ’88 to February ’89… 
   Variety, September 1989374 
 
During the spring of 1987, Fox executives busily prepared for the April 5th 
launch of the prime time schedule. They planned to start slowly, premiering only 
two half-hour sitcoms on this first night and then gradually adding several more 
series to the schedule over the course of the next several weeks.  Such a well 
thought-out strategy belied a great deal of uncertainty about the direction the 
program service would take. In fact, throughout the late 1980s, strong doubts 
remained about the long-term viability of Fox Broadcasting. These doubts were 
fueled primarily by a string of failed series and marginal ratings across-the-board.  
In large part because Fox’s status was so uncertain, executives 
increasingly took chances in the program formats they acquired and the 
scheduling strategies they implemented. As it turned out, out of the company’s 
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desperation came success. The more it reacted to what the other networks were 
doing – and counter-programmed accordingly – the more success the company 
had. When Fox used up everything it had in development, the company made the 
unprecedented move of licensing several series from pay and basic cable program 
services. What started as a stop-gap measure soon became an effective means by 
which Fox could build up its audience base. Similarly, when more traditional 
sitcoms and dramas failed to perform at the desired level, the company turned to 
reality programming developed out of the Fox owned-and-operated stations. The 
company’s innovative strategy of scheduling such reality programs as Cops and 
America’s Most Wanted during the summer proved to be a smart choice. At the 
same time, larger industrial developments including, most notably, a Writer’s 
Guild strike, also worked in Fox’s favor. 
Thus through a process of trial and error, Fox slowly formulated its 
identity and carved out its demographic profile. From the fall of 1988 on, the 
company increasingly focused on targeting teenagers, African-Americans and, 
with growing frequency, the entire 18-to-34 age group. By identifying its 
audience, Fox was better able to cultivate its image as the “alternative” program 
service and shore up its relationships with its affiliates. While the other networks 
continued to see Fox as marginal, the company proceeded to lay the foundations 
from which it would redefine the television landscape during the 1990s. 
Fox was not the only company struggling to define itself during the late 
1980s. Indeed, this was a transitional moment for both regulators as well as the 
media industries in general. The Mark Fowler regime gave way to the Dennis 
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Patrick regime. Patrick brought into office the same deregulatory fervor as his 
predecessor. However, in drawing the ire of Congress through his support of the 
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, he soon found himself and his commission 
rendered impotent.  This caused the FCC to enter a period of brief moment of 
stasis.  
The media world did not experience a similar stasis. Rather, the 
entertainment business was rocked by a string of mergers and acquisitions during 
the late ‘80s. These transactions far eclipsed the network sales of the mid-‘80s. 
The “foreign” status of many of these new buyers contributed to a state of panic 
about the competitive role of American industry in the global marketplace. With 
journalists trying to understand the implications of the entry of European and 
Japanese investors into Hollywood, the press coverage attended upon the 
television industry diminished substantially. Thus, while newspapers heralded the 
new era of global media conglomerates initiated by the union of Time and 
Warner, Sony and Columbia, and Matsushita and MCA, the broadcast networks 
quietly began to recover from their crisis period of a few years earlier. News 
Corp. was similarly absent from many discussion of the “global future of 
Hollywood.” Yet as the next section shows, the company was forging ahead with 
such global efforts, primarily through its development of a new satellite venture in 




DIFFICULT TIMES FOR REGULATORS AND MEDIA CONGLOMERATES ALIKE  
It's business as usual at the FCC these days. That is, if you take into 
account a three-person agency with a Republican chairman and two 
Democrats, unable to act on anything if anyone leaves the room, in the 
heat of an election campaign that could change the entire direction of 
telecommunications policy, not to mention the political futures of the 
incumbents, and with the leadership of the Congress exerting pressure to 
assure that nothing happens at all… 
Broadcasting, 1988375  
Weakened by a devalued dollar and vulnerable to the dynamics of the free 
market, US show biz companies have been increasingly squeezed between 
Japan and the Pacific Rim on the one hand and the prospect of a united, 
economically reinforced post-1992 Europe on the other… 
Variety, 1989376 
In April 1987, Mark Fowler stepped down from his position at the FCC 
after serving for five years, the longest of any chair. As noted in chapter two, his 
influence at the FCC was considerable, particularly during the first half of his 
tenure. During the latter portion of his term, his deregulatory zeal lessened. In part 
this was due to the fact that he had already deregulated so much. However, it was 
also a result of the growing resistance to deregulation on the part of both Congress 
and the other commissioners.  In spite of his best efforts, a number of issues 
which he had hoped to address were not resolved upon his departure. The Fairness 
Doctrine remained in place as did ownership caps. PTAR and fin-syn likewise 
remained in place due mainly to effective lobbying by the MPAA and 
independent stations.  
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Yet although Fowler was unable to completely deregulate the media 
business, his impact was nonetheless considerable. Broadcasting’s editors – like 
much of the industry – acknowledged that he played a central role in reshaping 
the business. However, his contributions were not always seen in the most 
positive of lights. As the trade publication noted immediately before he left office, 
“To the Fifth Estate, for which the Fowler FCC has done much, the question is 
not just what he did for it but what he did to it.”377 While broadcasters’ paperwork 
may have lessened, their headaches increased due to the wave of hostile takeovers 
brought on with the raised ownership caps and removal of the station trafficking 
rules.378  There came hope from many quarters that the Patrick FCC would be less 
polemical in its discourse and more moderate in its policies.  
Patrick certainly had his work cut out for him when entered into the 
chairmanship. The cry for re-regulation was intensifying even as he began his 
term. In part this was due to mounting dissatisfaction with the Cable Act of 
1984.379 It seemed no sooner had the act been implemented than the cable 
industry further consolidated and rates accelerated upward.380 However, if Patrick 
was coming into an inflammatory environment, he helped stoke the fires still 
more through his support for the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine. In August 1987 
– just a few months after taking office – the FCC voted unanimously to repeal this 
                                                 
377 “The Fowler Years: A Chairman Who Marched to His Own Drummer,” Broadcasting, 23 
March 1987, 51. 
378 Ibid. 
379 The act went into effect on December 29, 1986. For a discussion of the act, see Paul Harris, 
“Cable’s Image Takes Pounding in D.C.: Copyright Stance is Sheer Lunacy,” Variety, 12 March 
1986, 39, 46; “D-Day for Rates Arrives for Cable Industry,” Broadcasting, 29 December 1986, 
28-29.  
380 Paul Harris, “FCC Joins Others Seeking Repeal of Compulsory Cable Licenses,” Variety, 2 
November 1988, 48. 
 145
regulation.381 Although the Fairness Doctrine had been intended to encourage 
broadcasters to provide “a balanced perspective on controversial issues of public 
importance,” in fact it often had been perceived as ineffective.382 Many critics of 
the rule believed it had a chilling effect on the media’s coverage of hot-button 
issues.383 Regardless of its value, Congress responded to the Doctrine’s repeal 
with hostility. After its elimination, members of both the House and Senate 
monitored the FCC much more closely. As Broadcasting observed, “through 
legislation and verbal and written protests, [congressional representatives] have 
managed to impress their will on the agency and [made] it harder for the FCC to 
exercise its own.”384 
The most explicit means of retaliation came in the form of Congress’ 
refusal to appoint new commissioners when the terms of the active commissioners 
expired. Thus, the FCC was forced to operate with only three commissioners 
during much of Patrick’s short time as chairman. During the remainder of his two 
years in office, Patrick and his commission accomplished relatively little; any 
hope they may have had of repealing additional regulations such as fin-syn 
quickly disappeared in the wake of the Fairness Doctrine uproar.  Further 
deregulatory acts would have to wait until the next chair, Alfred Sikes, began his 
term in the summer of 1989.  
The tumultuous times experienced inside the Beltway were matched by 
the instability felt on Wall Street during the late ‘80s. The turning point came on 
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October 19, 1987, when the stock market dropped over 500 points in one day.385 
“Black Monday,” as it became known, occurred just as the advertising and 
broadcasting businesses were beginning to bounce back. This disturbance in the 
financial world affected various media entities differently. Television stations – 
both independents and affiliates – were particularly hard hit. This was partly 
because their prices had been so inflated to begin with. Station owners wanting to 
sell their properties often found themselves unable to unload them, especially 
after the stock market crash.386 
The networks’ status during the late ‘80s was more mixed.  As discussed 
in chapter three, the networks suffered losses in market share, employees and 
income in the period immediately after they changed ownership. In 1986, NBC 
was the only network to turn a profit.387  Network shares continued to decline as 
the decade wore on, reaching their lowest point in 1989 at 55%.388 Yet in spite of 
the general economic crisis as well as the continued defection of viewers to cable 
and video, the networks began to rebound. In 1989, the Big Three reported an 
“extraordinary” upfront – the best in history.389 Their operating margins were 
reported to be at levels “last seen in the late 1970s.”390 Thus, the odd situation 
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emerged whereby the network operations themselves were turning a profit even 
though many of their affiliates were struggling to get by. 
Such seeming contradictions were also apparent at the motion picture 
companies. Mounting production and marketing costs prevented the studios from 
reaping the full benefit of record box office grosses both at home and overseas. 
Yet in spite of the heightened risk associated with making movies, the studios (or 
their parent companies) became increasingly attractive targets for takeover. The 
move toward consolidation began in November 1987, when Sony made its first 
foray into the entertainment industry with its purchase of CBS Records.391  The 
deal was significant both because it signaled the increased interest of ‘foreign’ 
companies in predominantly U.S.-based businesses and because it marked the first 
large-scale attempt by a hardware company to invest in a software corporation. 
Sony further increased its investment in Hollywood a couple of years later when it 
purchased Columbia Pictures.392 This deal was followed by Japanese hardware 
manufacturer Matsushita’s purchase of MCA-Universal in late 1990.393  
Although the Australian-based News Corp. had actually initiated this wave 
of foreign investments with its purchase of Fox in 1985, the press and industry 
generally represented the entry of European and Asian money into Hollywood in 
the late ‘80s as the point when overseas investments began. The fact that these 
transactions were taking place within the larger context of reports of growing 
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Japanese dominance in manufacturing and the impending creation of the 
European Union contributed to a rising anxiety about the decline of American 
businesses. With each additional sale of a U.S.-based media company, the “fear of 
the foreign” seemed to rise even more. This was abundantly clear in March 1989, 
when Time and Warner combined to create what was described as the “largest 
media and entertainment giant in the world.”394 The deal was widely perceived as 
America’s attempt to fend off overseas investors. Richard Gold of Variety, for 
example, described the merger as “the first big blow by American entertainment 
companies against aggressive, takeover-minded foreign operations.”395 In other 
words, the Time-Warner merger was often portrayed in the press as a defensive 
act, rather than as an outright effort at expansion.396 
The motivations guiding these mergers and acquisitions varied to some 
extent depending on the particular company making the deal. However, two 
specific strategies dominated during this time. First was the hardware-software 
combination, explored most extensively by Japanese manufacturers such as Sony 
and Matsushita. These companies believed that potential synergies could take 
place by having an investment in both media production and equipment 
manufacturing. The second strategy involved “tight diversification.”397 
Companies employing this tactic focused on shedding their non-media assets 
while building up their entertainment divisions. The Time-Warner merger was 
                                                 
394 “Time Inc. + Warner Communications: Media Giants Strike Merger Deal,” Broadcasting, 13 
March 1989, 28. 
395 Gold, “Time’s Move of the Year,” Variety. 
396 For example, see John Lichfield, “Only Time Will Tell if Media Merger Fends Off Foreign 
Giants,” The Independent, 6 March 1989, 10; Samuel Fromartz, “Time-Warner Merger Defensive 
Move,” Toronto Star, 6 March 1989, B1. 
397 For a lengthier discussion of this, see Schatz, “The New Hollywood,” 30. 
 149
largely motivated by a desire to become one of the largest producers of 
entertainment software. Disney similarly focused on building its own divisions. 
The belief driving these conglomerates’ activities was that the properties 
developed by each division – publishing, television, motion pictures, etc. – could 
find synergies with the properties in every other division, thereby generating 
increased profits across the entire corporation.398  
Like Disney and Time Warner, News Corp. acquired and created a variety 
of new divisions during the late ‘80s. Though Murdoch did not ascribe to the 
philosophy of synergy as wholeheartedly as Disney’s Michael Eisner or Time 
Warner’s Gerald Levin, he did focus on building up a range of media assets for 
the company.399 Murdoch focused during the mid-‘80s on strengthening his 
American television holdings. By 1986, he had the fourth largest station group in 
the country; only the Big Three covered more of the U.S.400 Throughout the latter 
part of the decade, News Corp. shifted toward accumulating more publishing 
assets. In December 1986, he purchased Australia’s Herald and Weekly Times; in 
March 1987 he bought publisher Harper & Row.401 The following year, he spent 
approximately three billion dollars to acquire Triangle Publications.402 The key 
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property obtained with this deal was TV Guide. As a result of this transaction, 
News Corp. became the largest publisher of consumer magazines in the United 
States in terms of revenues.403  
The Triangle publications purchase marked the last large purchase 
Murdoch would make in the ‘80s.404  It also served as the culmination of his 
efforts over the past several years to increase his American holdings. According 
to Shawcross, by the end of 1988, News Corp.’s U.S. properties accounted for the 
majority of its total revenues of almost $3 billion dollars.405 Unfortunately, News 
Corp.’s European ventures were not nearly as successful. In fall 1988, Murdoch 
began to withdraw from his money-losing pan-European Sky Television venture, 
exiting the Austrian, French and German markets.406 At this point, he decided to 
reinvent Sky as a U.K.-based enterprise. He rushed the project to market in order 
to beat out a competitor, British Satellite Television.407 The following February, 
the newly reformulated Sky Channel began beaming four channels direct-to-
home.408 Much of the early programming on the Sky Channel came from the Fox 
film and television libraries.409 In spite of its exclusive programming as well as its 
ability to reach the British market ahead of British Satellite Broadcasting, Sky 
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Channel was a financial disaster. By mid-1989, the division was losing millions 
every week; it lost more than $120 million in its first six months.410 
Meanwhile, back in the U.S., the various Fox filmed entertainment 
divisions continued to perform below News Corp.’s expectations. Instability 
reigned in the executive suites even after Diller’s arrival. Lawrence Gordon, who 
had recently been elevated to Fox’s president, departed in January 1986.411 Alan 
Horn, who was brought in to replace Gordon, quickly found himself at odds with 
Diller.412 He was also gone by fall 1986. However, the management instability did 
not extend to Diller, who at this time renegotiated his contract with Murdoch. 
Under the new terms of their agreement, signed in October 1986, Diller received a 
base salary of three million dollars and was vested with 25% voting control via 
Fox preferred stock.413  
Even as Diller signed his new contract, Fox reported its first fiscal year in 
the black since 1981.414 Though Diller was unable to hold onto many of his top 
executives at this time, they did stay long enough to generate a fair number of box 
office successes. Jewel of the Nile (1985), Aliens (1986), and The Fly (1986) were 
among the films responsible for the division’s turnaround. After Horn left, Diller 
turned to his former boss at ABC, Leonard Goldberg, to continue the process of 
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revitalizing Fox. In November of ’86, Goldberg was named the president of Fox 
Film Corp., thereby becoming Diller’s second-in-command.415 Though 1987 was 
a so-so year for the movie division (with Mannequin and Revenge of the Nerds 2 
being the biggest box office earners), 1988 was a banner year. While event films 
such as Die Hard, Alien Nation and Young Guns all performed at or above 
expectations, the company also had sleeper hits with Working Girl and the James 
L. Brooks-produced Big. Cumulatively, these movies propelled Fox to third place 
in terms of domestic box office market share – the best position it had held in 
years. The studio only trailed only behind Buena Vista, which led the pack with 
such hits as Cocktail, Beaches and Who Framed Roger Rabbit, and Paramount, 
which was running high off the success of Crocodile Dundee II, Naked Gun and 
Coming to America. 
Goldberg’s good fortune did not stretch into 1989. The year was nothing 
less than a disaster for the motion picture division. Film after film bombed; the 
appropriately titled The Abyss - which was the company’s biggest earner for 1989 
- failed to earn back its budget at the box office.416 Fox dropped to seventh place 
in domestic market share and the film division’s profits slipped 40% over the 
course of one year.417 By the end of 1989, Goldberg been replaced by independent 
producer Joe Roth.418 
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Although Goldberg paid the price for Fox’s fall, some observers felt the 
responsibility for the studio’s downturn rested with Diller.419 His energy had been 
siphoned away from the motion picture division and directed toward building up 
the new network. At this time, such a focus must have seemed illogical to many 
industry observers as the primary source of profit and prestige for the studios 
came from the production of high-concept event films. However, as would 
become apparent over the course of the next several years, Diller’s decision to 
concentrate on establishing the television network would be a prescient one. Not 
only would the Fox network come to be central to News Corp.’s activities, but in 
fact it would define the economic, cultural and aesthetic terms by which the other 
major studios entered into network television distribution. First, though, Fox had 
to survive a rocky prime time launch.  
 
THE PURSUIT OF A SUITABLE PRIME-TIME PROGRAMMING SLATE 
The kind of product in mind [for Fox]: programs with ‘no fences, no outer 
perimeters. The only rule we will enforce is that the program must have 
taste, must be engaging, must be entertaining, must be original, whether it 
is a situation comedy, an hour-long drama, a television movie or some 
new form not yet born…’ 
   Rupert Murdoch, January 1987420 
In November 1986, as Fox executives were still in the preliminary stages 
of developing the prime time schedule for their new programming service, Variety 
ran a front page article with a headline declaring “It’s Still a 2 ½ TV Network 
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Race.”421 The writer, Bob Knight, argued that as a result of audience erosion, 
there were not enough viewers to accommodate three – let alone four – broadcast 
networks. On four nights of the week, he claimed, “the third-place series in any 
half-hour is not generating enough audience to justify the cost.”422 Further, he 
believed that the current network environment was such that only two series 
formats could work in prime time – half-hour comedies and hour-long dramas. He 
perceived musical variety programs, reality shows and anthology series to be 
passé.  
No one would make similar claims at the end of the 1980s. In the matter of 
a few short years, Fox would prove the viability of a fourth network. In addition, 
the company would play a major role in bringing back such “passé” formats as 
variety programs, reality shows and anthology series. From early on, Fox relied 
heavily on counter-programming the networks. The more the company responded 
to the networks’ programming gaps and scheduling failures, the more it 
succeeded. Though Fox’s early years were filled with ups and downs, in a 
relatively brief time span, the company refined a series of effective distribution 
and marketing strategies – strategies which would redefine how its competitors 
did business. Fox executives’ skill in reacting swiftly to the other networks’ 
limitations – as well as its own – enabled them to assemble a program service 
which was demographically desirable, stylistically distinctive and financially 
solvent. What’s more, this reactive strategy, which was refined from the time of 
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Fox’s prime time launch in April 1987 through the premiere of The Simpsons in 
December 1989, established the foundation from which the weblet could 
influence how the networks, cable programmers and independent stations 
operated for years to come. 
 Fox executives did not have the formula for success immediately, 
however. In fact, Fox programmers seemed to have no clear set of objectives 
during the late 1980s. Rather, Fox’s first few years in the network business were 
marked by uncertainty and often outright embarrassment. Beyond a general 
notion that the new venture had to be “alternative” to the networks in some sense, 
early on there was minimal direction. In the year prior to the prime time launch, 
Fox executives repeatedly shifted course. At the time of the official public 
announcement in May 1986, Murdoch spoke of a desire to provide a “family-
oriented” prime-time schedule which would downplay gratuitous violence.423 This 
was followed by a proposal to launch the network with a weekly movie screening. 
That idea was soon scrapped due to objections from independents-cum-
affiliates.424 Later, executives proposed starting off with a five-hour weekend 
block. However, Fox’s research people argued this approach would result in 
“promotional nightmares.”425 At one point, the company was close to securing the 
rights for a new Star Trek series. However, Fox was unwilling to meet 
Paramount’s terms.426 The deal also stalled due to Paramount’s concern that it 
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would be helping a competitor and diminishing the amount of time available for 
its syndicated product.427  
By October 1986, Fox executives decided they would start the service 
with one night of programming which would air on Sunday nights. By the end of 
the year, programmers solidified a couple of additional points: First, they wanted 
to launch “off-season” so they could most readily exploit weaknesses in the 
networks’ schedules.428 The month of April became a choice time for starting up 
because the networks were concluding their regular season. With an April start, 
Fox could continue airing original programming during the summer. Executives 
hoped sampling of Fox would increase as people grew tired of network reruns.429 
Second, they wanted to offer potential viewers as many opportunities as possible 
to discover the existence – and quality – of their service. To accomplish this, Fox 
borrowed a tactic from syndicators and planned to repeat the first night’s 
programs three times in a row. Thus Fox planned to air the same episodes of its 
two premiere series three times each on launch night.430 (At the time of the 
announcement, the company had not yet decided what these shows would be.) 
Kellner described this as an “open house” approach to programming and 
perceived it as yet another means through which to secure more eyeballs.431 This 
move – which can be seen as foreshadowing the “multi-plexing” strategies 
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increasingly used during the late ‘90s – also enabled Fox to report cumulative (or 
“cume”) ratings for the three runs of each show.432 Advertisers gave a 
“lukewarm” response to this tactic.433 
Though Fox executives had formulated some general scheduling strategies 
by the end of 1986, they still remained uncertain about the specific nature of their 
programming. With the new year, the first night’s schedule began to crystallize. 
The Embassy Communications-produced family sitcom Married…with Children 
and the James L. Brooks/20th Century Fox-produced sketch comedy series, 
Tracey Ullman, were chosen as the shows with which the company would start its 
prime-time broadcast. Fox then proceeded to premiere one additional show each 
week until the Sunday line-up was complete with three-and-a-half hours.  
With the April 5th lineup set, Fox prepared for a marketing blitz to 
accompany premiere night. Executives realized from the outset that it was as 
important to create awareness of the Fox network as it was to make viewers 
familiar with specific programs. In consultation with advertising agency 
Chiat/Day, the company decided to add the word “FOX” in front of the 
HOLLYWOOD sign.434 In addition, the advertising agency encouraged 
executives to drop the “FBC” acronym which they had been using to identify the 
program service up to that time.435 From thereon out, the service would be 
marketed as the “Fox network” to the public. Chiat/Day believed that the Fox 
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moniker would be associated with the motion picture studio, “which could be 
identified with a tradition of great entertainment.”436 
In spite of these promotion efforts, the prime time launch results were less 
than stellar from a critical or ratings perspective. Critical response to the new 
programs was mixed. Instead of evaluating the shows on their own merits, many 
journalists focused on how “alternative” the programming was in relation to that 
available from the Big Three.437 There was also a great deal of attention paid to 
Fox’s purported censorship of the first episode of Married…with Children.438 The 
controversy was stimulated by the producers of the program publicly airing their 
dissatisfaction that, after being drawn to Fox with promises of greater creative 
freedom, they were forced to remove a line of dialogue.439 The point of contention 
involved father Al Bundy declaring that P.M.S. actually stands for “pummel 
men’s scrotums.”440  
Though the press reported on the line’s deletion prior to the airing of the 
episode, the media coverage did not provide the show with as much of a ratings 
boost as executives might have liked. Anticipating that they had overestimated 
their premiere night ratings, Fox scaled back its initial guarantees from an eight to 
a six before the first shows aired.441 The decision to total the results from the three 
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airings makes it difficult to discern how well the shows performed (which was 
perhaps part of the rationale behind employing the strategy to begin with). 
Ultimately, the first Married…with Children garnered a 15.2 rating and 24 share 
and the first Tracey Ullman earned a 13 rating and 20 share.442 The launch was 
broadcast on 108 affiliates, reaching 83% of the country.443 Approximately 100 
sponsors advertised over the course of the night.444  
For the next three weeks, additional programs were added to the lineup. 
On April 12, the teen action-drama 21 Jump Street, produced by Stephen J. 
Cannell (Hunter, The Rockford Files), began its run. This was followed by the 
premiere of Gary David Goldberg’s (Family Ties) dating-focused sitcom, Duet, 
on April 19; the television spin-off of Disney’s hit film Down and Out in Beverly 
Hills on April 26; and the Ed. Weinberger-produced (Taxi, The Cosby Show), 
sitcom, Mr. President, beginning on May 3. None of the Sunday lineup had much 
of an impact initially. Fox appeared to have staked too much confidence in its 
belief that top talent would bring in solid ratings and innovative programming.  
Before programmers were able to get a handle on Sunday nights, they 
began rolling out the Saturday night lineup. On July 11, 1987, Fox began its 
second night of programming with the two-hour premiere of a supernatural drama 
called Werewolf. This night was an important one for Fox, marking the first 
occasion in which the service was included in Nielsen’s NTI ratings. Historically, 
shows airing on independent stations and in syndication had been measured by 
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Nielsen’s Station Index. This night marked the first time a fourth group was 
measured via the NTI ratings scale.445  By being included in these rankings, Fox 
could sell advertisements at higher rates. The premiere of Werewolf was important 
for an additional reason: With it, Fox began a consistent strategy of airing original 
programming during the summertime. At this time, such a tactic was unheard of 
in the industry – though in the ensuing years, it would become much more 
widespread in large part due to Fox’s successes in this arena. 
After its first week, Werewolf ran as a one-hour program on Saturday 
nights. The rest of the evening was filled out with the teen espionage sitcom The 
New Adventures of Beans Baxter and the Patty Duke sitcom Karen’s Song. As 
was the case with Sunday nights, there was little continuity between programs in 
terms of target audience or concept. The only trait the shows had in common was 
that they all came from producers with strong track records. For example, 
Werewolf was developed by A-Team creator Frank Lupo, while Beans Baxter was 
created by teen movie director Savage Steve Holland (Better Off Dead, One 
Crazy Summer). Ultimately these track records mattered little; the shows were all 
ratings failures.  
Fox programmers quickly began shuffling series around their schedule. 
When that had little effect, the programs were pulled off the air. Karen’s Song and 
Down and Out in Beverly Hills have the distinction of being the first two 
programs cancelled (with the last episode of each airing September 12, 1987). In 
their place came two more sitcoms – Women in Prison, from the creators of 
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Married…with Children, and Second Chance, about a man who dies and comes 
back to earth to advise his younger self how to make better choices in life. Fox 
tried to stick with Second Chance, renaming it Boys Will Be Boys and changing 
the focus to the (living) teen star (played by Matthew Perry). In spite of the 
retooling, Boys Will Be Boys - along with Mr. President, Werewolf, The 
Adventures of Beans Baxter and Women in Prison – was off the air by summer 
1988. 
Fox’s late-night show also continued to be a frustration. By April 1987, it 
was apparent that the Late Show wasn’t working. During that month, Rivers left 
for a vacation and had a series of guest hosts fill in for her. Surprisingly, the 
ratings for the show actually increased slightly during her absence.446 Motivated 
by concerns that affiliates would begin to defect soon if they didn’t do something, 
Fox fired Rivers in May.447 In her place, they decided to rotate hosts indefinitely. 
Suzanne Somers, Robert Townsend and Arsenio Hall were among the performers 
who took on hosting responsibilities for the program following her departure. Fox 
tried to hire Arsenio Hall for a permanent post, but he was lured away by an offer 
from Paramount for a syndicated program.448  Instead of Hall, programmers hired 
Late Night with David Letterman executive producer Barry Sand to develop a new 
late-night program. He came up with a comedy-newsmagazine hybrid called The 
Wilton North Report (named after the street on which it was filmed).  
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If The Late Show with Joan Rivers was a disappointment, The Wilton 
North Report was a flat-out humiliation. Premiering on December 11, 1987, the 
show was critically reviled.449 It also became a site around which many affiliates 
proclaimed their displeasure with Fox’s programming efforts. Although it was 
taken off the air less than a month after its premiere (and replaced with re-runs of 
The Late Show), the damage had already been done. A handful of affiliates began 
to rebel. In December 1987, affiliates in Minneapolis, Portland and Orlando 
canceled Fox’s Saturday night line-up.450 In July 1988, Fox lost its first affiliates 
when their contracts came up for renewal.451 Things would continue to get worse 
before they got better. More shows came and went, some in a matter of weeks. 
Fox became embroiled in a battle with MGM over one short-lived series, The 
Dirty Dozen (inspired by the film of the same name). MGM accused Fox of 
breaching its contract by dropping the show prematurely.452   
Due to the problems Fox faced with the two nights it had on the air, the 
company was forced to slow down its expansion. In early 1987, Diller had 
expressed his hope that the network would be on seven nights a week by 1990.453 
But with Saturday nights a complete bust and Sundays only marginally 
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successful, executives kept postponing plans for the launch of an additional night 
of programming. One of Fox’s lowest points came in the summer of 1988. It was 
at this time that News Corp. finance director Richard Sarazen allegedly expressed 
some concerns about the long-term viability of Fox.454 According to newspaper 
reports – which Sarazen said took his remarks out of context – News Corp. was 
keeping “a close eye” on Fox’s performance.455 
The press may have misrepresented Sarazen’s comments, but there was no 
denying Fox was losing much more money than initially had been projected. For 
the fiscal year ending June 21, 1988, News Corp. reported Fox lost $99 million – 
nearly twice as much as was originally budgeted.456 The higher losses were partly 
due to larger-than-expected development and programming costs. By September 
1988, of the nineteen shows introduced by Fox, only five were still on the air.457  
As a result of the rapid turnover in programs, Fox executives began to 
look to different outlets for product. One of the places they turned to was cable. In 
March 1988, Fox began re-airing episodes of the Showtime series It’s Garry 
Shandling’s Show.458 In a first-of-a-kind deal, Fox broadcast episodes of the 
Viacom-produced program one month after they aired on Showtime. Showtime 
received a license fee, which was in turn directed toward other programs on the 
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pay service.459 The arrangement was viewed as so successful that Fox O&Os 
struck another deal with Viacom, this time for the Nickelodeon series Family 
Double Dare.460 It was only a matter of weeks before Fox placed Family Double 
Dare on its Saturday night prime time schedule, replacing Women in Prison.461  
While a handful of cable-bred shows provided a quick fix to Fox’s 
troubled schedule, another set of programs provided much more long-term 
assistance. These shows, which came out of Fox’s owned-and-operated stations, 
not only gave a boost to Fox in prime time but also helped the program service 
establish an early identity for itself. The first program to be developed out of an 
O&O never made it to prime-time – but it did make Fox lots of money and 
provide a business model for how to proceed. This show, A Current Affair, began 
its run on Fox’s New York station, WNYW, in July 1986. It soon expanded to run 
on all the Fox O&Os and a year later, was syndicated nationally.462 From fewer 
than a dozen stations in December 1987, the program expanded to play on 129 
outlets by the following December.463 By this time, it was regularly placing 
among the top five syndicated shows on television. What’s more, it was attracting 
one of the most desirable demographics: viewers ages 25-to-45.464 Produced for 
approximately $260,000 per week, the program grossed in excess of $850,000 
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during that time span.465 Its tremendous success rapidly spawned a slew of 
syndicated imitators, including Inside Edition (King World), Tabloid 
(Paramount), Crimewatch Tonight (Orion) and Exclusive (Viacom).466  
Not only did A Current Affair become an immediate ratings winner and a 
financial boon for Fox, but it also jump-started a new programming trend in the 
U.S.: “tabloid television.” Although new to America, this format – which 
employed the “well-tested formula of crime, sex and scandal of tabloid 
newspapers” – had been a success abroad for some time.467 In fact, a program of 
the same name and style of reporting had aired in Australia since the early ‘70s. 
Many a journalist noticed that A Current Affair replicated the look and feel of 
many of Murdoch’s tabloid publications.468 In fact, Murdoch was one of the 
strongest proponents of the reality magazine format. Its relatively low cost meant 
that major market stations could afford to produce it and test it out in a limited 
number of cities. Shows with potential could then be expanded to run nationally 
either via syndication or on the network.469  
Fox executives saw A Current Affair as a strong model in terms of format 
and distribution strategy. The trick became finding another program like it which 
could be plugged into one of the many gaps in Fox’s prime time schedule. In 
spring 1988, they found it. On February 11, 1988, Fox O&Os premiered a new 
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program modeled after a British series. The show, called America’s Most Wanted, 
asked viewers to call in if they had any knowledge of the whereabouts of 
criminals which were profiled. In a strike of good fortune for Fox, the first 
fugitive featured was captured due to a tip provided by a viewer of the 
program.470  Building on the publicity surrounding the arrest of this fugitive, 
David James Roberts, Fox rushed the show onto its prime time schedule.471 On 
Sunday, April 10, 1988, America’s Most Wanted made its national debut.  
The timing of the launch could not have been better. At just that moment, 
the Writer’s Guild of America (WGA) began a five month strike. The strike led to 
a delay on the production of all entertainment programming for the fall. This, in 
turn, caused the networks’ schedules to be more rerun-heavy than usual.472 The 
strike benefited Fox in a couple of important ways. First, it enabled some viewers 
to discover Fox for the first time. Though Fox’s entertainment programming 
consisted of reruns, they were nonetheless new to many viewers. Second, Fox 
could continue to generate fresh episodes of America’s Most Wanted during the 
strike because the show did not employ WGA employees. Thus Fox was able to 
produce original programming during the summer while the Big Three had little 
new to offer. What’s more, the shows were far less expensive to produce than 
sitcoms or dramas. The average episode of America’s Most Wanted cost 
approximately $125,000 per half hour versus a half-hour sitcom which cost 
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upwards of $500,000.473 This programming was therefore perfectly suited for an 
increasingly “fiscally conservative” Fox.474  
Fox executives recognized their advantage over the networks and 
exploited it to their benefit throughout the summer and into the fall. In July, Fox 
transferred some of the journalists from A Current Affair to a new hour-long 
newsmagazine. The Reporters, performed better on Saturday nights than any of 
the sitcoms which had preceded it.  In September, Fox began airing another 
reality program, Beyond Tomorrow. This show, adapted from an Australian series 
called Beyond 2000, focused on innovative, future-thinking inventions. While 
neither of these programs lasted for longer than a couple of years, they served a 
valuable short-term function for the company. 
Cops was another series developed during the strike. In October 1988, six 
Fox O&Os began broadcasting this cinema vérité-style reality program, which 
followed police officers around during their shifts.475 The show moved to the 
network’s prime time schedule the following March, where it played on Saturday 
nights alongside The Reporters and Beyond 2000. Yet again Fox had a low-cost 
hit on its hands. Cops was a success from its first night on the air. Indeed, Fox’s 
Saturday night reality programming – with Cops as the anchor show – proved to 
be strong counter-programming against a movie-of-the-week on ABC, dramas on 
CBS, and NBC’s powerhouse comedy line-up of 227, Amen, Golden Girls and 
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Empty Nest.  Whereas previous Fox programs on that night had been unable to be 
different enough from what was available on the networks to attract a substantial 
audience, these shows were both stylistically distinctive and attractive to 
completely different (e.g., younger male) demographic.476  
With the success of this Saturday line-up, Fox moved one step closer to 
targeting a specific group: viewers 18-34. This schedule also enabled Fox to 
establish a clearer identity for itself. Even as the strike concluded and the Big 
Three returned to producing original programming once again, Fox continued to 
rely heavily on the format. In fact, a disproportionate number of shows introduced 
by Fox through fall 1989 were reality series. Another popular program was the 
Candid Camera clone, Totally Hidden Video. On July 16, 1989 – only the second 
week it was on the air – Totally Hidden Video was the most-watched program in 
the U.S. during its time period.477 
In the wake of the strong ratings performances of these reality shows, Fox 
was finally able to secure an effective schedule for two days of the week.478 By 
summer 1989, Saturday nights were working with an all-reality line-up that 
included Cops, The Reporters and Beyond Tomorrow. Sundays, meanwhile, 
included a mixture of drama, comedy and reality programming. 21 Jump Street 
began the evening, followed by America’s Most Wanted and Totally Hidden 
Video. The night concluded with four sitcoms – Married…with Children, It’s 
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Garry Shandling’s Show, The Tracey Ullman Show and Duet. With Saturday and 
Sunday relatively stable, Fox started preparing for the launch of a third night. 
Programmers played it safe in unrolling this evening’s shows. In May 1989, they 
began running a Monday movie night once a month. The movies came primarily 
from the Fox library. Among the motion pictures which aired were The Fly 
(1986), Big Trouble in Little China (1986), Jumpin’ Jack Flash (1986), Black 
Widow (1987) and Revenge of the Nerds 2 (1987).479  
In September of 1989, Fox shifted from movies to a third night of series 
programming. Again, the company was conservative in its choice of new shows. 
21 Jump Street was moved to Monday nights to make way for a spin-off, Booker, 
featuring teen heartthrob Richard Grieco. Duet was re-formatted and re-named 
Open House. And Fox made its next effort at developing synergies between the 
motion picture and television divisions with the re-invention of Alien Nation as a 
prime-time program. Though short-lived, Alien Nation (which aired following 21 
Jump Street on Mondays) was significant in being the first science fiction show to 
run on the program service. 
Alien Nation was one of the many programs developed during Garth 
Ancier’s tenure as president of the Fox network. However, by the time the show 
premiered, he would no longer be employed at the company. In February 1989, 
Ancier left in what was the first “top-level shake-up” at Fox.480  His departure was 
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a direct result of the shift in program philosophies taking place.481 Ancier 
remained a strong proponent of developing half-hour sitcoms and hour long 
dramas. Throughout his tenure, he resisted relying heavily on reality shows. As 
these reality shows took off while the entertainment programming stalled, Ancier 
was pushed out. He was replaced as head of Fox Entertainment Group by Peter 
Chernin.482 
Ironically, many of the programs Ancier had championed were just 
starting to take off at the time of his departure. 21 Jump Street, which had early on 
attracted a strong following among teenage girls, continued to expand its audience 
base.483  In August 1988, 21 Jump Street star Johnny Depp became the first Fox 
performer to grace the cover of TV Guide.484 The momentum for the show 
continued to build through 1989. At the beginning of that year, Variety estimated 
that, for every television set on, one out of every two women age 18-49 was 
watching 21 Jump Street.485 By the summer of ’89, the show was also number one 
with men ages 18-34.486   
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Married…with Children also increased its viewership over the course of 
1989. As with 21 Jump Street, its audience expanded as a result of the media 
attention it garnered during that year. However, the publicity attended upon 
Married…with Children differed substantially from that provided to 21 Jump 
Street. The press coverage of Married…with Children occurred as the result of a 
very public campaign undertaken by one Michigan mother against the show. In 
early 1989, Terry Rakolta campaigned for a boycott against the sitcom and the 
sponsors that supported it. Her crusade was motivated by an episode which made 
references to homosexuality and showed a character removing a bra.487 Rakolta’s 
protests generated national coverage and she appeared on such shows as Nightline 
and The CBS Morning News.488 In addition, the story was featured on the front 
page of the New York Times as well as in USA Today.489 As might be expected, 
instead of deterring people from watching the show, she drew more attention to it. 
The ratings for Married for Children – which were already slowly rising – 
skyrocketed following the Rakolta hoopla.  In July of 1989, Married…with 
Children was the number-one program during the 9:00 time period, earning an 
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11.5 rating and 21 share.490 A few weeks later, it became the first Fox series to 
move into the top 20 in the Nielsen rankings.491 
As a result of the publicity surrounding Married…with Children, 21 Jump 
Street and the reality programs, Fox began to establish a particular profile for 
itself with the press and public. In the broadest sense, its shows seemed unlike 
anything that could be found on the Big Three. Its shows were pushing the 
boundaries of style and content in ways that programs on ABC, CBS and NBC 
were not. For example, the reality series favored fast cutting, hand-held video 
cameras and sensationalistic subject matter. Married…with Children often 
featured biting satire and raw dialogue. 21 Jump Street provided a new take on 
action stories by depicting twenty-something cops going undercover as high 
schoolers. Slowly, Fox began to refine its image as the “alternative” programming 
service. No longer did “alternative” merely function as a catch-all term. Rather, 
alternative began to suggest younger, riskier and – in the increasingly used term, 
“edgier” – than what could be found on the Big Three. As the decade came to a 
close, such labels were used to describe the company and its shows with 
increasing frequency by both the press and Fox’s own executives.  
The connotations of such terms were not always positive. In fact, many 
critics reviled this programming, seeing it as taking television to new lows.492 But 
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regardless of critical opinion, the shows were earning both ratings and dollars for 
the program service. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1989, Fox broke even for 
the first time.493 This was far earlier than anticipated; News Corp. had been 
prepared to lose money for up to five years.494 Murdoch’s short-term mandate was 
to “increase the value, the revenues and profits” of the O&Os.495 In fact, Fox was 
well on its way to profitability.  The company received an additional boost that 
June when it cleared an impressive $250 million in upfront advertising sales.496 
Little did Fox executives know how profitable the company would soon become. 
 
REFINING STRATEGIES, DEFINING AUDIENCES: FOX, NEWS CORP. AND THE 
MEDIA INDUSTRIES PREPARE FOR THE 1990S 
In 1989, Fox turned a corner. It was at this time that the service began 
making money, building a brand identity for itself and honing in on a variety of 
effective programming strategies. The degree to which the company had 
blossomed in a relatively short time is apparent from a survey of its handling of 
the Emmy Awards ceremony during the late ‘80s. In April 1987 – the same month 
Fox premiered its prime time slate – the company announced its purchase of the 
rights to Emmys for the next three years. Fox paid $1.25 million per year for 
broadcast rights, as well as an additional $250,000 for the rights to the Television 
                                                                                                                                     
House was described by Matt Roush of USA Today as “a tawdry two-step…but not necessarily a 
step in the right direction,” “Disheveled ‘Open House’ is Littered with Sorry Humor,” 25 August 
1989, 3D.  
493 Gay, “Fox is Closing in on Record $250-Mil in Upfront Sales,” Variety, 21-27 June 1989, 37, 
40. 
494 Stuller, 142. 
495 Murdoch statement provided in “Fox Eases Affiliates’ Concern,” Variety. 
496 “Fox is Closing In,” Variety. 
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Hall of Fame Awards.497 The rationale behind the deal was that it would add to 
the company’s legitimacy as a programming service with viewers. Fox would not 
only have the opportunity to attract a large audience with this “event” 
programming strategy, but could also use the night to promote its regular series. 
Thus, though it was thought unlikely Fox would earn back its money from 
advertising sales, the event could serve as a “loss leader,” increasing viewer 
awareness of the company and its shows.  
The Big Three were furious with the Academy of Television Arts and 
Sciences. Previously the networks had rotated the awards between them, with 
each having the rights to the show every third year. In conjunction with that 
arrangement, they had avoided scheduling competitive shows on that night. Now 
the way they traditionally had done business was being disrupted. They claimed 
that Fox’s purchase of the awards compromised the integrity of the event.498 In 
response, CBS and NBC decided to air original programming against the Emmys. 
This tactic, along with Fox’s low profile at the time, helped turn the awards 
broadcast into a disaster for the new service. Whereas NBC’s 1986 broadcast 
received a hefty 21.1 rating/36 share, Fox’s 1987 Emmy broadcast earned a 
meager 8.8 rating/14 share for the evening.499 Fox had the distinction of having 
                                                 
497 Since Fox didn’t have 100% coverage of the U.S., the company agreed to offer the show to 
network affiliates or independents in areas where it didn’t reach. At the time of the purchase of the 
rights, Fox had 108 stations covering about 84% of the U.S. Broadcasting reports: “ABC, CBS 
and NBC had offered $875,000 a year for the Emmys – an increase of $125,000 over the previous 
annual rate – but did not want the Hall of Fame.” Figures from “Fox Wins Emmy Awards,” 27 
April 1987, 37. 
498 See “Fox Wins Emmy Awards,” Broadcasting; Dave Kaufman, “CBS-TV Gets Fall Head 
Start; Debuts Sked Two Weeks Early, Indifferent to Fox’ Emmy Show,” Variety, 26 August 1987, 
75, 98; “Fox Airs Emmys; NBC Wins Most,” Broadcasting, 28 September 1987, 46, 54. 
499 William Mahoney, “FBC Boosts Its Ratings for Emmys Telecast,” Electronic Media, 25 
September 1989, 16. 
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both the lowest rated awards broadcast in history as well as the longest show ever 
(with the event coming in one minute short of four hours).500  
By the time of the September 1988 awards ceremony, circumstances for 
Fox were improving. Its reality programming was on the rise, as were some of its 
other prime time shows. The landmarks Fox hit on this evening were more 
positive than those attained the previous year. Most importantly, Fox had its first 
ever Sunday night win over another network (ABC). In addition, the company 
earned its highest Nielsens to date, with a 10.4 rating/18 share – a 29% 
improvement over the previous year.501 The 1988 awards ceremony also had the 
distinction of being the first time cable channels were eligible to be nominated.502 
The HBO special Dear America: Letters Home from Vietnam took home the first 
awards given out to cable programmers.503 
It was in 1989 that Fox’s fortunes with the Emmys – as with the rest of its 
prime time schedule – improved most dramatically. Fox once again gained in the 
ratings, attaining an 11.4 rating/19 share.504 Further, the program service beat both 
CBS and ABC in the rankings.505 Even more significantly, Fox won its first 
Emmys. The Tracey Ullman Show received four statuettes at the 1989 event, 
including the honor for outstanding variety, music or comedy program.  
                                                 
500 In spite of its low ratings performance, Fox nonetheless earned its highest ratings yet with the 
broadcast on that evening. See “Fox Airs Emmys; NBC Wins Most,’ Broadcasting; “FBC Boosts 
Its Ratings,” Electronic Media. 
501 “ABC Tops Emmy List,” Broadcasting, 5 September 1988, 35-36. 
502 Ibid. 
503 The program won “Outstanding Informational Special” and its writers won for “Outstanding 
Individual Achievement, Informational Programing.” 
504 “FBC Boosts Ratings,” Electronic Media. 
505 Ibid. 
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In several ways, this analysis of the evolution of Fox’s Emmy broadcast 
during the late ‘80s reveals the company’s growing influence over the television 
landscape. First, Fox’s purchase of the rights to the program marked the first time 
– but not the last – that the company overpaid for event programming in order to 
boost its profile with viewers and be taken more seriously by the industry. The 
effect of this move, as with many that followed, was that Fox upset how the 
networks did business. ABC, CBS and NBC were forced to change their 
scheduling practices in response. Second, the lower ratings for the Emmys during 
their time on Fox points to the increasing fragmentation of television viewing. 
When the Emmys were broadcast on NBC in 1986, they attracted 60 million 
viewers.506 Three years later, the ceremony was seen by 15.8 million viewers on 
Fox.507 While the lower numbers were partially a result of Fox’s lesser coverage 
of the U.S., they were also a function of the increased options available to 
television viewers.508 Cable, video and independent television stations were all 
biting into the networks’ total audience share. At the time of the 1989 Emmy 
awards broadcast, the various cable channels were totaling a 42 share for the full 
day’s schedule while independents (including Fox) averaged a 17 share, and the 
                                                 
506 Jeff Kaye, “Fox & the Emmys: Will the Show Hit the Road, Now that the Maverick Network’s 
Contract is Up?,” Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1989, Calendar 1. 
507 Ibid. 
508 At this time Fox had roughly 165 affiliates and 89% clearance versus the Big Three’s 205 and 
nearly complete national saturation. Further, the networks’ affiliates were mainly on VHF whereas 
Fox had a disproportionate sum of UHF affiliates. Fox affiliate numbers from Paul Harris, “Focus 
on INTV: Fox’ Growing Appetite Should be Tastiest Topic at INTV Buffet,” Variety, 3 January 
1990, 31. Big Three affiliate numbers from Gay, “The Big Three: A Well-Oiled Machine That 
Still Delivers the Goods – and Viewers,” Variety, 11-17 October 1989, 95.  
 177
Big Three averaged a 44 share.509 In prime time, the networks’ numbers were 
slightly higher: They had a 47 share as compared to independents’ 18 share and 
cable’s cumulative share of 40.510 
Third, the awards given to The Tracey Ullman Show reaffirmed that Fox 
was not strictly a low-brow, bottom-feeding service. The awards also 
foreshadowed the different direction Fox would take over the next several 
months. While the company’s reliance on reality shows had provided a short term 
boost for ratings, they could not be a permanent salve. Many advertisers steered 
clear of the programs, not wanting their products associated with such low-end 
shows.511 As a result, ad rates on many of the reality programs were lower than on 
the more traditional entertainment fare.512 Also, by relying so heavily on reality 
shows, Fox was in danger of becoming too narrow in its focus. Should the trend 
suddenly lose steam, Fox would have to overhaul a large portion of its schedule 
quickly. Further, their syndication value was less than ideal because they did not 
re-run well and because they did not play well abroad.513 Thus, although they 
were relatively inexpensive to produce, their revenue streams remained limited. 
What Fox (and News Corp.) needed was an entertainment franchise which could 
be exploited throughout many of its divisions.  
                                                 
509 Study was conducted by the Cabletelevision Advertising Bureau, which analyzed Nielsen data. 
Cable share represented 30 basic services and 12 pay services. Information from Richard Huff, 
“Cable Viewership Hits Record High,” Variety, 13-19 September 1989, 55. 
510 Ibid. At this time, paycable penetration was at 29.4%, while VCR penetration was at 65.8%. 
This was a rise from 28.6 from cable and 53.3 VCR in 1987. Numbers again from Nielsen, as 
reported in the chart titled “VCR and Paycable Penetration,” Variety, 13-19 September 1989, 66. 
511 “Syndies Plan ‘Current Affair’ Clones,” Variety; Meg Cox, “Advertisers Are Flocking to 
Fledgling Fox,” Wall Street Journal, 28 February 1989.  
512 Dempsey, “24 Advertisers Boycott ‘Affair,’ ‘Edition,’ ‘Copy,’” Variety, 21 March 1990, 1, 60. 
513 “Syndies Plan ‘Current Affair’ Clones,” Variety. 
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The primary importance of the reality programs was in enabling Fox 
programmers to define their desired audiences more clearly. Previously there had 
been some uncertainty about which demographic groups were preferable.  One 
week Ancier would tell the press that Fox wanted to generate “mass appeal 
shows”; the next week he would speak of his pursuit of shows that were “young 
in appeal.”514 As the reality shows increasingly hit with teenagers, urban 
audiences and the 18-34 demographic, executives focused on picking up more 
shows targeted to these groups. However, the programs in development were not 
reality series. Rather, by fall 1989, Fox began to focus once more on scheduling 
sitcoms and hour-long dramas.515 
The first such entertainment programs to be broadcast in line with this new 
strategy proved to be much more successful than anyone at Fox could have 
anticipated. On December 17, 1989, Fox ran a half-hour special entitled “The 
Simpsons Roasting on an Open Fire.” The characters had been spun off from The 
Tracey Ullman Show, where they appeared in bumpers for that program each 
week. From their first half-hour prime time appearance, the show was a stunning 
success. The program ranked 30th in the Nielsens and surpassed the record Emmy 
ratings Fox had earned a few months earlier. Yet the news for the night got even 
better. That evening’s episode of Married…with Children ranked 13th for the 
week and became “the first Fox program ever to win a timeslot during the regular 
                                                 
514 First statement from Diane Haithman, “Fox Network Picks Up ‘Garry Shandling Show’; 
‘North Report’ Canceled,” Los Angeles Times, 6 January 1988, Calendar 1. Second statement from 
“Fox Eases Affiliates’ Concern,” Variety. 
515 Brian Lowry, “Reality Out for Fox’ Monday Night Sked,” Variety, 22-28 March 1989, 43, 54; 
Tom Jicha, “Fox Turns Thumbs Down on New Reality Show From WSVN Miami,” Variety, 1 
November 1989, 53. 
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season,” beating every show of that week “in ratings for a number of key 
demographic groups, including adults 18-34, men 18-49 and youths 12-17.”516 
Clearly a change was at hand for Fox – not to mention the media 
industries at large. In late 1989, newly instated Fox Entertainment Group head 
Peter Chernin was learning the ropes at the network. At the same time, new 
motion picture division head Joe Roth was becoming familiar with the studio.  In 
November, another important individual joined the company. This person, Preston 
Padden, left his top position at INTV to become senior vice president of Fox 
affiliates.517 Padden’s arrival signaled Fox’s growing strength as well as the 
diminishing influence of independent stations. In the ensuing years, he would do 
much at Fox to increase its authority. Padden’s forceful lobbying efforts proved to 
benefit both Fox and the networks. He would be aided in his pursuit of 
deregulation by the incoming FCC chairman, Al Sikes. As the next chapter 
shows, the Sikes-led FCC accomplished what neither the Fowler nor Patrick-led 
commissions had been able to – an overhaul of the fin-syn rules.  
Meanwhile, consolidation continued in the media industries following the 
recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. Even as News Corp. incorporated its 
newly acquired publishing divisions and expanded its satellite investments, Time 
Warner, Sony and Matsushita integrated their recently purchased holdings and 
redefined their corporate structures. Within these newly formulated entities, 
filmed entertainment divisions would serve an increasingly important function. 
For most of these companies, event films were becoming ever-more important to 
                                                 
516 Tom Bierbaum, “Fox Finds ‘Married’ Bliss in Nielsens,” Variety, 27 December 1989, 25, 32. 
517 “Padden to Leave INTV for Fox,” Broadcasting, 20 November 1989, 34. 
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the bottom line. Such big-budget movies were a focal point for Fox Filmed 
Entertainment as well. However, at the same time, Fox was in the unique position 
of being able to explore the economic opportunities available to it as both a 
television producer and network distributor. As the next chapter demonstrates, 
The Simpsons served as the program through which Fox was first able to test the 
economic value of this structure. In the process, the program demonstrated that a 
successful niche-targeted television franchise could be every bit as profitable as a 
high concept film.  
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Chapter Five: Finding a Niche with The Simpsons, January 1990 – 
February 1992 
It’s a very weird thing…We’ve all of a sudden gone from doing our stupid 
little jobs to becoming the Big Story… 
Fox executive Peter Chernin, October 1990518 
In TV, especially, the era of nichification is at hand. A year ago I 
remember Robert Wright, president of NBC, complaining about the 
upstart Fox network. Fox was free to go after the niches, he said, while the 
senior networks still had a mandate to pursue the broad spectrum 
audience. Well, times have changed... 
Variety editor Peter Bart, January 1991519  
 
As the ‘90s began, Fox’s future looked full of possibilities. The young 
program service was coming off its first profitable year and the next year seemed 
even more promising due to record upfront sales. The company’s executives were 
starting to establish a clear identity for the weblet. The number of viewers in the 
18-to-34 target demographic continued to increase. Saturday and Sunday nights 
were performing well and Monday nights were slowly building an audience. The 
back-to-back broadcasts of The Simpsons special and Married…with Children in 
December 1989 had brought the company its highest ratings yet. Those in the 
industry and press who had expressed skepticism about the program service’s 
long-term viability were no longer doing so.  
                                                 
518 Mark Morrison, “Year of the Fox,” Rolling Stone, 4 October 1990, 76-77. 
519 “Niche-picking for the ‘90s, or, Don’t Mind the Masses,” 14 January 1991, 5, 129. 
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Fox’s impressive performance during the late ‘80s would prove to be 
nothing compared to the influence it would wield in the early ‘90s. Largely as the 
result of the success of this one show, The Simpsons, Fox transitioned from a 
gradual, methodical growth process into a rapid, chaotic, and stunningly 
profitable period of expansion. The company exploited the popularity and 
publicity surrounding the show to expand its schedule from three to five nights a 
week, shore up affiliate support and cross-promote its nascent Fox Children’s 
Network. Most significantly, The Simpsons helped Fox solidify its image as the 
renegade program service – hipper, younger and brasher than the Big Three. The 
show became interchangeable with Fox’s identity. This, in turn, led Fox to be 
viewed as a threat to the established networks for the first time. In attracting the 
18-to-34-year-old viewers most sought after by advertisers, The Simpsons enabled 
Fox to evolve from its position as a self-described “gnat” to become a force to be 
reckoned with – and, in some cases, feared by its competitors.520 The program had 
a halo effect, providing the company with a clear brand identity which served 
valuable marketing functions for the entire Fox schedule as well as for other 
divisions of News Corp. 
As I demonstrate in the chapter which follows, in a little over a year Fox 
evolved from being a weekend program service to a legitimate challenger to the 
Big Three. Due to a combination of savvy programming strategies, skillful 
negotiations with cable operators, and effective lobbying in Washington, Fox’s 
fortunes rose at a time when its parent company – as well as the rest the networks, 
                                                 
520 “Fox Broadcasting Co.: The Birth of a Network?,” Broadcasting. 
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motion picture studios and broadcast industry – were struggling to survive a harsh 
economy and tight advertising environment. By the time Barry Diller left the 
company in February 1992, Fox had not only instituted a number of innovative 
scheduling strategies but, even more importantly, used its image as an underdog 
to challenge the fin-syn rules. Largely due to Fox’s campaigning, the FCC 
reevaluated the utility of the rules and found them no longer necessary.  The rules 
would remain intact only long enough for Fox to gain a substantial advantage 
over its network competitors. Through this advantage, the company could exist in 
the privileged position of being both network – and not-a-network – as suited its 
particular regulatory, industrial and programming needs at a given point in time. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF A TELEVISION PHENOMENON: THE CASE OF THE 
SIMPSONS 
Seemingly overnight, Fox Broadcasting’s The Simpsons has emerged as a 
breakaway ratings hit, an industry trendsetter, a merchandising 
phenomenon, a cultural template and, among its most fanatical followers, 
a viewing experience verging on the religious… 
Newsweek, April 1990521 
The Simpsons has been a critical and academic darling since its earliest 
seasons on the air. Over the years, it has been written about in a number of 
contexts. Most frequently, the show has been evaluated in terms of its postmodern 
sensibility, its subversive depiction of a blue-collar family, and its influence on 
contemporary prime time animation.522 Scholars have concentrated predominantly 
                                                 
521 Harry F. Waters and Linda Buckley, “Family Feuds,” Newsweek, 23 April 1990, 58. 
522 For an example of the treatment of the show as postmodern, see Carl Bybee and Ashley 
Overbeck, “Homer Simpson Explains Our Postmodern Identity Crisis, Whether We Like It Or 
 184
on The Simpsons’ politics and its aesthetics – traits most readily apparent through 
an analysis of the show’s textual dimensions. Given the substantial amount of 
literature on the series, it is surprising that scholars have rarely discussed its wide-
ranging influence on the television industry’s practices and products. Instead, 
such discussions have occurred mainly in journalistic circles.523   Journalists 
covering the industrial dimensions of the program are typically focused on its 
status at the time they are writing. Such articles, while useful as resources, often 
fail to evaluate the broader relationship between the show and the contemporary 
media environment. 
In this section, I attempt to fill this gap in the literature on The Simpsons, 
considering the program in terms of its influence on larger production, 
distribution and marketing processes. As will become clear in this analysis, the 
history of Fox – its image as a program service, its status as a ‘network,’ and its 
position as a vertically integrated company – has been intricately intertwined with 
the development of The Simpsons. This program not only was the first major 
success story for the young company, but was also the first show to be produced, 
broadcast and syndicated by one company after the enactment of the fin-syn rules. 
In other words, The Simpsons was the first television program to demonstrate the 
                                                                                                                                     
Not: Media Literacy After The Simpsons,” Studies in Media & Information Literacy Education 1, 
no. 1 (2001). http://www.utpjournals.com/simile (accessed June 23, 2004). For an analysis of the 
program’s representation of the family, see Diane F. Alters, “‘We Hardly Watch That Rude, Crude 
Show’: Class and Taste in The Simpsons,” Prime Time Animation: Television Animation and 
American Culture, eds. Carol A. Stabile and Mark Harrison (London: Routledge, 2003), 165-184. 
Several other articles in Prime Time Animation nicely contextualize The Simpsons in relation to 
contemporary animation. In addition, see “The Simpsons Archive” online for an inventory of 
academic and popular articles written about the show: http://www.snpp.com/misc.html (accessed 
June 23, 2004). 
523 The most extensive such discussion can be found in the paperback edition of Alex Ben Block’s 
Outfoxed. Also see various journalistic articles cited in this section.  
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economic value of a hit series to a contemporary media conglomerate. The show 
served a branding function for Fox, helping the company further cultivate its 
image as the “alternative” program service.  
The Simpsons rapidly emerged as a television franchise unlike any others 
which had come before. Although programs such as The Cosby Show and 
M*A*S*H were immensely successful in syndication – and Star Trek was an 
unparalleled merchandising phenomenon – no single program ever had brought 
one company profits via so many different avenues from its first days on the air. 
This extraordinary financial success carried with it additional industrial, 
programming and cultural implications. However, before delving into these 
elements, it is important to provide a bit of background about how The Simpsons 
made it onto the air in the first place. 
The Simpson family was created when The Tracey Ullman Show producer 
James L. Brooks approached Los Angeles underground comic strip artist Matt 
Groening and asked him to provide brief animated sequences to air between 
Ullman’s skits. Groening, whose comic strip “Life in Hell” had developed a 
strong cult following by this time, decided to create new characters so he would 
retain the rights to his print characters. The Simpsons were named after members 
of his own family, with the exception of Bart (an anagram of “Brat”), who was a 
stand-in for Groening.524 The animated bumpers of The Simpsons were first aired 
during the second season of The Tracey Ullman Show (1988-89). Many of the 
                                                 
524 See the BBC special, “America’s First Family,” The Simpsons: The Complete First Season. 
1989-90. DVD. 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2001. 
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character voices – as well as behind-the-scene talent – were drawn from the crew 
on Ullman’s series.525 
From early on, Brooks felt the Simpsons should have a series of their own, 
but he met with resistance from many Fox executives.526 Though Ancier and 
Wendle supported a Simpson-centered series, Diller initially doubted it would 
work.527 He supported creating a number of specials instead. Part of Diller’s 
concern stemmed from the fact that the last successful prime time animated series 
was The Flintstones, which had gone off the air more than twenty years before. 
The high cost of animation also worried Diller. Given the long lead time needed 
to complete animation, the entire season (e.g., millions of dollars) would have to 
be approved up front.528 If the show failed early on, millions would be lost. 
Nonetheless, The Simpsons finally received a green light, in large part due to 
Brooks’s clout.529 It was produced by Brooks’s Gracie Films production company 
in collaboration with Twentieth Century Fox Television. From the outset, the 
creators had an extensive amount of creative freedom. When there were conflicts 
between Fox and the show’s executives, Brooks served as an intermediary.530 
The mandate from the earliest stages of development was that the show 
had to be different from previous efforts at television animation. Brooks told 
Block that his vision from the outset was that it should “be based on the inner 
                                                 
525 Julie Kavner (Marge) and Dan Castellaneta (Homer) were featured actors on The Tracey 
Ullman Show; in addition, producer-writers Sam Simon and Wallace Wolodarsk as well as editor 
Brian Roberts worked on the sketch comedy series. 
526 Block, 377. 
527 Ibid. 
528 “America’s First Family,” The Simpsons: The Complete First Season. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Block, 381. 
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emotional lives of cartoon characters.”531 The characters should seem real – only 
animated. Groening and Brooks felt it was important that the characters obey the 
laws of physics, meaning that they could not randomly fall off a ten story building 
or be hit on the head with a frying pan and emerge uninjured.532  
It didn’t take long for Fox executives to see the potential of this new take 
on animation. Upon viewing the first episode, Diller’s attitude toward the show 
changed dramatically. From then on, he was completely supportive of the 
series.533  The Simpsons, of course, didn’t need any backing from Fox executives 
to survive – as noted in chapter four, it was a hit from the airing of the Christmas 
special in December 1989. The series officially began on Sunday, January 14, 
1990, premiering after America’s Most Wanted and before Married…with 
Children. By the time the fourth show was broadcast, Fox deemed it enough of a 
success to renew it for a second 24-episode season.534 Week after week in the 
spring of 1990, The Simpsons continued to ascend in the ratings. By April, it was 
regularly placing in the top 20 in spite of the fact that Fox’s national coverage 
remained below 90%.535 At the end of first season (consisting of an abridged 13 
episodes), The Simpsons was regularly in the top ten among the 18-49 
demographic.536 
                                                 
531 Ibid, 377. 
532 Ibid, 380. 
533 Block, 377. 
534 Ibid, 282. 
535 Waters and Buckley, “Family Feuds.” 
536 “CBS, Fox Round Out Prime Time 1990-91,” Broadcasting, 4 June 1990, 55-57. 
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A few months before The Simpsons premiered, Variety had declared the 
1989-90 season to be the first “hitless season in memory” for the Big Three.537 
Suddenly, in mid-season, there appeared a new “national obsession” – one that 
wasn’t coming from the established networks.538 Simpsons characters were 
featured on the covers of a range of publications, including Newsweek, US, 
Rolling Stone, Mother Jones, Spy Jr., and the syndicated TV Week.539 In addition, 
Simpsons-based merchandise was selling more quickly than stores could stock 
it.540 By the end of August 1990, millions of dollars worth of merchandise had 
been sold, for which Fox typically received a royalty ranging from five to eight 
percent.541 And the show was not solely a national phenomenon; Simpsons 
merchandise was selling even in countries where it had not yet aired.542  
Much of the initial merchandise – as well as many of the early storylines – 
focused on the character of Bart. For example, a Bart doll declared “the kids in 
TV land are being duped,” while t-shirts featured Bart proclaiming one of his 
                                                 
537 Lippman, “Big 3 Webs Mired in First Hitless Season in Memory: Is it the Writers’ Strike, the 
Competition or the Nets’ Reluctance to Take Risks? Reasons Vary, But All Agree New Show 
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538 Michael Kinsley, “Bart for President,” New Republic, 23 July 1990, 4. 
539 See Waters and Buckley, “Family Feuds,” Newsweek; Jerry Lazar, “The Bratty Bunch,” US, 
30 April 1990, 38-41; Bill Zehme, “The Only Real People on T.V.,” Rolling Stone, 28 June 1990, 
40-42, 46-47; Sean Elder, “Is TV the Coolest Invention Ever Invented?,” Mother Jones, December 
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Week insert of Washington Post, 18 March 1990; “Bart Simpson’s Match the Excuse to the Thing 
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540 Christy Fisher and Marcy Magiera, “Hey Dude – Fox’s Simpson Family is Hot,” Advertising 
Age, 19 March 1990, 4. 
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Mouse Duo to Revitalize ‘The Simpsons’ Merchandise Sales,” Brandweek, 10 August 1992, 16-
17. 
542 For example, according to Lefton, although The Simpsons was not yet airing on television in 
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signature lines: “Don’t have a cow, man.” Variety declared The Simpsons “the 
hottest character license in the country.”543 Meanwhile, Fox generated respect for 
its restraint in licensing of the program; licensees during the first year were 
limited to a relatively conservative number of 75.544 
While Fox may have carefully managed the merchandising for the show, 
this is not to say the company limited its commercialization. Promotional tie-ins 
were struck with a number of major companies early on. In March 1990, Nestle 
arranged a deal to use the animated characters to promote its Butterfinger candy; 
by June, Burger King ads starring The Simpsons were in production.545 These 
commercial tie-ins elicited strong responses from Fox’s competitors. Both ABC 
and NBC refused to air the spots, claiming they helped promote a competitors’ 
program.546 They argued that, whereas a Mickey Mouse or a Bugs Bunny-
centered advertisement was not associated with the shows on any particular 
network, the Simpson characters were closely linked to the identity of Fox.547 
They felt that to broadcast an advertisement with the Simpsons would be to 
advertise indirectly for Fox. 
The concern expressed by the other networks over showing Simpsons 
commercials indicates Fox’s rapidly changing status as a program service. 
Suddenly Fox was no longer just an annoyance – the equivalent of little more than 
                                                 
543 “Will the Summer Stifle ‘Simpsons’ Sizzle?,” 30 May 1990, 43. 
544 Ibid. According to Block, the show was credited with helping to expand the market for 
licensed merchandise. Customers ranged from age three to adults, Outfoxed, 373. 
545 Fisher and Magiera, “Hey Dude,” Advertising Age; “Burger King-‘Simpsons’ Ad May Not Air 
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another independent television station. In large part due to the increased profile 
the company was attaining with The Simpsons, Fox had become a legitimate 
competitor. The company’s executives recognized the incredible boost they were 
gaining from The Simpsons and attempted to use the show as the means by which 
they could further expand their schedule. In May 1990 – after The Simpsons had 
been on the air less than six months – Fox executives surprised the industry by 
announcing plans to move it from Sunday nights to Thursday nights.548 The 
Simpsons would air at 8 p.m. opposite top-rated NBC’s Cosby Show, which at this 
time was the most popular series on television.549 The change was suggested by 
Murdoch and seconded by Diller; other Fox executives responded much more 
warily to the proposal.550  
The decision to move The Simpsons to Thursday nights was driven by a 
desire to expand Fox beyond its current three-night-a-week schedule. Fox 
executives believed that by moving the show to Thursdays, they would have a 
powerful base from which to build up the night.551 The Simpsons would function 
as the launching pad not only for Fox’s Thursday nights, but rather for its entire 
newly expanded schedule. As of September 1990, Fox planned to broadcast 
programming five nights a week. Two hours of programming a night would play 
Thursday through Monday with the exception of Sundays, which would have four 
hours of programming. The Simpsons move functioned as the linchpin of Fox’s 
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most ambitious scheduling strategy to date. However, Fox made other surprising 
choices at this time as well, including canceling 21 Jump Street and shifting 
America’s Most Wanted to Friday nights, where it would be the anchor for that 
new night of Fox programming.552  
Fox slated nine new shows to premiere in the fall of 1990 – the same 
number being launched on both NBC and CBS.553 The Fox programming week 
began on Thursdays with The Simpsons and a new sitcom called Babes, about 
three heavy-set sisters living in New York City. After Babes came a new teen 
drama, the Aaron Spelling-produced Beverly Hills 90210. On Fridays, Fox placed 
D.E.A after America’s Most Wanted. This police drama used news footage and 
hand-held camerawork to give it a grittier feel. The Saturday line-up consisted of 
two returning series – Totally Hidden Video and Cops – as well as two new series, 
the David Lynch-produced anthology series, American Chronicles, and the 
comedy-variety series, Haywire. Married…with Children was now the lone 
veteran series on Sunday nights. It was joined by a number of different comedies: 
True Colors was centered on an interracial relationship; Parker Lewis Can’t Lose 
featured a Ferris Bueller-type of teenager; Get A Life was a Chris Elliot vehicle 
and Good Grief a Howie Mandel vehicle. Concluding the evening was the hour-
long dramedy, Against the Law. Sandwiched in between Parker Lewis Can’t Lose 
and Get a Life was a sketch comedy/variety series which made its debut in April 
of 1990. This series, In Living Color, was already developing a following of its 
                                                 
552 In addition, Tracey Ullman decided to end her series before Fox pulled the plug on her (still 
low-rated) show. “Tracey Ullman Calls It Quits, Too,” Variety, 23 May 1990, 74. 
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own. Often labeled a “black Saturday Night Live” by the press, In Living Color 
was produced by Fox in association with the show’s creator and star, Keenan 
Ivory Wayans.554  
Fox’s decision to premiere so many shows at one time was a risky one. 
However, it was a move that the company’s executives deemed to be necessary 
for a couple of key reasons. First, by expanding its schedule to five nights a week, 
Fox struck a substantial blow to other companies which had a potential “fifth 
network” in the works. At the time Fox prepared its fall 1990 schedule, MCA-
Universal and Paramount (in conjunction with the Chris-Craft television stations) 
were in the early stages of formulating a new network of their own.555 Their 
business plan relied in part on linking up with Fox affiliates during the service’s 
“off” days. In expanding to five nights, Fox reinforced it was well on its way to 
having a full week’s worth of programming. Any new services would have little 
room to expand beyond two nights a week – and Fox executives emphasized the 
company would be airing shows on those nights soon.556 These scheduling moves 
thus served as a way for Fox to prevent affiliates from striking “time-sharing” 
arrangements with other services. It didn’t take long for MCA and Paramount to 
put away the blueprints for their fifth network venture – at least for the time 
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being.557 In place of such plans, both companies began developing first-run hour-
long action adventure series to play in the gaps on the Fox schedule (as well as on 
other independent stations and perhaps even some network affiliates).558 
A second reason Fox executives decided to expand so swiftly was because 
they recognized the company was on a roll. They wanted to take advantage of the 
high degree of positive publicity being afforded to Fox as a result of The 
Simpsons craze. The publicity surrounding The Simpsons was having a positive 
effect on the entire Fox schedule; viewers tuned in not only to that series but 
began sampling other programs on the service as well. Media coverage of the 
company and its shows was at an all time high: Journalists were calling Fox the 
“guerrilla network” and portraying it as “fresh” and “young” while the Big Three 
were described as “old” and “stale.”559 Fox’s decision to air The Simpsons – and 
air it against The Cosby Show no less – helped to highlight its status as a 
renegade, a risk-taker, an innovator. In the days leading up to the “match-up” 
between the two programs, the press increasingly built up the oppositions between 
Fox/The Simpsons and the Big Three/The Cosby Show. For example, Time 
magazine depicted Fox as the “upstart outsider” [launching] an attack on the very 
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symbol of the network establishment. Whatever the outcome, notice has been 
served: where once there were three contenders on the network battlefield, now 
there are four.”560  Variety ran a front page headline declaring “Bart to Cos: Eat 
My Shorts” and opined that this one programming move had changed “the whole 
complexion of the season.”561  
The image of a “contest” between The Simpsons and The Cosby Show was 
further reinforced by comments made by executives at Fox as well as at the Big 
Three. Howard Stringer, Broadcast Group President at CBS, told Variety within 
the context of a discussion of the impending “battle of Bart versus Bill” that 
“Everything’s changing….You have to be careful about stifling [producers] 
because they’ll look around and say, “Oh, we’ll go work for Fox.”562 Fox’s own 
Peter Chernin, meanwhile, was portrayed by Variety as touting “his team as the 
upstart programming guerrillas, taking audacious swipes at the Big Three. What 
better way to boost that brash image than having punk rebel Bart Simpson take on 
primetime's grand-old man Bill Cosby?”563 
Such journalistic proclamations served immense promotional value for 
Fox with the public as well as with advertisers. In short order Fox had found an 
effective means of tweaking its image. No longer was it the reality network; it had 
become the house that Bart built. Executives had found a program which appealed 
to demographics similar to those attained by the reality shows. However, unlike 
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the reality series, The Simpsons also received critical praise and advertiser 
support. Riding high off the media attention surrounding The Simpsons, Fox had 
an amazing 1990-91 upfront season. The company’s upfront sales totaled between 
$550 and $600 million – an increase of approximately $300 million from the 
previous year.564 Individual spots sold for as much as 33% more than they had a 
year before.565  
Even before this record upfront, The Simpsons had already provided a 
major boost to Fox’s bottom line. Whereas the previous year Fox had broken even 
for the first time, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1990, the program service 
reported $33 million in profit.566 In other words, Fox was turning a profit much 
earlier than its executives ever expected. When the program service started in 
April 1987, Kellner had stated his desire for the company to make its first profit 
within four or five years.567 In fact, Fox reached this target in only three years and 
with a mere three nights a week of programming.568 
The summer of 1990 was clearly a high point for Fox. The Simpsons was 
making headlines across the country. Sponsors were paying top dollar to advertise 
on a schedule with which featured only a handful of returning series. The 
Simpsons received its first Emmy award for Outstanding Animated Program. 
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America’s Most Wanted, Cops and Married…with Children were still rising in the 
ratings and In Living Color was beginning to take off.569 Fox executives were 
making headlines and earning kudos for their shrewd counter-programming 
strategies. And media attention continued to build as the Bart vs. Cosby match-up 
drew closer.  
NBC and Fox helped fuel the publicity for their respective series by 
holding off on airing new episodes until several weeks into the season. This 
allowed for several different ‘landmark’ events by which each could measure (and 
publicize) its success. The first such occasion took place on Thursday, August 23, 
1990. On this date, a re-run of The Simpsons played against a Cosby “bloopers” 
special. Cosby, wrote Broadcasting, “won the first round.” 570 In terms of ratings, 
this might have been the case, but The Simpsons was nonetheless a victor in the 
advertising department, receiving approximately $300,000 per 30-second spot.571 
These prices – which rivaled those being charged by NBC for The Cosby Show – 
were being paid even before new episodes of each show were broadcast.   
The first time original episodes of both programs aired was on October 11, 
1990. Although Cosby was the overall ratings victor, the race was much closer 
than even Fox executives had predicted it would be. In the first “head-to-head” 
competition, The Cosby Show beat The Simpsons by a slim one-tenth of a ratings 
point.572 The audience share for each show amounted to 29%.573 On this evening, 
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The Simpsons also recorded the highest rating ever for an animated program and 
for a Fox series.574 Fox had still more to celebrate the following week, when 
“battling Bart” nearly doubled the ratings attained by The Cosby Show in the 
highly desirable and difficult-to-attract male 18-49 demographic.575 
From the moment Fox announced the move of The Simpsons to Thursday 
nights, the company’s executives had publicly downplayed their expectations. 
They repeatedly stated in interviews that they had little hope of defeating The 
Cosby Show – rather, they were only hoping for second place. Chernin said in the 
summer of 1990 that moving The Simpsons to Thursday nights was “never about 
killing Cosby….We have no illusions about that. It's the other guys, the other two 
networks that aren't really there on Thursday night. There's a lot of audience left 
over the other two networks aren't hitting.”576 As it turned out, there were a lot of 
viewers that Cosby wasn’t hitting – or keeping, at any rate. Prior to The Simpsons’ 
move to Thursday nights, The Cosby Show was gaining in viewers in the 18-34 
and 18-49 age groups. From the 1987-88 season to the 1989-90 season, The 
Cosby Show increased its share of the 18-34 audience from 27% to 32% and its 
share of the 18-49 audience from 44% to 52%.577 However, as Variety noted, 
against The Simpsons “the numbers fell back to 27% and 46% respectively, while 
kids and teens dropped from 29% in ’89-90 to 23%.”578 What this meant was that 
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The Cosby Show’s audience was getting older – and smaller.579 With The 
Simpsons, Fox had found the first of many shows able to dethrone a network 
stalwart and ratings champion. What’s more, it enhanced its profile as a youthful 
alternative to the so-called stodgy networks and built up a core audience of 
viewers highly sought out by advertisers. 
The immense success of The Simpsons affected the broadcast television 
schedule in other ways. The show extended Fox’s focus on the “blue-collar 
family,” an emphasis begun a few years earlier with Married…with Children. The 
two programs were often perceived to be mirror images of each other by 
journalists; one writer called The Simpsons a “cartoon copy” of Married…with 
Children while another labeled the Simpson characters as “Fox’s other offbeat 
family.”580 Although the Big Three had first begun airing working-class comedies 
in the late ‘80s following the launch of Married…with Children (i.e.., Roseanne 
started its run in 1988), the phenomenal performance of The Simpsons 
significantly heightened the level of emulation. ABC – which in the early ‘90s 
was targeting similar demographic groups as Fox – relied most extensively on 
working-class comedies with shows such as Home Improvement (premiering in 
1991) and Grace Under Fire (premiering in 1993). 
Far more important and explicit than the influence of The Simpsons on the 
networks’ live action television formats was its influence on their larger 
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programming strategies. The high dollar sums commanded for commercials on 
The Simpsons and other Fox programs reinforced that advertisers were willing to 
pay premium prices for spots on series which attracted particularly desirable 
demographic groups. As noted in previous chapters, the pursuit of niche 
audiences by Fox intersected with the desire by advertisers for more targeted 
marketing. An emphasis on specific demographics rather than household ratings 
had also increased during the late ‘80s with the release of the people meter, a new 
measurement system capable of recording more specific demographic 
information.581  
Fox exploited these industrial developments with great acuity. The lesson 
learned by the Big Three from Fox’s success with The Simpsons was that a 
network didn’t have to attract mass audiences to turn a profit. This was a positive 
development for the networks given the continued fragmentation of television 
viewership. After Fox took the initial steps toward scheduling more niche-
oriented programming, the other networks hastily followed. For instance, in 
summer 1990, both NBC and CBS changed their upfront strategy to secure 
demographic rather than household ratings.582  
The immense popularity of The Simpsons had other, more immediate 
effects on the schedules of the Big Three as well as Fox itself. The most direct 
impact was felt within the world of television animation, an arena where The 
Simpsons single-handedly spurred a renaissance. While the movie business had 
been in the midst of an animation revival throughout the late ’80s, animation had 
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been slower to return to television. In terms of motion pictures, Disney had 
reassumed the mantle of animation king as a result of the stunning box office 
performance of Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988) and The Little Mermaid 
(1989). Universal’s American Tail (1986) and The Land Before Time (1988) also 
contributed to the animation boom of the late ‘80s. Not long after The Simpsons 
became a hit, the networks explored prime time animation once more.583 A new 
objective for many network executives involved finding the next big thing in 
“animation for adults.”584 This proved to be an elusive goal, at least in the early 
‘90s. A number of imitators came and went, including Dinosaurs (ABC, 1991-
1994), Capitol Critters (ABC, 1992) and Fish Police (CBS, 1992).  
Cable programmers stayed out of adult-oriented animation altogether at 
this time. Most remained focused on airing a slate of motion pictures, off-network 
dramas and low-cost original series. However, slowly a handful of cable channels 
made their first tentative steps into children’s animation.585 Among the new 
children’s-oriented animated series which began their run shortly after The 
Simpsons premiered were Captain Planet and the Planeteers (TBS, 1990-96), The 
Legend of Prince Valiant (The Family Channel, 1991-94), Doug (Nickelodeon, 
1991-93), and The Little Mermaid (Disney, 1992-94).586  
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Fox also began to move into the children’s animation business. In June 
1989, Fox announced it would launch a daytime children’s program block in the 
fall of 1990.587 The company decided to enter into the kids programming business 
partly as a result of affiliates’ concerns about the rising costs of syndicated 
programming.588 The arrangement was designed as a profit-sharing enterprise 
between Fox and its affiliates. The Fox Children’s Network (FCN), as it came to 
be called, had the potential to work heavily in the affiliates’ favor. The terms of 
the deal involved Fox taking 15% of FCN’s national advertising revenue, and 
then using the remaining 85% to cover production costs.589 Whatever was left 
after this would be divided between the affiliates based on their market delivery. 
A possible added bonus for affiliates down the road would come if a hit series 
emerged. Should a winning show appear on the FCN schedule, 100% of all 
ancillary revenues would go to the affiliated stations.  
Fox stood to gain much from this undertaking. Fox’s O&Os would be 
among the profit participants and thus could reap the same financial benefits as 
other affiliates (if not more because they were located in most of the largest 
markets). Further, the enterprise was intended to serve a variety of marketing and 
promotional functions for Fox. It would enable the company to expand its “brand 
identity” across another part of the day. Even more to the point, it would help Fox 
heighten its profile with children and teenagers – demographic groups which were 
being pursued ever-more aggressively by advertisers. Kellner, widely considered 
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the main architect behind FCN, argued that today’s FCN viewers would become 
the teens and young adults of tomorrow. And these teens and young adults of 
tomorrow, in turn, were among the main demographic groups sought by Fox in 
prime time: “We want them to think this is their network right from the start,” he 
stated in explaining the rationale behind the formation of the FCN.590 To 
accomplish this, Fox arranged to cross-promote the daytime and prime time 
schedules.591 Of course, advertisements on – and for – The Simpsons were central 
to this plan. Also crucial to FCN would be a “Fox Kids Club,” an organization 
“developed for local merchandising opportunities.”592 Fox could keep an 
inventory of its audience composition in various markets based on who registered 
to be members of the Kids’ Club. 
Another benefit of FCN to Fox was that it provided a low-cost way for the 
company to expand its program schedule quickly. Daytime children’s animation 
was both relatively cheap to produce and easy to syndicate. It also worked well 
with Fox affiliates’ schedules, as 99% of them were already in the children’s 
business.593 Further, 76% of these affiliates already ranked number one with 
children ages 2-11.594 These factors made Fox’s move into this realm substantially 
easier.  
Fox’s expansion into daytime children’s programming was not viewed 
with excitement throughout the industry. One key company affected by the 
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formation of FCN was Disney, which at the time of FCN’s launch was earning a 
tidy sum with its broadcast of the “Disney Afternoon” on many Fox affiliates. It 
didn’t take long for Disney to file a suit against Fox, alleging anti-competitive 
behavior on the company’s part.595 Disney claimed Fox was threatening to drop 
stations as affiliates if they agreed to air the Disney Afternoon instead of the Fox 
Children’s Network.596  
In spite of the Disney lawsuit, Fox continued to expand its daytime 
schedule throughout 1990. Within months of hiring former Hanna Barbera 
executive Margaret Loesch to run FCN, the first programs were announced and 
the launch dates scheduled. FCN began operations on Saturday, September 8, 
1990 with six half-hour series: the game show Fun House and the animated series 
Bobby’s World, Zazoo U, Tom and Jerry Kids Show, Peter Pan and the Pirates, 
and Attack of the Killer Tomatoes.597 On Monday, September 17, Fox initiated its 
weekly children’s schedule with a re-airing of Peter Pan and the Pirates.598 This 
half-hour program proceeded to air five days a week. 
By the time of the launch, Fox had already signed up approximately two 
million children for the Kids’ Club and sold about $30 million in the daytime 
upfront – and this was only the beginning.599 Fox showed no signs of letting up in 
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its expansion plans. Rather, the company intended to continue growing FCN until 
it had four weekday hours and four Saturday hours of programming.600 To 
accomplish this feat, FCN needed a major program supplier. In October 1990, the 
company found it in the form of Warner Bros. At this time, Warner Bros. signed a 
multi-series deal to provide Fox with children’s shows.601 
Several other significant Fox-related events occurred in tandem with the 
launch of FCN and the expansion of prime time to five nights a week.  In 
particular, a number of developments transpired on the syndication front. In the 
spring of 1990, The Tracey Ullman Show became the first Fox-produced program 
to be sold into syndication when it was purchased by the Lifetime cable 
channel.602 At the same time, 21 Jump Street was put on CBS’s late night 
schedule, replacing The Pat Sajak Show. This marked the first time a program 
which had started on Fox went on to play on another network’s schedule.603 
Perhaps the most noteworthy event involved the sale of Married…with Children 
into syndication.  The off-network rights to the show were sold far more quickly – 
and for far more money – than supplier Columbia Television had expected. The 
program soon became one of the most sought-after syndicated properties in 
television history, trailing behind only The Cosby Show in terms of license fees in 
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many markets.604 Several network affiliates purchased the rights to the show, 
making it the first off-network sitcom to air in the prime time access period of 6-7 
p.m. in more than fifteen years.605 Whereas Married…with Children’s status as a 
Fox series previously had made it an unknown quantity in the syndication 
marketplace, by the end of 1990, there was little doubt: Fox’s unique identity as a 
PTAR-exempt program service – and not a network – gave its shows added value 
in syndication.  In sum, Married…with Children’s solid sales set a promising 
precedent for Fox and caused a shift in the syndication marketplace.  
At the same time that the sale of Fox’s prime time series was altering the 
syndication business, the company also substantially affected the long-standing 
relationship between broadcasters and cable operators. During the summer of 
1990, trade reports appeared that Fox was engaged in negotiations with Tele-
Communications Inc. (TCI), one of the largest cable system owners in the 
country. The conversations between the two companies involved having Fox’s 
programming placed on cable channels in areas where there was little or no 
broadcast signal.606 Through this arrangement, which was finalized in the spring 
of the 1991, TCI not only arranged to create a channel for Fox in so-called “white 
                                                 
604 Dempsey, “Fox Sitcom’s Married…with Money, in Syndie Deal,” Variety, 2 May 1990, 8. 
605 Fox’s exemption from PTAR meant Married…with Children could be aired in the premiere 
prime time access periods on the networks in the top 50 markets, whereas programs previously 
shown on the Big Three were not allowed in these time slots. Guider, “Chi Station is 1st Net O&O 
to Pledge Troth to ‘Married,’” Variety, 6 June 1990, 39, 49.  
606 Broadcasting reported this to be the “first time a broadcast network has directly licensed its 
programming to cable systems,” “Fox & TCI: The Crossover to Cable,” 10 September 1990, 23-
24. Also see Dempsey, “Affils Wary of Budding Fox, TCI Romance,” Variety, 11 July 1990, 59, 
62. 
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areas” where Fox was not available, but also agreed to give Fox better channel 
positions on its cable systems whenever possible.607   
These were significant developments not only for Fox but for network-
cable relations in general. The networks and cable operators long had been at odds 
over the carriage of broadcast signals. For well over a decade, debates had raged 
in Congress, the FCC and the courts over whether cable systems should be 
required to carry broadcast signals via “must-carry” regulation, or if cable had the 
choice of whether to provide – and pay for – local stations.608  Diller recognized 
that, given the technological limitations constraining Fox’s coverage in several 
parts of the country, a failure to work with cable would keep the service at a 
disadvantage relative to the Big Three. As he stated in one interview, “We believe 
we are broadcasters… and at the same time we believe that cable will not be an 
adversary to the growth of the businesses that we’re in.”609 Thus the deal with 
TCI was not so much a luxury as a necessity if Fox wanted to continue to increase 
its audience base and advertising revenues. Variety speculated that the deals 
negotiated with TCI and other cable systems increased Fox’s reach by 6% – from 
                                                 
607 “Fox, TCI Cement Ties,” Variety, 1 April 1991, 88. 
608 The 1984 Act retained a “must-carry” requirement which stipulated that cable systems had to 
carry all local broadcast signals. Cable operators successfully challenged this rule and in 1986 a 
federal appeals court ruled in their favor, deeming the rules unconstitutional. Regulators spent the 
next several years trying to determine how to make carriage of local stations by cable operators 
both mandatory and constitutional. One approach which gained in favor in light of the legal 
challenges to must-carry regulation was “retransmission consent.” This regulation required 
broadcasters to either be paid for their signal (in the case of powerful broadcasters) or demand 
carriage (as was the case with weaker broadcasters). Retransmission consent was included as part 
of the 1992 Cable Bill. For more on retransmission consent and must-carry, see Patrick R. Parsons 
and Robert M. Frieden, The Cable and Satellite Television Industries (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1998), 62-63. 
609 In fact, Fox had begun speaking with cable operators in the late ‘80s. See “Fox to Air Three 
HBO Originals,” Broadcasting, 29 May 1989, 43-44. Comment from Diller comes from “Barry 
Diller and Fox: Taking the High-Risk Option,” Broadcasting, 1 January 1990, 50. 
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91% to 97% – by December 1990.610 This was expected to mean more than $300 
million annually in added revenues.611 
Fox’s good fortunes in 1990 did not end with its heightened presence in 
the television business. In addition, its motion picture division was also having a 
banner year. Following Joe Roth’s arrival in the summer of 1989, the film studio 
began churning out a string of hits.612 Though For the Boys (1991) was a 
disappointment, Predator 2 (1990) and Edward Scissorhands (1990) performed 
well at the box office and Die Hard 2 (1990) was a smash. Nothing could have 
prepared the studio, however, for the astounding box office returns of a little $15 
million dollar comedy centered on one eight-year-old boy accidentally left at 
home during the holidays. Home Alone, which opened in November 1990, 
became one of Fox’s most profitable films ever and contributed more than $250 
million to the company’s bottom line.613  In what was unusual for a comedy, the 
movie also traveled well abroad. Primarily on the strength of Home Alone and Die 
Hard 2, Fox dominated the overseas marketplace in 1991, with a 22.2% market 
share and rentals of $265 million.614 In fact, Fox’s foreign box office surpassed 
the company’s domestic earnings by more than $30 million.615 
                                                 
610 “Fox Details Benefits of Cable Affils: How About $300 Mil?,” Variety, 10 December 1990, 
32. Throughout 1991, Fox made deals with other cable systems as well, including Cox, Vision, 
KBLCOM, Northland, and TriStar. Matt Stump, “Fox Extends Reach with Latest Cable Deals,” 
Broadcasting, 6 May 1991, 23. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Many of these projects were developed by Roth’s predecessor, Leonard Goldberg, but Roth 
received the praise for the division’s success. 
613 Noglows, “Market Mavens Root for Rupert,” Variety, 21 October 1991, 1, 89-90. 
614 Claudia Eller, “‘Home Alone,’ ‘Enemy’ Keyed Big Year for Fox Overseas,” Variety, 20 
January 1992, 7, 12. 
615 Ibid. Though it would change soon, this was still a time period when domestic earnings were 
larger than foreign earnings. Domestic rentals for Fox for 1991 totaled $228.5 million. 
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Another film responsible for Fox’s number-one performance overseas in 
1991 was the Julia Roberts thriller, Sleeping with the Enemy. Benefiting from the 
growing popularity of Roberts in the wake of Pretty Woman (Disney, 1990), 
Sleeping with the Enemy was also a hit both at home and abroad. Joe Roth, it 
seemed, had managed to turn around the long-struggling feature film division. 
Unfortunately, though the Fox Film Corporation was performing well, many other 
divisions of News Corp. – including Fox – began to struggle. By late 1990, the 
euphoria which had been felt by the Fox program service during most of the year 
began to fade. Yet the difficulties faced by Fox’s television division at the start of 
1991 proved to be nothing compared to the desperate times encountered by News 
Corp. A rough economy and overextension of the company’s resources were 
affecting News Corp.’s balance sheet. It would take some skillful negotiating on 
Murdoch’s part – as well as several infusions of cash and some strategic alliances 
– to keep the company from going under in the new year. 
 
FIGHTING OFF A FINANCIAL FREEFALL: THE MEDIA INDUSTRIES IN A TIME 
OF CRISIS 
[Murdoch] did not expect that there was going to be one of the severest 
advertising recessions in recent history, a banking crisis in America, 
liquidity squeezes in the U.K. and Australia and a war in the Persian Gulf 
– all on top of the appallingly costly competition with BSB… 
Murdoch biographer William Shawcross616 
The recession continues unabated, suppressing advertising revenue. 
Entertainment program costs, most agree, are out of control. Professional 
sports rights will this year single-handedly drive the three-net earnings 
                                                 
616 Murdoch, 385. 
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figures into the loss column for the first time ever. Unless you're Jeff 
Sagansky or Barry Diller, working for a network means wondering 
whether a pink slip with your name on it is on the way. And it seems clear 
the downsizing (or bloodletting, depending on your point of view) will 
continue. Welcome to the new reality of network television - a business 
that has never been more problematic… 
   Broadcasting, November 1991617 
Fox’s impressive performance during 1990 was not replicated by other 
News Corp. divisions. Rather, as securities analyst Jessica Reif noted, the Fox 
Entertainment Group was a lone “bright spot” for the problem-laden News 
Corp.618 Throughout the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, News Corp. – along with many 
other media companies - came under severe financial strain. News Corp.’s set of 
problems were due to a number of factors, including an extensive debt load 
caused by the company’s rapid expansion, rising interest rates, and falling stock 
prices.619 In addition, a weak economy had caused advertisers to cut back on their 
expenditures. Since News Corp.’s publishing, satellite and broadcast divisions 
depended heavily on advertising, they were all affected by this soft ad market.620 
On top of this, Sky Television continued to be a tremendous financial 
drain on News Corp.  Murdoch expected this division’s performance to improve 
after it was re-invented as a U.K.-based service in February 1989. However, he 
could not have been more wrong. By March 1990, when competitor British 
Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) began operations, the reformulated Sky had lost 
                                                 
617 McClellan, “The TV Networks in Play,” 11 November 1991, 20-22. 
618 “Murdoch’s $11 Billion Image Problem,” Broadcasting, 8 October 1990, 65-66. 
619 Jeremy Coopman, “Media Barons Struggle in Debt Sweat,” Variety, 8 October 1990, 1, 83. 
620 Ibid. Of Murdoch’s woes, Shawcross observes that “he did not expect that there was going to 
be one of the severest advertising recessions in recent history, a banking crisis in America, 
liquidity squeezes in the U.K. and Australia and a war in the Persian Gulf,” 385. 
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more than $340 million.621 And there was no sign the end was in sight. Sky 
continued to lose an average of $3.2 million per week, thereby playing a major 
part in bringing down News Corp.’s operating profits.622 Recognizing something 
had to be done, Sky merged with BSB (which was also losing large sums of 
money) in the fall of 1990. In the new venture, News Corp. controlled 50% and 
BSB partners Chargeurs, Granada TV, Pearson Publishers and Reed Intl. shared 
control of the other 50%.623  The newly named enterprise, British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB) began operations in March 1991 – and continued to rack 
up huge deficits. BSkyB went on to lose approximately $12 million per week.624 
The disappointing performance of Sky Television forced Murdoch to put 
the brakes on Sky Cable, a U.S.-based satellite venture which News Corp. and co-
investors Cablevision Systems, NBC and Hughes Communications had 
announced to much fanfare only a few months earlier.625 As Variety declared, by 
March 1991, Sky Cable was “for all intents and purposes, dead.”626 However, Sky 
Cable was not only halted due to the slow growth of BSkyB. News Corp.’s 
rapidly rising debt load also played a major part in shutting down Sky Cable and 
                                                 
621 “Murdoch Takes Big Hit on Britain’s Sky TV,” Broadcasting, 26 February 1990, 55. 
622 Variety states that for the six months prior, News Corp.’s operating profits before tax 
“plunged”45%, reducing its worldwide net income to a “relatively paltry $100m.” Groves, “Who 
Will Rule Britannia’s Skies? BSB Satellite Programming Blasts Off Against Murdoch’s Year-Old 
Sky TV,” 21 March 1990, 63. 
623 Guider and Coopman, “BSB and Sky TV Now Birds of a Feather,” Variety, 5 November 1990, 
1, 103. 
624 Terry Ilott, “B-Sky-B Relaunching Amid Dish Sales, Cash Crises: Brit Sat Service Faces 3-
Year Fight for Survival,” Variety, 4 March 1991, 35, 78. 
625 When announced in February 1990, Sky Cable was depicted as “the next generation” of 
television. It was to include 108 channels as well as HDTV potential and was scheduled to begin 
airing programming in 1993. “DBS: The Next Generation,” Broadcasting, 26 February 1990, 27-
28. 
626 Dempsey, “The Question in the Sky: Can DBS Fly?,” Variety, 4 March 1991, 25, 32. 
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limiting other expansion efforts as well. By October of 1990, News Corp. had 
more than $8.2 billion dollars in debt – and, as one journalist noted, its stock 
prices were in a “freefall.”627 Early efforts to diminish this debt – which included 
the sale of the Fox plaza building in Los Angeles and a half interest in Elle and 
Premiere – had little effect on the company’s balance sheet.628 More drastic 
measures followed. As Shawcross notes:  
[Murdoch] had to sell assets even if the price was disappointing, squeeze 
extra margins wherever possible, still sell more assets, consider the 
possibility of diluting his family share by issuing new equity, cut back or 
eliminate developments today in the knowledge that there would be other 
opportunities tomorrow, do whatever else was needed to attract long-term 
debt and fight his way out.629 
By late 1990, News Corp.’s financial woes were featured in the headlines 
of newspapers around the world.630 In January 1991, it all came to a head as 
several banks called in their loans.631 Ultimately, after several tense weeks, News 
Corp. was able to restructure its debt. With the agreement of more than 150 
banks, News Corp. created a new loan repayment schedule.632 Over the course of 
the 1991, News Corp. took a number of additional measures in order to dig itself 
out of its financial hole. One step involved taking on additional investors. TCI 
                                                 
627 $8.2 billion figure from Robins, “Recession Pinch Takes Punch Out of Networks,” Variety, 29 
October 1990, 1, 78; term “freefall” from Groves, Sky & BSB: Scenes from a Marriage,” Variety, 
12 November 1990, 60. 
628 “New Corp. for News Corp,” Broadcasting, 13 March 1989, 46-47. 
629 Murdoch, 397. 
630 For example, see S. Karene Witcher, “Murdoch Asks Creditors for More Time to Repay News 
Corp.’s Existing Debts,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1990, sec. 1, 15; Kevin Brown, 
“Australian Agency Cuts Debt Rating of News Corporation,” Financial Times, 3 December 1990, 
sec. 1, 21; Emiliya Mychasuk, “Agency Rings Alarm Bells Over $13.8Bn Debt Burden,” Sydney 
Morning Herald, 3 December 1990, Business sec., 29; Barnaby J. Feder, “Murdoch’s Time of 
Reckoning,” New York Times, 20 December 1990, D1.  
631 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Chenoweth, Rupert Murdoch: The Untold Story.   
632 “Murdoch, Banks Agree on Loan Repayment Sked,” Variety, 4 February 1991, 107-108. 
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was one company which advanced money to Murdoch’s company at this time, 
thereby furthering News Corp.’s relationship with the cable industry.633  
Another step News Corp. took to lessen its debt involved reducing costs 
“across the board” by 10%.634 Every division was affected by these cuts. Even the 
motion picture division of Fox, which was coming off of one of its most 
successful years in recent memory, suffered from News Corp.’s financial 
problems. As a means of limiting expenditures, Joe Roth was told to find a partner 
on bigger budgeted films.635 Although this might limit Fox’s risk, it also limited 
the potential profit the company could attain from any single project. This proved 
to be the case, for example, with Last of the Mohicans (1992), which was one of 
the early films affected by News Corp.’s mandate to co-finance and co-produce 
whenever possible. When the film performed better than expected, Fox was 
forced to split the profits with its producer, Morgan Creek.636  
The belt-tightening taking place at Fox’s film division was not unique for 
the time. With many media conglomerates showing minimal growth due to stalled 
stock market prices and a poor economic climate, several motion picture divisions 
were receiving directives from their corporate parents to cut costs wherever 
possible.637 The widely circulated and publicized “Katzenberg memo” – in which 
Disney executive Jeffrey Katzenberg criticized the sky-rocking prices of 
                                                 
633 $175 million was advanced by TCI in partnership with Boston Ventures Group and billionaire 
Robert Miller. According to Broadcasting, the money was to help pay back debt and fund BSkyB, 
“TCI Deepens Relationship with News Corp.,” 28 October 1991, 28. 
634 Joe Flint, “News Corp. to Cut Costs by 10%,” Broadcasting, 8 April 1991, 57. 
635 Charles Fleming and Richard Natale, “Hollywood Seeks Visa for Foreign Exchange: Majors 
Divided on How to Conquer Foreign B.O.,” Variety, 30 September 1991, 1, 90. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Stock prices described as showing “mediocre results” in 1991; see Noglows, “1991: Recession 
Deflates Showbiz,” Variety, 9 December 1991, 66. 
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Hollywood films – compelled many studios to promise a new level of fiscal 
conservatism.638 Executives assured their new corporate parents they would lower 
production and marketing costs as well as star salaries.639  
Television and radio properties, meanwhile, had their own set of 
problems, including uncertainty surrounding the crisis in the Middle East and a 
poor advertising climate.640 These concerns drove down the prices of broadcast 
stocks. As one trade publication stated, “For Fifth Estate stocks 1990 was a year 
to forget. All sectors including entertainment, cable, broadcasting, ad agencies 
and equipment were off by double-digit percentages.”641 Many companies 
followed in News Corp.’s footsteps and underwent a period of reorganization. 
SCI Television, Gillett Holdings, Price Communications and Tak 
Communications were a few of the many companies which were restructured in 
an effort to improve cash flow.642  
As this list indicates, companies which owned stations were particularly 
hard hit. In 1990, station trading hit a seven-year low. In 1987, 125 stations with a 
combined value of $5.4 billion changed hands; in 1990, only 72 stations were sold 
                                                 
638 Richard Turner, “Disney Seeks to End Big, Big Pictures as Executive Calls for Small, Small 
World,” Wall Street Journal, 30 January 1991, B1; Larry Rohter, “Hollywood Abuzz Over Cost 
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for a total of $615 million.643 Then in 1991, prices went even lower.644 A mere 38 
stations were sold for a total of $273 million.645 Not only was this the slowest year 
in station trading since 1982 but the prices being asked were equivalent to those 
being sought in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s.646   
The networks, which had only recently begun to rebound, were also 
affected by the deepening economic crisis of the early ‘90s. The impact of the 
recession and the Gulf War became evident as the networks planned their fall 
1990 schedules.647 What made matters worse was the continued increase in 
license fees for programming. Rates had risen nearly 45% for a half-hour show 
between 1985 and 1990 and there was no sign that costs were going to stop going 
up.648 The situation did not improve as 1991 wore on. Upfront sales for the Big 
Three for the 1991-92 season were down 19% from the previous year, falling 
from $4.3 billion to $3.5 billion.649 The decline in advertising affected the 
networks’ bottom lines; NBC and CBS both lost money during the 1991 calendar 
year.650  
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The networks took a variety of steps to try to limit their losses.651 In the 
fall of 1990, CBS made the radical and highly controversial announcement that it 
was slashing compensation payments to its affiliates by up to 25%.652 Executives 
estimated this would save the network $24 million.653 This decision caused an 
outcry among CBS affiliates; many started looking at syndicated product from the 
studios and independent producers to replace underperforming CBS series.654  
This reaction by affiliates forced CBS to backpedal on its proposal. In the end, 
compensation was reduced by less than $10 million.655 NBC and ABC also cut 
compensation by approximately 10% each.656 Though their affiliates also spoke 
out against the reductions, their response was not nearly as intense as had been the 
response from CBS affiliates.  
Another area where the networks tried to reduce costs was in the purchase 
of sports rights. The top executives of ABC, CBS and NBC all repeatedly 
declared they would no longer allow themselves to get into bidding wars over 
baseball, basketball and football contracts.657 The losses were too steep: CBS, for 
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example, wrote off $190 million in 1990 and $123 million in 1991 due to the 
costs associated with its purchase of Major League Baseball and NFL rights.658  
Due to the networks’ decreased expenditure on sports programming and 
their reduction in compensation payments, relations between the Big Three and 
their affiliates grew increasingly strained. On a growing number of other issues, 
the two groups did not see eye to eye. To the affiliates’ frustration, the networks 
were investing more heavily in cable networks (i.e., ABC’s stake in ESPN; ABC 
and NBC’s stake in A&E). In fact, affiliates objected to the networks making any 
gestures toward cable, believing that whatever relationships were established 
between the entities would only decrease their own viewership and influence. 
Affiliates responded to the networks’ actions in a range of ways, including pre-
empting lower rated shows and time-shifting prime time schedules.659 
While the networks’ actions seem logical given the financial conditions in 
which they found themselves, over the longer term these moves would have a 
variety of ramifications for them as well as for independent stations and Fox. 
Relative to the networks, independent stations (assuming they weren’t for sale) 
were doing well.660 This was in part due to the fact that only about 135 remained 
in business and unaffiliated to Fox by 1990.661  Due to their ever-more limited 
numbers, independent stations had more leverage over program producers and 
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syndicators.662 They found themselves paying less and getting higher quality 
programming. 
This isn’t to say that independent stations were without their fair share of 
problems. As their numbers declined, so did their lobbying power.  Although Fox 
affiliates remained members of INTV and still called themselves as independents, 
they grew less involved with the organization as the ‘90s wore on. INTV 
attendance was down 30% from 1990 to 1991, largely due to the absence of about 
one-third of Fox’s affiliates at the gathering.663 Attendance dipped further in 
1992.664 Though Fox affiliates maintained they still had a number of issues on 
which they identified with independent stations – including PTAR, must-carry 
and channel repositioning issues – as Fox continued to expand, the gap between 
traditional independents and “Fox independents” widened further.665 By early 
1992, speculation increased as to when Fox and its independent-cum-affiliates 
would withdraw from INTV altogether.666 
Independents were further assailed by the growing economic power of a 
number of cable programmers. The financial resources of several cable services 
rose as cable penetration went to nearly 60%.667 Increased license fees from 
MSO’s, combined with growing advertising revenues, made several cable 
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channels quite profitable.668 By 1992, fourteen of the largest ad-supported basic 
cable networks, including USA, MTV and ESPN, reported profits.669 This money 
enabled both pay and basic cable to allocate more for sports, syndicated motion 
pictures, hour- long dramas and original motion pictures.670 Part of the reason 
behind cable’s increased influence over syndicators was due to the shrinking 
number of alternative outlets for such product. The disappearance of independent 
stations, accompanied by the additional number of nights in which Fox was airing 
original series and the general disinterest of the networks in airing theatrical 
motion pictures, combined to push certain types of product toward cable.  One 
sign of the changing television environment came when MCA reported in 1990 
that it had earned more money for the sale of its syndicated properties from cable 
than broadcasting for the first time.671  
With more money, cable programmers could produce and acquire original 
series with higher production values. By 1992, channels such as Lifetime, USA, 
TNT, HBO, Showtime and Nickelodeon were adding more original sitcoms and 
dramas to their schedules.672 In addition, cable channels and broadcasters 
continued to explore different distribution windows for programming. In some 
cases, the networks and cable collaborated on projects. For example, 
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Nickelodeon’s first sitcom, Hi, Honey, I’m Home (1991) was aired on ABC 
shortly after episodes premiered on the cable channel.673 Similarly, USA aired re-
runs of the action-adventure series Silk Stalkings (1991) within a week of its 
initial broadcast on CBS.674 Made-for-television movies were also shared between 
the two entities. This pattern began when ABC aired the melodrama Stop at 
Nothing a few months after it appeared on Lifetime.675 
The early ‘90s were a time when cable channels, independent stations, the 
networks, and syndicators tested out new relationships with each other. By 1991, 
the stigma associated with appearing in a cable series or cable-produced motion 
picture had lessened substantially. Well-known actors increasingly saw 
performing in cable movies-of-the-week as an acceptable alternative to 
performing in theatrical motion pictures.676  In 1991, Dennis Hopper and Barbara 
Hershey earn Emmy nominations for their roles in the Showtime film, Paris 
Trout; the following year, Beau Bridges received the award for the HBO drama 
Without Warning: The James Brady Story.  
Although cable programmers may have been held in higher regard than 
ever before, the same could not be said for multiple system operators. The 
political tide continued to turn away from the owners of major cable systems. 
These companies had drawn the ire of politicians and consumers alike due to the 
consistent rate hikes they instituted following the passage of the 1984 Cable Act.  
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The anger felt toward the cable industry culminated in January 1992 with the 
Senate’s passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act. The passage 
of this act was interpreted as the consequence of the “arrogance” of cable 
operators as well as the effective lobbying by broadcasters.677 Included in this act 
– which Congress passed in spite of a veto by President Bush - were caps on the 
amount cable rates could be raised as well as a requirement that cable operators 
carry the broadcast stations in their region.  
Even as broadcasters, motion picture companies and cable operators faced 
an array of financial and political difficulties, executives at Fox met with their 
own unique set of economic, regulatory and scheduling problems. When The 
Simpsons initially took off and Fox expanded its primetime and daytime schedule, 
the program service had seemed unstoppable. However, only one year later, it 
became clear Fox had developed too quickly.678 The motivations behind going 
from three to five nights a week may have been sound; however, that was little to 
comfort the company’s programmers, who suddenly were faced with what 
seemed to be an insurmountable number of challenges.  Diller and his staff knew 
they had taken a risk by placing nearly every series they had in development on 
the air. Unfortunately, it was a risk that didn’t pay off, at least in the short term. 
Though Babes had a prime time slot following The Simpsons on Thursdays, it 
failed to retain a large portion of the animated series’ viewers. Sundays had been 
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weakened with the shift of The Simpsons and America’s Most Wanted to other 
evenings. The ratings for the Monday night movies were abysmal – in fact, they 
were so low that Fox temporarily canceled that night’s programming and returned 
the time to its affiliates.679  
While the established Fox series continued to perform well, almost all of 
the new shows were failures.680 As a result, Fox was forced to provide its 
advertisers with additional commercials in prime time programs (called “make-
goods”).681 Fox was in such dire circumstances that executives had to create an 
additional fifteen seconds of commercial time in order to break even with 
advertisers.682 Daytime was equally problematic. The ratings for the weekday 
series Peter Pan and the Pirates were so low that in order to satisfy its 
commitment to advertisers, Fox had to take one minute of commercial time back 
from affiliates.683 The show was also fraught with production delays, forcing Fox 
to re-run episodes extensively.684 The Saturday morning series were performing 
somewhat better, with Zazoo U being the only casualty for the first year.685  
Amazingly, in spite of these many setbacks, Fox’s affiliates remained 
supportive.686  This was partly the result of the speed with which Fox responded 
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to its programming problems. It was also the result of the distinctive perspective 
which Fox’s affiliates had. Unlike affiliates of the Big Three, many of Fox’s 
affiliates were used to having low ratings and marginal programming. The 
majority of these stations were either UHF stations with poor channel positioning 
or relative newcomers to the broadcast business (sometimes both). Anything the 
company did raised the profile of these stations. Thus, as long as Fox remained 
attentive to their concerns, it would retain their allegiance.  
This is not to say that Fox didn’t have run-ins with its affiliates. Following 
the other networks’ compensation cuts, Fox executives decreased compensation to 
their affiliates. This was a brash move, considering Fox affiliates already received 
a much smaller amount of compensation relative to what was paid to the Big 
Three.687 However, Fox’s actions yielded fewer protests because of the way the 
deductions were structured. Specifically, reductions were to be made only if the 
service’s ratings rose by at least six-tenths of a ratings point.688 Fox constructed a 
sliding scale whereby as ratings improved among the 18-49 demographic, cuts 
would be instituted.689 Thus, instead of implementing across-the-board decreases 
in compensation, Fox devised a more “affiliate-friendly” system based on future 
level of performance.   
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Meanwhile, Fox executives were taking a variety of steps to further build 
up prime time viewership. In May 1991, the company announced it was disposing 
of the traditional notion of a “fall season.” Instead, Fox would premiere series 
year round.690 In addition, the weblet planned to increase the number of fresh 
episodes it ordered and aired each year. In place of the standard 22 episodes, Fox 
intended to air up to 30 episodes per year of several shows, including The 
Simpsons, Cops and America’s Most Wanted. This new plan was put into effect 
with the premiere of the second season of Beverly Hills 90210 in July.691 Fox 
found both advertisers and viewers supportive of the changes.692 Only one week 
into its second season, the teen melodrama showed an 84% ratings increase over 
its first season.693 By the end of the summer, Beverly Hills 90210 was regularly in 
the top 20 in the ratings – and was placing first among viewers 12-34.694 By the 
beginning of the fall, Beverly Hills 90210 had become a pop culture phenomenon. 
Entertainment Weekly declared it “TV’s hottest number,” and it was voted a 
reader’s favorite for Seventeen.695 Once again Fox had found a program – and a 
scheduling strategy – which enabled it to rebound after a difficult season. And in 
the process, the company became the envy of its network competitors, causing 
them to launch their fall premieres earlier than usual and to think more seriously 
about scheduling programs during the summertime. 
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The envy which Fox executives attained from the Big Three for its 
summer programming successes was nothing compared to the anger they caused 
via their forceful lobbying in Washington. At the same time Fox was altering 
network scheduling practices, the company was also transforming regulatory 
conditions. During the summer of 1991, the program service finally accomplished 
what the networks had long been unable to: Fox compelled the FCC to reconsider 
– and revise – the financial interest and syndication rules. While the rules were 
not completely repealed at this time, the first major blows were struck. What’s 
more, these blows gave Fox substantial short-term economic and political 
advantages over its competitors.  
 
WHEN FOX CAMPAIGNS, THE FCC WAIVERS: THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
OF FIN-SYN  
 Fox has posed quite a problem for the commission… 
FCC Commissioner James Quello, January 1990696 
The Financial Interest and Syndication rules were approved when words 
like VCR and cable TV didn't exist….If you tell me that the status quo 
must be maintained, I'll tell you you're an idiot…  
Barry Diller, March 1991697 
Shortly after FCC Chairman Al Sikes came into office in the summer of 
1989, he spoke of his desire for a more ‘activist’ FCC than had existed under his 
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predecessor, Dennis Patrick.698 This FCC would welcome the development of 
new technologies, look favorably on innovation, and encourage experimentation 
in the mixing of video, data and voice information services.699 One of the things 
he promised his FCC would not do was “tackle” fin-syn.700 
Sikes may have believed his agency could avoid returning to the financial 
interest and syndication rules. He had no idea how wrong he was. Largely as a 
result of effective campaigning by Fox executives, the Sikes-led commission was 
forced to dedicate much of its time to evaluating and revising fin-syn. The means 
by which the rules were debated and shaped reveals much about the increasing 
authority of the networks, the gradual disempowerment of the studios, and the 
extent to which Fox defined the industrial and regulatory terrain of the early ‘90s. 
In the process of seeking a modification of the rules, Fox also forced the 
commission – and its competitors – to (re)identify the key characteristics of a 
network.  
After Fowler’s unsuccessful attempt at repealing the rules in the early 
‘80s, discussions of fin-syn were taken off the regulatory table for the rest of the 
decade. When the topic did come up at the FCC, commissioners tried to deflect 
responsibility, saying it was up to the studios and the networks to come to terms 
on the matter. During Fox’s first couple of years in operation, the issue was 
irrelevant. The weblet was busy struggling to come up with a workable schedule 
for two nights of the week. It was nowhere near the fifteen hour limit which 
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defined a network and thereby made it subject to the rules’ prohibitions on 
operating as both a producer and syndicator of programming. 
Fox executives tested the commission’s stance on fin-syn for the first time 
in the summer of 1988. However, at this point the company had no intention of 
seeking an adjustment to the rules. Rather, the weblet – which was currently 
airing three nights and ten-and-a-half hours of programming a week – wanted to 
be made exempt from fin-syn. Fox requested permission from the FCC to air up 
to 30 hours per week of programming before being considered a network.701 
Fox’s co-members in the MPAA responded with concern at the request and 
refused to provide comments to the commission on the matter.702 Soon after, Fox 
submitted a file with the FCC clarifying its position on the rules. In these 
documents, the company stated the rules were “absolutely essential to the 
maintenance of a fairly competitive marketplace. Without [fin-syn], the three 
major networks would have such dominance no competition would survive. This 
is why [fin-syn] should neither be abolished nor weakened.”703 
In spite of these filings, Fox once again went silent on the issue for nearly 
two years. Then in January 1990 – not long after Preston Padden joined the 
company as its chief lobbyist – Fox broached the matter when it filed a request for 
an eighteen month waiver from fin-syn.704 More important than its request for a 
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waiver was its call for the FCC to reexamine the definition of a network.705 In 
responding to this appeal, the commission would be forced to reconsider the 
broader value of the rules to the current media environment. 
Fox did not intend drop the topic this time around, as an adjustment to the 
rules was imperative for the company to continue its expansion. Fox was in the 
midst of its first major boom period – The Simpsons was starting to take off, the 
Children’s Network was in development – and the applicability of fin-syn to its 
future had to be established. In the process of making its case as to why it should 
be awarded a waiver, Fox positioned itself as both a fragile underdog as well as 
the lone answer to the commission’s long-sought-after pursuit of greater diversity 
in the marketplace. The company’s representatives argued that not only had it 
provided stability to its many UHF affiliates and fulfilled the FCC’s vision of 
sustaining the first successful new network in several decades, but it intended to 
further serve the public interest in the future through its development of new 
children’s programming.706 The position Fox maintained throughout the fin-syn 
battles which ensued is nicely outlined by a statement made by Barry Diller in an 
interview with Broadcasting at the time of the filing for the waiver:  
I can say that we're very, very confident that the financial interest and 
syndication rules as they were arrived at in the early 70’s should not 
include Fox Broadcasting - should not, as they're presently constructed, 
put Fox Broadcasting Co. into that kind of regulation. The FISR rules 
were founded to promote competition, not to shackle a new competitor. 
Fox Broadcasting Co. bears, other than the word network, about as much 
                                                 
705 Ibid. 
706 “Fox’s One-Year Fin-Syn Waiver Now Official,” Broadcasting, 14 May 1990, 43-44. 
 228
relationship to the structure, the capital base, the cumulative viewing of 
the three networks as I do to the Sony Corp.707 
Fox, as it presented itself to the FCC, was not a major media company as 
well as a division of a major multinational conglomerate. Nor was it a network, 
although it marketed itself as such to the press and to the public.708 Rather, the 
Fox which was presented to the FCC was a marginal company at best – a 
company with little more than 100 employees, a few nights of entertainment 
programming and a small viewership relative to the networks.709 
The ploy of presenting itself as a minor entity apparently worked. The 
FCC granted Fox’s request with haste, setting up an expedited proceeding so the 
company could adjust its fall schedule accordingly.710 The FCC’s role in resolving 
fin-syn was made much clearer later that month when Senate Communications 
Subcommittee chairman Daniel Inouye declared that Fox’s request for 
reconsideration of the rules raised “an opportunity for the commission to assert its 
jurisdiction on this issue.”711 With the green light to proceed, Sikes offered the 
networks and the studios one last chance to negotiate on their own. He gave them 
until June 1990 to strike a deal. If an agreement could not be reached by this time, 
the FCC would launch a new rulemaking.712 Even as the two sides were 
                                                 
707 “Barry Diller and Fox,” Broadcasting. 
708 As Variety states, Fox executives “maintained that there is no contradiction in its efforts to 
position itself as a network in the public’s mind yet to steer clear of such official designation 
because of Financial Interest in Syndication Rules.”  See Lowry, “TV Critics Grill Fox Execs on 
‘Totally Hidden Video: Diller Cries Foul as Critics Focus on ‘Video’ Fracas, Not the Web’s 
Summer Ratings,’” 19-25 July 1989, 45. 
709 Staff at about 100 in 1987 according to Chambers, “Fox Making Its Debut,” New York Times.  
It was up to 218 in 1991, Kathryn Harris, “Making Money on Rotten Ratings,” Forbes, 27 May 
1991, 42-43. 
710 Wharton, “Outlook for Fox Finsyn Requests.” 
711 “Inouye Puts Fin-Syn Ball in FCC’s Court,” Broadcasting, 26 February 1990, 32. 
712 “Sikes Runs Out of Patience on Fin-Syn,” Broadcasting, 19 March 1990, 27-28. 
 229
purportedly discussing how to revise the rules, the FCC gave Fox a one-year 
waiver, allowing the weblet to schedule the eighteen-and-a-half hours per week it 
had requested.713 The networks, meanwhile, remained limited to a maximum of 
fifteen hours.714 Fox was also granted a PTAR waiver which allowed its affiliates 
to continue airing off-network programming during the prime time access 
period.715 
As had been expected, the networks and studios were unable to come to 
terms about the rules by the June deadline.716  Thus, the FCC began the lengthy 
process of evaluating the continued utility of fin-syn. The networks’ position was 
given a boost in late 1990 with the purchase of MCA by Matsushita. The 
acquisition of yet another studio by a “foreign” company helped the networks 
make their case that they were being hindered from being competitive globally.717 
Playing on the rapidly rising fears of the decline of American industry, the 
networks argued that these so-called foreigners could own “Hollywood” studios 
while the rules constrained them from moving widely into international markets. 
As Variety noted at the time of the announcement of the MCA-Matsushita deal, 
“now that four out of seven of Hollywood’s top production companies have come 
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under foreign ownership, the debate over the finsyn rule has taken on a distinctly 
nationalistic tone favoring the U.S. nets.”718  
The networks also played the “cable card” effectively in their campaign 
for the repeal of fin-syn. For example, on one occasion, the heads of the Big 
Three united to declare that the “demise of ‘free television’” could be at hand if 
they were unable to continue to grow (e.g., move more extensively into 
syndication).719 Such rhetoric appeared to work in their favor. By late 1990, when 
the FCC began holding hearings on fin-syn, Sikes had made clear that the “burden 
of proof” was on Hollywood to show why the prohibitions should be kept.720 
Concurrently, both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
came out in support of a complete repeal of the rules.721 The President’s office 
chimed in shortly thereafter via a letter from White House Chief of Staff John 
Sununu which emphasized “the President’s interest in seeing the FCC resolve the 
issue in line with his ‘aversion’ to government regulation of businesses.”722 
By early 1991, the political winds seemed to be moving in the networks’ 
direction. However, all of a sudden they encountered something they had not 
anticipated: dissent from within the ranks of the FCC. Through skillful lobbying, 
Hollywood managed to gain the support of two of the five commissioners – 
Sherrie Marshall and Ervin Duggan. Meanwhile, the swing vote, Andrew Barrett, 
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developed a convoluted proposal in place of a complete repeal of the rules. The 
“Barrett plan,” as it became known, had several components, including allowing 
the networks to take 100% financial interest in all programs but barring them 
from the distribution of first-run syndicated product. It placed a 40% production 
cap on in-house production of primetime entertainment and allowed the networks 
to possess both foreign and domestic syndication rights to those (and only those) 
prime time shows. Further, it defined a network as any company airing eleven 
hours of prime time programming a week and placed no expiration date on these 
revised rules.723 
No one was satisfied with this new proposal, least of all Fox. The 
company announced that, should the Barrett plan be implemented, it would exit 
the network business altogether.724 If given the choice between operating 
primarily as a network or as a syndicator, to Fox, there was no choice: The bulk of 
the money to be made was in syndication, and the company was not prepared to 
abandon that profitable business in order to be America’s fourth network. 
Realizing the situation was not working in his favor, Sikes postponed the 
fin-syn vote while he tried to gain support from his fellow commissioners.725  
Seeing that the chance of a full repeal of the rules was unlikely, he was ultimately 
able to obtain a limited number of modifications to the Barrett proposal. Almost 
all of the changes made worked in Fox’s – and only Fox’s – favor. The rules, as 
they were finally passed in April 1991 in a 3-2 vote (with Sikes and 
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Commissioner James Quello as the dissenters), were significant primarily in terms 
of the manner in which they redefined a network. Whereas previously a network 
was considered to be an entity delivering more than fifteen hours of 
programming, it now was defined as an entity delivering more than fifteen hours 
of prime time programming.726 This meant that while the Big Three remained 
subject to the rules based on their twenty-two hours of prime time programming, 
Fox could continue to be exempt from the rules even it if offered forty hours of 
programming spread out over the multiple dayparts.727 Another major change to 
the Barrett proposal involved foreign syndication. Namely, in response to 
concerns expressed by Congress about the potential hindering of the networks’ 
competitiveness in the international market, the rules were adjusted to allow them 
to obtain 100% foreign syndication rights.728 The other important adjustment 
pertained to the rules’ long-term prospects. The FCC agreed to look at the status 
of the marketplace in four years, and if conditions at the time were viewed as 
“sufficient,” then the regulations could be repealed altogether.729  
In analyzing the new rules, Broadcasting expressed what many in the 
industry and the press felt: Fox was the only “clear winner.”730 No one else 
benefited substantially from the changes. Neither the networks nor the studios 
were content with the results. Hollywood felt it lost too much; the networks 
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thought they didn’t get nearly enough. To Sikes, the rules were “bad law, bad 
economics and bad policy.”731 The other commissioners were equally dissatisfied, 
recognizing the rules to be a compromise at best.732 Meanwhile, in the eyes of 
many a journalist, the FCC had made a mockery of itself and its Chair. The 
following observation sums up the opinion of many a media analyst: 
In the 3 to 2 vote for new regs, set to take effect June 15…commissioners 
Andrew Barrett, Sherrie Marshall and Ervin Dugan exhibited the 
independence of rebellious teenagers. Studios and networks alike say the 
three regulators mocked a legion of lobbyists, thumbed their noses at 
editorial writers, humiliated FCC chairman Alfred Sikes and essentially 
told the 'pro-finsyn repeal' Bush administration to take a hike.733  
Given the widespread displeasure with the new rules, it was no surprise 
that both Hollywood and the studios immediately appealed the decision. To the 
shock of many, Fox also drafted an appeal.  Fox executives claimed that, although 
their company profited the most from the new ruling, they were opposed to fin-
syn because they were opposed to regulation of any kind. In the ensuing years, 
this would become an oft-cited mantra for the company.  
While the paperwork continued to wend its way through the court system, 
the rules went into effect in the summer of 1991. The only immediate 
consequence of their implementation was that the networks started syndicating 
more programming overseas.734 Otherwise, the rules’ modification mattered little 
in terms of the status of the industry. Minus their complete elimination – which 
could only occur in tandem with a modification of the consent decrees by an 
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appeals court – little more consolidation could take place. By the end of the ‘80s, 
independents had already become an “endangered species.”735  For example, 80% 
of the revenues from foreign syndication were going to only eight companies.736 
Independent producers simply did not have the resources to compete with the 
studios. Most could not pay the millions of dollars to produce several episodes up 
front nor could they handle the deficits which the networks required companies to 
incur. As the syndication business grew even more competitive – and the 
recession kicked in – a bad situation became even worse.737 Only the most 
successful independent producers remained in the business, and many of them 
were desperately seeking out studio or network partners. PTAR, which was also 
designed to help out independents, was equally ineffective. By early 1991, 78% of 
the access slots in the top 50 markets were occupied by only five shows – all 
produced by King World and Paramount.738  
Such figures reinforce the extent to which power had become concentrated 
into two camps: the studios and the networks.739 The only thing keeping these 
camps balanced – or separate – was fin-syn. By early 1992, most media analysts 
and industry executives recognized it was but a matter of time until the networks 
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and studios merged. As Merrill Lynch analyst Harold Vogel observed, “There is a 
certain inevitability about the networks and the studios getting together in some 
way or another, whether it's a merger or joint venture…. This is just the beginning 
of that process. Once you remove the finsyn rule complications, then you just 
have to wait for the event.”740 In the meantime, Fox used the head start it had 
gained from the FCC to its best advantage, demonstrating to its competitors the 
benefits of vertical integration and the means by which to proceed. 
 
THE END OF AN ERA: THE DEPARTURE OF DILLER, THE ARRIVAL OF A 
NETWORK 
With the launch of a new tv season, there's no minimizing what Barry 
Diller hath wrought. In the process of levitating a onetime hodge-podge of 
low-power UHF and VHF stations into a legitimate fourth network, he has 
managed to: zap many of the basic programming precepts of the three 
established networks; obliterate a chunk of the U.S. syndication business; 
strike fear in the hearts of basic cable networks that they might lose 
desirable channel positions; reconfigure the economics of station 
ownership; and alter the way in which advertisers view television itself… 
Variety editor Peter Bart, September, 1990741  
You can't really think of Fox as the fourth network anymore…It's no 
longer a network alternative like cable or syndication, but part of a base 
network TV plan for many brands… 
Steve Farella, Young & Rubicam, October 1991742 
At the same time that Fox was triumphing in the regulatory arena, the 
weblet was also regaining its footing on the programming field. During the 
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summer of 1991, several events indicated Fox’s fortunes were on the upswing. 
The audience for Beverly Hills 90210 continued to grow, thereby providing Fox 
with its first successful hour-long series. The Emmy telecast in August not only 
ranked number one in prime time but also helped Fox attain its highest weekly 
rating yet in its four-year history.743  Also in August, WGMB-TV in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana signed on as a Fox affiliate, giving the company full representation in 
the top 100 markets for the first time.744 With the addition of this station, Fox had 
137 affiliates and reached 92% of the country.745 Even as Fox’s affiliate numbers 
grew, so did its production strength. At the start of the 1991-92 season, Fox was 
producing more than 50% of its primetime schedule.746 Meanwhile, Married… 
with Children began its off-network run and performed above expectations, 
quickly emerging as the number one new show in syndication.747 Fox concluded 
1991 as the only program service to increase its prime time advertising revenues; 
the company improved by 15% over the previous year, yielding $606.7 million in 
income.748 Fox’s share of prime time also rose during the year by more than 2%, 
giving the company a total of 10.1% of the television audience in prime time.749  
And there was still more good news. As the new year began, several 
problem spots on Fox’s schedule disappeared. Married…with Children and In 
                                                 
743 The show received a 12.6 rating and 22 share, which was more than a 50% improvement from 
the previous year. Coe, “Emmy Show Wins Fox Its Highest Weekly Rating,” Broadcasting, 2 
September 1991, 20-21. 
744 “FBC in all Top 100,” Variety, 19 August 1991, 21. 
745  Ibid. 
746 The programs came from several different divisions: STF Productions, Twentieth TV and 
FNM Co. Wharton, “Fox and CBS Affiliates Court Finsyn Changes,” Variety, 24 June 1991, 33. 
747 From advertisement in Broadcasting: “The Most Upwardly Mobile Family in America,” 23 
March 1992, 2-3. 
748 “Fox Tops Nets in Prime-Time Ad Revenue Increases,” Advertising Age, 11 May 1992, 44. 
749  Ibid. 
 237
Living Color were no longer the sole programs holding up Sundays. Both 
Herman’s Head and Roc were gaining viewers as well. Similarly, the viability of 
The Simpsons on Thursday nights was no longer in question; it had proved it 
could stand on its own against The Cosby Show. At the end of February, an 
important moment occurred for Fox when a fresh episode of The Simpsons beat 
an original episode of The Cosby Show for the first time in household ratings with 
a score of 16.5 to 15.1.750  Thursday nights were being strengthened further by 
Beverly Hills 90210, which attracted ever-larger numbers of viewers. With those 
two nights improving, and reality programming providing a solid base on Fridays 
and Saturdays, Fox reintroduced its movie night on Mondays. This time around, 
the company was better prepared, having more original made-for-television 
movies ready to air.  
Thus, by March of 1992, Fox had five nights a week secured and a full 
seven-day-a-week prime time schedule was in the works. Prime time ratings were 
up 20% and FCN was dominating weekday and Saturday morning television in 
terms of both reach and advertising dollars.751 Further heightening its authority 
over children’s programming, Fox announced plans to increase its daytime 
children’s output from ten-and-a-half to nineteen hours a week starting in the fall 
of 1992. Warner Bros. would supply a substantial number of the new children’s 
shows, including the “tween”-targeted Batman: The Animated Series, Tiny Toon 
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Adventures and Animaniacs.752 Reports also surfaced that Fox was in the hunt for 
a late-night host once again.753 
With so many dayparts either gaining ground or in the works, Fox was 
looking more and more like a network. Trade papers started to speak of the “Big 
Three-and-a-half.”754  Fox’s viability was no longer an uncertainty, its influence 
no longer marginal. In fact, the company was continually shaping new 
programming practices. In addition, its marketers were often lauded, with 
particular attention drawn to their skill at encouraging affiliates to “Foxify.” 
According to Variety,  
There are many ways to Foxify, from answering station phones with “Fox-
4” or “Fox-7” (instead of the stations’ call letters); tacking the Fox name 
onto local newscasts; using a fox mascot in kids’ clubs; and putting the 
Fox logo in on-air promos and billboards even when touting non-Fox 
shows.755 
Having drawn respect for its skill at attracting the 18-34 audience, 
encouraging fresh programming trends, forging fresh means of station branding, 
and influencing regulatory processes, journalists began to ask, “What next?”  
With its guerrilla image starting to grow old, many wanted to know how the 
weblet would next define itself creatively and industrially.756 This question began 
to be asked with even greater frequency as the result of Barry Diller’s resignation 
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in late February. Speculation ran rampant as to why he was leaving: Was it 
because he felt he had accomplished what he wanted at Fox? Was it because, at 
age 50, he was at a turning point in his life and wished to do something else? Was 
it because Murdoch had refused to grant him an ownership stake in the company?  
As it turned out, Diller departed for all of the above reasons. He had 
helped create a legitimate competitor to the Big Three – an entity which operated 
according to its own set of rules yet was nonetheless every bit as profitable as the 
established networks.757 He had grown the company the way he had wanted to, 
pursuing and attaining the 18-to-34-year old audience he had sought out. He had 
overseen the development of a hit sitcom (Married…with Children), 
variety/sketch comedy show (In Living Color), multiple reality series (Cops, 
America’s Most Wanted), and most recently, hour-long drama (Beverly Hills 
90210) – not to mention a cultural and industrial phenomenon in the form of The 
Simpsons. In addition, he had developed a line of succession, with Lucie Salhany 
– whom he had personally recruited from Paramount’s syndication division to 
serve as head of Twentieth Television – rising up the ranks to be second-in-
command at the company behind Jamie Kellner.758  
After Diller operated for years doing as he pleased and taking orders from 
no one, suddenly Rupert Murdoch decided he wanted to become more involved in 
Fox on a day-to-day basis. To make matters worse, Murdoch’s vision for Fox was 
starting to diverge substantially from Diller’s vision for the company. 
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Technically, Diller’s contract limited Murdoch’s direct involvement with Fox, 
confining him to the status of “advisor and consultant.”759 Contract or not, during 
much of the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, Murdoch’s attentions had been directed 
elsewhere – in particular, trying to stop the flow of red ink out of BSkyB at first 
and then later out of his entire corporation. By early 1992, however, News Corp. 
was once again showing signs of life. In a relatively short time, the company had 
made an amazing turnaround. Shares in News Corp. were up approximately 200% 
from a year earlier as a result of cost-cutting and debt-reduction efforts.760 In 
addition, BSkyB was finally breaking even.761 
With many of the problems worked out in other parts of the company, 
Murdoch increasingly focused on Fox.  He stated his desire to expand its audience 
beyond the 18-34 demographic and to make it a more “journalistic operation.”762 
As it turned out, Murdoch would attempt these things without Diller at the helm. 
Diller left Fox to explore the world of “emerging technologies,” and Murdoch 
stayed to transform Fox into a “full-service network.”763 What precisely this 
entailed would become much more apparent over the course of the next several 
years.  
The first major indication Fox was striving for network status (except in 
the regulatory realm) came a few weeks after Diller’s resignation when the 
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company pulled its O&Os out of INTV.764 This was both a symbolic and literal 
means by which Fox made a break with its past. The challenge now became 
defining precisely what constituted a ‘network’ in this era of cable, satellite, video 
and video games. As the next chapter demonstrates, part of what “becoming a 
network” meant was pursuing a broader audience. However, the means by which 
Fox could accomplish this was anything but clear or easy. Fox had to take several 
expensive programming missteps before it could find productive ways to increase 
its viewership. While the company made these missteps, two new “fifth 
networks” were breathing down its neck, waiting to seize some of Fox’s viewers, 
executives, affiliates, programming strategies and marketing tactics. 
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Chapter Six: Struggles to Become a “Full-Service” Network, 
March 1992 – November 1993 
That's right, we'd prefer you don't call us a weblet anymore…. The 
fledgling, almost, not-quite-a-wannabe-network will become a full-
service, seven-night source… 
Fox Entertainment President Peter Chernin, 1992765 
 
Over the course of 1992, the economy took a turn for the better. Many 
companies which had previously cut back their expenditures during the recession 
began increasing their advertising budgets again. In addition, stock prices – 
including entertainment stocks – were on the rise. Both broadcasters and motion 
picture companies were beneficiaries of these developments. News Corp. was no 
exception to the market upswing. Several divisions of the company were 
performing well: BSkyB was finally making money. The company’s print 
publications were profiting from the increased advertising spending.  The feature 
film division had one of its best years in ages – and now many of these box office 
hits were making money through home video sales and rentals.  
Fox Broadcasting’s future seemed promising as well. The program service 
was nearing a full seven-nights-a-week schedule at last. Diller had left behind 
several strong managers including Jamie Kellner and Lucie Salhany as well as a 
strong slate of prime time programs. There was little reason to suspect that tough 
times were ahead for Fox. Yet while the rest of the industry was rebounding, the 
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company began to stumble. Its problems were mainly due to Murdoch’s desire to 
speedily transform Fox from a weblet into a “full-service” network. The primary 
means by which he hoped to accomplish this was by expanding Fox’s target 
demographic from 18-to-34 to 18-to-49. To attain this broader audience, the 
company took several different steps simultaneously, including developing more 
hour-long dramatic programming for prime time, allocating additional funds for 
the creation of a news service, and preparing to return to the late night arena after 
a long hiatus. It wasn’t long before it became clear that none of these strategies 
were working. In fact, each venture was a bigger disaster than the last.  
This chapter explores Fox’s initial struggles in trying to move from being 
a weblet to a network. The company came under assault on several different 
fronts at the same time. Journalists attacked Fox for its new programming, 
labeling the shows unoriginal and uninspired. Top talent accused Fox of 
overexposing successful shows, thereby lessening their syndication value. 
Affiliates criticized Fox for strong-arming them. In addition, several top 
executives left the company. And, to make matters worse, with the repeal of fin-
syn imminent, Paramount and Warner Bros. laid out blueprints for their own fifth 
networks.  
As other companies were moving forward, Fox seemed to be in a holding 
pattern. In this chapter, I discuss the stops and starts Fox experienced as it sought 
to modify its programming practices as well as its identity as a network. Fox’s 
time of stasis is contrasted with the significant growth taking place at other 
divisions of News Corp. as well as the rest of the media industry. Much of this 
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growth involved broadcasters and studios developing new relationships with cable 
operators and creating new cable services. There was also a great deal of 
expansion into additional markets overseas. As far ahead of the curve as Fox was 
in terms of its programming practices and means of branding itself, by no means 
did it proceed without trouble. The company’s development was one of trial and 
error – and during this particular period, there were a lot of errors. Before 
describing these missteps, however, I first establish the political and economic 
milieu within which Fox operated at this time. 
 
CLEAR SKIES AHEAD FOR THE STUDIOS AND BROADCASTERS 
 The U.S. was in the midst of a political transformation during 1992. With 
Clinton’s election into office in November, the FCC prepared for the changing of 
the guard. That guard, however, was slow to change: Clinton held off appointing 
an FCC chair until the summer of 1993. Prior to this, long-time commissioner 
James Quello served as interim chair. Finally in July Reed Hundt took over the 
chairmanship.766 As it turned out, Hundt’s agenda was not so different from his 
Republican predecessors. In general, he maintained the deregulatory direction 
established before his arrival. Among the items on his agenda were a review of 
the broadcast ownership rules and the repeal of PTAR – the same items which 
Sikes had on his agenda when he left office.767 In outlining his views, at times 
Hundt could have been mistaken for Mark Fowler. On one occasion, for example, 
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he declared that “the best regulator of programming and content is the competitive 
market itself.”768 His actions over the next several years would be in keeping with 
this perspective.  
Broadcasters and motion picture conglomerates would soon reap the 
benefits of Hundt’s deregulatory approach. Improving economic conditions 
provided them with an additional boost. 1993 marked a turning point for several 
major media companies. Both Time Warner and Viacom reported their first 
positive net earnings statements since their respective mergers in the late ‘80s.769 
Having turned a corner into profitability, Viacom continued its expansion efforts. 
In the fall of 1993, the company announced its plan to merge with Paramount 
Communications.770 Although the completion of the merger was stalled due to 
hostile bids – including one via Barry Diller at his new company, QVC – 
ultimately it went through, creating the second largest media corporation in the 
world.771  In the wake of the deal, much speculation appeared in the press as to 
whether Viacom CEO Sumner Redstone would be able to realize the kinds of 
synergies which had motivated the transaction in the first place.772 
                                                 
768 McAvoy, “FCC’s Hundt: Sensible Dereg Needed: Chairman Also Addresses PTAR, Going-
Forward Rules,” Broadcasting & Cable, 10 October 1994, 18-19. 
769 Noglows, “TW, Viacom Annuals Finally Written in Black,” Variety, 15 February 1993, 101. 
770 Farhi, “Paramount, Viacom Plan Merger; Deal Would Create Entertainment Industry Giant,” 
Washington Post, 12 September 1993, A1. 
771 Time Warner remained the world’s largest media corporation. Noglows, “A Long Hot Sumner: 
Redstone’s New Alliance Goes Above Par,” Variety, 11 October 1993, 1, 197; Jay Greene, 
“Sumner’s Star Rises: Redstone Takes the Reins; Execs Take Cover,” Variety, 21-27 February 
1994, 1, 184. 
772 For example, see Bart, “Mega-Managing,” Variety, 21-27 March 1994, 8, 71; Geraldine 
Fabrikant, “Viacom’s Victory; Viacom is Winner Over QVC in Fight to Get Paramount,” New 
York Times, 16 February 1994, A1. 
 246
Murdoch had never declared the pursuit of synergies as one of his main 
objectives in his growth of News Corp.  He placed a much greater emphasis on 
the importance of expanding and integrating the production and distribution 
holdings of his filmed entertainment divisions.773 By the spring of 1992, he once 
again had the resources to act on these desires. Initially, these investments took 
the form of moving into new television markets around the world. As discussed in 
previous chapters, in spite of News Corp.’s depiction in the press as a ‘global’ 
company, through 1992, the company had focused primarily on English-language 
markets. From that year on, however, News Corp. adjusted its strategy and made 
its first significant investments in electronic media in non-English speaking 
countries. This process began in June ’92, when the company acquired a stake in 
the Spanish commercial network, Antena-3.774 This marked News Corp.’s first 
move into Continental Europe since the early ‘80s. In July of the following year, 
the company significantly increased its holdings in Asia with the purchase of a 
63.6% interest in satellite network Star Television.775 In August 1993, Fox 
launched a Latin American cable channel.776 Called simply “Fox,” the bulk of this 
channel’s programming came from the company’s film and television library.777 
                                                 
773 According to Shawcross, Murdoch never placed much faith in the building of synergies. See 
pp. 227, 288. 
774 Linda Moore, “Murdoch Widens Reign with TV Stake in Spain,” Variety, 22 June 1992, 33, 
40. 
775 Meredith Amdur,” Murdoch Star Deal Transforms Asia,” Broadcasting & Cable, 2 August 
1993, 34-35. Rhonda Palmer of Variety called this purchase “the world’s most expensive impulse 
buy.” It cost $525 million. See “Murdoch Satcaster Gets Lingo(s): Different Program Strokes for 
Different Far Eastern Folks,” 5-11 September 1994, 43. 
776 Flint, “Bart and Company Make Run for the Border: Fox Plans Rollout of Latin American 
Cable Channel,” Broadcasting & Cable, 5 July 1993, 16. 
777 Ibid. 
 247
According to Broadcasting, following this investment Murdoch has access to 
more than three-fourths of the world’s population.778 
News Corp. may have been moving quickly into new parts of the world, 
but it was not neglecting markets in which it was already involved. In fact, quite 
the opposite was the case. The company was equally attentive to the regions in 
which it already had large investments. For example, BSkyB – which was now 
turning a profit – tripled its basic channel capacity and shifted into operating as a 
pay cable channel.779 Similarly, in the U.S., Murdoch remained diligent in his 
pursuit of a cross-ownership waiver allowing him to retain ownership of the New 
York Post as well as the broadcast station, WNYW. The FCC rewarded him for 
his patience, providing him with a permanent waiver in the summer of 1993.780 
Though Murdoch worked hard to regain control of the New York Post, 
television – particularly his U.S. television assets – became ever more central to 
his company. In 1993, for the second year in a row, News Corp. reported a higher 
income from its television-related activity in the U.S. than two of the three 
networks.781 Though News Corp.’s stakes in broadcasting continued to grow, the 
company did not neglect cable. Rather, cable remained every bit as important to 
News Corp.’s growth strategy as it had always been. This was evident with the 
creation of the Fox Basic Cable division.782 This entity was designed both to 
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develop a cable program service and to continue expanding the reach of Fox 
Broadcasting into regions where VHF or UHF outlets were unavailable.783 The 
results were most immediately visible in Fox’s expanded reach. By the summer of 
1992, Fox had struck several additional deals with MSO’s, thereby using cable to 
augment its penetration on the VHF band to nearly 60%.784  
Re-regulation of the cable industry also worked to the advantage of Fox as 
well as the other networks. Different parts of the 1992 Cable Act went into effect 
over the course of 1993. On April 1, cable rates were rolled back 10%; by 
October, cable operators were expected to have negotiated with local broadcasters 
how they were to be compensated for carriage of their service.785 Depending on 
their degree of leverage and popularity, local stations had the option of choosing 
to be paid for their signal (re-transmission consent) or to have their signal carried 
free of charge. The networks, of course, were in a position to demand payment for 
their signal. Fox took the lead in these negotiations. In place of straightforward 
payment for carriage, Fox struck an innovative deal with TCI whereby the MSO 
provided it with $30 million per year.786 This money was to be directed toward a 
new cable network – a network which was already in development at Fox.787 The 
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Big Three followed suit, seeking new cable outlets in place of compensation for 
their signal via retransmission consent. Through these negotiations, ABC was able 
to jump-start ESPN2, and NBC launched America’s Talking.788 CBS also 
bargained for a new channel, though it never came to fruition.789 Cumulatively, 
the passage of the 1992 Act proved quite beneficial for all of the networks. They 
were not only able to slow the growth of cable via rate rollbacks, but were able to 
make additional inroads into cable. What’s more, the networks extended their 
reach into cable at a time when few additional cable programmers were appearing 
due to a lack of available channel space.790 
The 1992 Cable Act – an act brought in part through effective lobbying 
efforts by broadcasters – had the odd effect of stimulating more extensive 
dealings between MSO’s and broadcasters. In the ensuing years, relations 
between cable and broadcasters heated up even further, leading to what one 
journalist described as a passionate “love affair” between the two industries.791 
Simultaneously, the cable industry began a flirtation with telecommunications 
companies (“telcos”). Discussions between these two entities were partly 
motivated by a judicial ruling that telcos could enter into the cable business in the 
same markets where they provided voice services.792 It wasn’t long before several 
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of the Baby Bells invested in cable companies. By the end of 1993, mergers were 
being arranged between Bell Atlantic and TCI as well as between Southwestern 
Bell and Cox cable systems.793 In addition, US West made a $2.5 billion 
investment in Time Warner’s cable and entertainment divisions and Nynex 
invested $1.2 billion in Viacom.794 These events were seen as the first tentative 
steps toward building the “information superhighway” which the Clinton-Gore 
administration was touting so enthusiastically. 
In the end, however, few of these unions were consummated. In fact, 
relations between telcos and cable companies soon soured. The companies 
attributed their failed marriages to the FCC’s decision to roll back rates an 
additional 7% in 1994.795  Whether this was the cause or rather merely a useful 
scapegoat, the fact remains that the largest deals – including the mergers of 
Southwestern Bell-Cox and TCI-Bell Atlantic – were called off.796 As one 
journalist noted, “instead of coming together to form elaborate, complicated 
mergers, the telcos and cable ops will end up constructing their own paths on the 
information superhighway.”797 Also apparent was that the construction of the 
“infopike” would take much longer than had initially been anticipated.798  
                                                 
793 Farhi, “Southwestern Bell, Cox Plan Cable Partnership; Venture is Latest in Series of Baby 
Bell Deals; Ameritech Seeks Long-Distance Rights,” Washington Post, 8 December 1993, F1. 
794 Ibid. 
795 Dempsey, “Cloud Over Cable May Rain Networks,” Variety, 28 February – 6 March 1994, 1, 
79-80. 
796 Ibid; Flint and Dempsey, “Cox, S’West Bell Split: New Pothole on Superhighway,” Variety, 
11-17 April 1994, 45-46. 
797 Dempsey, “Cablers, Telcos Take Chill Pill,” Variety, 18-24 April 1994, 77. 
798 Among the developments expected to be slowed down in the wake of the failed mergers were 
the development of digital cable and the expansion in cable capacity. See Robert Silverman and 
Jay Greene, “Cold Water Hits Infopike Mania,” Variety, 7-13 March 1994, 35, 38; Dempsey, 
“Rough Seas for New Cable Webs,” Variety, 2-8 May 1994, 33, 35. 
 251
Though cable and telecommunication companies may have been 
experiencing growing pains, the same could not be said of broadcasters. Not only 
were they benefiting from the improving economy, but they were also already 
celebrating the demise of fin-syn. As discussed in chapter five, by 1992, the FCC 
had repealed a large portion of the rules, but not enough to satisfy either the 
networks or the studios. Thus, an appeals court in Chicago had begun to evaluate 
the FCC’s revisions.  In November the court issued a surprising decision: a three-
judge panel vacated the commission’s modified rules, declaring them “unreasoned 
and unreasonable.”799 The FCC was given 120 days to redraft the rules, a process 
it began in December after the various parties had submitted comments.800 In 
April the commission released their new rules.801 These were even more lax than 
the ones released previously. The latest version of fin-syn repealed the financial 
interest component of the rules altogether.802 Fox was allowed to expand to a full 
twenty-two-hour-a-week prime time schedule.  The networks were not allowed to 
have back-end rights to first-run syndication, nor could they syndicate 
programming domestically.803 These constraints were to be removed two years 
after the consent decrees were repealed.804 
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In November 1993, a U.S. District Judge finally lifted the consent 
decrees.805 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago accepted the 
FCC’s amended version of the rules.806 This set the clock ticking in terms of the 
complete elimination of fin-syn. As of November 1995, the rules would cease to 
exist once and for all. There were several important consequences to these 
developments. First, mergers between studios and networks were held off for a 
little while longer. Second, talks began to commence – and the press started to 
speculate – about who would merge with whom once the rules were completely 
removed.807 For the next several months, the trade publications were rife with 
speculation as to which network would be purchased first, and what studio would 
do the purchasing. Third, with network-studio mergers now a possibility in the 
not-too-distant future, the value of entertainment stocks – especially broadcast 
stocks – rose even more.808 This coincided with a broadcast marketplace which 
was already showing signs of improvement.809 Paine Webber analyst Alan 
Gottesman perhaps summed it best in observing that investors “finally got tired of 
waiting for the broadcasting business to die.”810 
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A fourth effect of the repeal of fin-syn was a shift in the nature of the 
syndication marketplace. As expected, the networks began developing 
programming for first-run syndication.811 This contributed to the glut in the 
syndication marketplace – a glut further augmented as Fox’s prime time programs 
also started to be prepared for their syndicated run. In response to this buyer’s 
market, syndicators grew more creative with the sale of their product.  Buena 
Vista, for instance, staked out new ground with its sale of the sitcom Empty Nest. 
For the first three years of its syndicated run, the program was licensed 
exclusively to broadcast outlets; after that, it was shared by those stations and 
cable channel TBS.812  
Though the syndication market was becoming more crowded, this did not 
stop the studios from selectively developing first-run product. As previously 
discussed, during the late ‘80s, Fox had effectively deterred MCA and Paramount 
from creating their own networks. In place of making official fifth networks, they 
took advantage of the dwindling number of prime time dramas and developed 
action hours for that daypart.813 Paramount was particularly successful with its 
two hour block of The Untouchables (1993) and Deep Space Nine (1993). Warner 
Bros. also lined up enough independent stations to launch the “Warner Bros. 
Independent TV Consortium” in January 1993. This effort consisted of the hour-
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long series Kung Fu and Time Trax.814 By fall of 1993, one executive observed 
there were enough first-run action adventure series in syndication – fourteen in 
total – to comprise a “pseudo-fifth network.”815 With a de facto fifth network 
already in existence, Paramount and Warner Bros. initiated development of their 
own fifth networks.  This impulse was also motivated by the recognition that the 
networks might soon opt for more of their own homegrown programming, leaving 
these top suppliers without a market for their wares. Having their own network 
meant having a guaranteed outlet for their product. For example, should Warner 
Bros.’ television production division find itself having difficulty placing its shows 
on the established networks, the company would be able to assure a place for its 
product on its own network’s schedule.  
In the meantime, Fox continued to build on its advantage as both program 
producer and network distributor. By late 1992, the company had approximately 
33 hours of programming on the air.816 Several of Fox’s prime time shows were 
being placed in syndication on both broadcast and cable channels. To the 
network’s surprise, some unanticipated series emerged as syndicated hits. Most 
notable was the popularity of Cops in its off-network run. Fox had low 
expectations for the program’s chances in syndication, as indicated by its initial 
placement on only one station. However, the program generated such strong 
ratings on this lone New York outlet – essentially doubling the ratings garnered 
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during that time period a year prior – that Fox quickly moved it into other 
markets, where it played well in both daytime and access slots.817 Thus Fox was 
able to earn still more money on a program which had broken even long ago. This 
development was particularly significant because it suggested that some reality 
programming had more of a long-term value than had previously been thought.818 
Though reality programming may have been bringing in unforeseen 
profits to Fox, it was not leading the company in the direction it wanted to go with 
its prime time slate. Unfortunately, it remained unclear precisely what direction 
Fox wanted to take for the 1992-93 season. With Diller gone, the pressure to 
pursue the 18-to-34 year demographic had diminished. Executives were aware of 
Murdoch’s desire to broaden the fourth network’s audience. This problem was in 
determining how much broader to go and who specifically should be pursued with 
this modified programming strategy. And even more to the point, what kind of 
programming would or should Fox develop to accomplish this task? Answers to 
these questions were not reached immediately. First, the company had to suffer 
through several misfires – including a late-night debacle and several 
underperforming hour-long dramas. 
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BEING CHASED OUT OF LATE NIGHT… AND OTHER DAYPARTS  
A lot of people thread [Fox’s target audience] a little more narrowly than 
we do. A lot of people think we want to be the teen network. Our desire is 
to appeal to the 18-to-49-year-old demographic… 
Fox executive Peter Chernin, March 1992819 
[The] dissemination of news and entertainment, for the good of us and our 
viewers, must be linked almost umbilically…  
Rupert Murdoch, June 1992820 
Fox’s schedule was beginning to stabilize at the time Diller left. With his 
departure, the company once again entered into a period of uncertainty. This was 
largely a function of the network’s pursuit of a wider audience over more hours of 
the day. There were several goals placed on the agenda simultaneously, including 
developing a news service, reaching 18-to-49-year-olds, and re-entering the late 
night programming business. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Fox made valiant 
efforts in all these realms, only to face significant setbacks due to a combination 
of low-rated programming and extensive turnover in the executive suites. 
Fox’s attempts at developing a news service actually began well before 
1993. Off and on over the years, the company had taken small steps toward 
building a news division. As with so many of its other programming endeavors, 
Fox executives never imagined their news would resemble the networks’ news.  
They saw a primary means of differentiating Fox’s news coverage – and saving 
money – could come by seeking material from the station group and affiliates. A 
                                                 
819 Natale and Kissenger, “…As Rupert Rolls Up His Sleeves,” Variety, 2 March 1992, 1, 78, 
820 Coe, “Murdoch Blasts Traditional News,” Broadcasting, 29 June 1992, 17-18. 
 257
preliminary move in this direction came in 1988, when the New York O&O 
WNYW began airing “Fox News Extra,” a two-minute nightly news brief.821 In 
June 1990 – shortly after Diller assured Congress that Fox would meet its public 
service commitment by covering major events such as presidential debates – the 
company provided more details about a national news service it had in the 
works.822 Yet in spite of Diller’s proclamation that the development of news was 
“one of our highest priorities,” little more was forthcoming except some “Fox 
Entertainment News” vignettes out of the Los Angeles O&O.823 
Fox’s idea for how news would look and feel became a little clearer with 
the appointment of Stephen Chao as president of Fox News in March 1992. Chao 
got his start as vice president for acquisitions at News Corp. in the mid-’80s, 
where he helped Murdoch put together the deal to acquire both the Fox studio and 
the Metromedia stations. 824 From there he was promoted to the position of vice 
president, Fox Television Stations Productions.825 In that role, he was central to 
the production of programming out of the station group; America’s Most Wanted, 
Cops and Studs were all created under his supervision. 826 At the time he was 
appointed to run Fox’s news effort, he had no prior experience in television 
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news.827 In addition, his experience with journalism consisted primarily of a 
period working at the National Enquirer in the late ‘70s.  
Chao never had the chance to implement his vision for Fox News, as he 
was abruptly fired from the company in the summer of 1992 following his hiring 
of a male stripper for a News Corp. conference. The embarrassing event was 
widely reported due to the presence of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and his 
wife, National Endowment for the Humanities chairwoman Lynne Cheney.828 
Following his dismissal, the Fox-news-service-that-wasn’t underwent another 
shake-up.829 This time, Fox took a different path in its formulation of a news 
service, turning to former CBS News president Van Gordon Sauter to run the 
operation.830 Sauter’s arrival came at the same time Fox covered its first major 
event, the Democratic National Convention in New York.831 While Sauter’s 
tenure at Fox may have started with a bang, it ended with a whimper. Less than a 
year later, he left the company and Fox News Service was shut down.832  
Fox was having as much trouble re-shaping its prime time as it was having 
defining its news service. The company was coming up against its usual 
expansion problems as it struggled to reach a full seven-day-a-week schedule. In 
addition, Fox encountered a new set of dilemmas which included conflicts with 
talent and difficulties identifying precisely what types of programs appealed to 
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18-to-49-year-olds. Fox’s scheduling problems kicked in shortly after the fall 
1992 season commenced. Executives had promised in June that a full weekly 
schedule would be in place shortly, yet by October they had postponed their 
launch of Tuesday nights until the next year.833 While the Aaron Spelling-
produced melodrama Melrose Place had premiered strongly during the summer, 
its ratings began to decline with the heightened competition which came at the 
start of the fall season.834 Meanwhile, another twenty-something drama, the rock-
and-roll centered The Heights, was doing poorly on Thursday nights. In January 
1993, Fox finally premiered its sixth night, Tuesdays, with the quirky comedy-
drama Key West and the college-focused drama Class of ’96. These shows proved 
to be an additional headache, as Fox was forced to deal with more low ratings and 
negative critical response.  Following the debut of these shows, critics attacked 
Fox for lacking originality; as one journalist put it, now Fox was simply “ripping 
itself off.”835 
During the 1992-93 season, Fox’s programmers discovered it was one 
thing to want to broaden its audience but quite another to actually be able to do it. 
Media buyer Paul Schulman noted that “you could put Lawrence Welk on Fox 
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and it would skew young.”836 While this statement was given as a compliment, it 
points to the dilemma the company’s executives faced as they tried to target older 
viewers: Namely, Fox had built its schedule and its image by being the “Clearasil 
Web,” a channel targeting to people who were younger, hipper, and edgier (or at 
least thought they were these things).837 To modify this image, the network would 
have to make a significant break with its past – both in terms of its marketing and 
programming strategies. This was a dangerous goal, for Fox risked alienating its 
core audience and losing the brand identity it had worked so hard to build. Fox 
was left with the daunting task of developing programming distinctive enough to 
retain its existing viewer base but familiar enough to attract viewers seeking out 
more standard network fare.  
To make matters worse, Fox had to accomplish this balancing act in the 
midst of a dispute with the producers of one of its most popular programs, In 
Living Color. The feud came about as a result of Fox’s double booking of the 
show on Thursday and Saturday nights – a measure taken so Fox could fill one of 
the many gaps which had appeared on its schedule. The show’s creator, Keenan 
Ivory Wayans, objected to this tactic, feeling it overexposed the show and reduced 
its value for syndication.838 However, since Fox was a co-producer of the 
program, it had the ability to override his protests and did so. In response, Wayans 
left In Living Color in December 1992; his siblings Damon, Kim, and Shawn left 
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shortly thereafter.839 This clash was significant not only because it affected the 
tone – and ratings – of the show, but even more importantly, because it 
foreshadowed the conflicts between talent and corporations which would become 
increasingly common in the impending era of vertical and horizontal integration. 
Although it was starting to fade, In Living Color remained on the 1993-94 
fall schedule. Other shows – including Key West, Class of ’96 and the dramatic 
anthology series Tribeca – did not. Nor did a slew of short-lived sitcoms, such as 
the sketch comedy-oriented The Ben Stiller Show, the domestic sitcom Shaky 
Ground and the workplace comedy Flying Blind. During the spring of 1993, Fox 
executives overhauled the schedule in their first full-fledged attempt at 
broadening the service’s reach to the 18-to-49 demographic.840 The development 
slate consisted of a blend of with Westerns, cop shows and science fiction series. 
This prime time schedule was said to have “confused some suppliers.”841 Among 
the programs which made the cut were the police dramedy Bakersfield P.D., the 
fantasy-Western The Adventures of Brisco County Jr., and the supernatural 
drama, The X-Files. While there were also several new comedies on the schedule 
– including the Don Rickles-Richard Lewis vehicle Daddy Dearest and the 
domestic sitcom The Sinbad Show – for the most part Fox executives avoided its 
trademark “ribald comedies,” declaring them “too Fox-like.”842 
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Fox – in developing its first post-Diller schedule – placed more programs 
into development than any other network. A total of eight new shows were 
announced, accounting for six of the service’s fifteen hours. Along with these 
additions, the company allocated a large sum of money to buy family-friendly 
films from Universal Pictures.843 This deal was significant not only because it was 
one of the first times the company purchased films from an outside supplier, but 
also because none of the movies had previously played on pay-television. It was 
also important because with the airing of the first movie on June 21, 1993, Fox 
finally reached the full seven day-a-week to which it had so long aspired.844 
The Universal film which was broadcast on June 21 was Beethoven 
(1992), a comedy about the run-ins between the family dog and its vet-owner 
(Charles Grodin). From the time of Beethoven’s broadcast throughout the entire 
1993-94 season, Fox interspersed a combination of “broad-appeal theatricals” 
with “action-driven made-fors aimed at its young, predominantly male 
viewers.”845 This programming tactic was emblematic of how Fox programmers 
were trying to balance the audience they already had with the audience they 
wanted to have. Fox Entertainment Group president Sandy Grushow framed the 
company’s “mandate” for the season as creating programs that helped it expand 
                                                 
843 Other movies in the Universal package included Stop or My Mom Will Shoot, The Babe and 
Mr. Baseball. Dempsey, “Fox Takes Universal Pics for New Movie Night Mix,” Variety, 5 April 
1993, 27, 196; Coe, “Fox Signs Movie Deals,” Broadcasting & Cable, 19 April 1993, 40. 
844 Coe, “Fox Expands to Seven Nights a Week; June 21 is Trigger Date for Weekly Monday 
Movie, Mix of Made-Fors and Theatricals,” Broadcasting, 22 February 1993, 16. 
845 Dempsey, “In Search of the Fox Monday Movie Niche,” Variety, 19 April 1993, 23. 
 263
beyond the core 18-34 demographic while maintaining the “Fox edge” and 
“consistently providing a distinctive alternative to the other webs.”846 
As the 1993-94 season played out, this strategy proved to be unsuccessful 
more often than not. Most critics argued that the new Fox programming wasn’t 
that different from the old Fox programming.847 Perhaps ad executive Betsy Frank 
summed it up best: Fox was “at somewhat of a crossroads.”848 The company’s 
executives knew they wanted to change course; they just weren’t quite sure how 
to do so. Alas, Fox had a couple more wrong turns to make before finding a 
profitable path.  
One such wrong turn came with Fox’s next foray into late night. At the 
same time Fox laid out its 1993-94 schedule, it also signed Chevy Chase for a late 
night talk show.849 After an extensive promotional build-up during the summer, 
the first episode aired on September 6, 1993 and featured guests Goldie Hawn and 
Whoopi Goldberg. The Chevy Chase Show premiered to respectable ratings 
earning a 5.7 rating and 13 share.850 On its premiere night, the program defeated 
both The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and The Late Show with David 
Letterman.851 The performance of The Chevy Chase Show was particularly 
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impressive considering Letterman’s show had premiered to much fanfare on CBS 
only a week prior.852 Alas, neither viewers nor critics liked what they saw in The 
Chevy Chase Show. USA Today declared that “Fox should put The Chevy Chase 
Show out of its misery,” while the Washington Post opined that the show was a 
“complete mess.”853 Chase was lambasted for his lack of charisma as well as his 
decision to re-hash skits from his time on Saturday Night Live in the early ‘70s.854 
Ratings declined almost immediately: On its second night on the air, the show lost 
28% of its viewers and fell to a 4.1 rating and 10 share.855 By the end of 
September, it dropped to a 2.1 rating, 5 share; by October it was off the air after 
only 29 episodes.856  
The Chevy Chase Show proved to be an extremely expensive 
embarrassment for Fox. Because the program failed to meet Fox’s 4.5 ratings 
guarantee to advertisers, the company was forced to provide make-goods for 
months.857 Between promotional costs, paying out Chase’s contract and fulfilling 
make-good agreements, Fox projected it would take a $40 million loss on the 
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show.858 With the failure of The Chevy Chase Show, the company gave up on 
trying to fill the late night time slot for the time being.859 
Fox’s newest talk show fiasco not only cost it financially but also in terms 
of its relationship with its affiliates. The failure of Chase’s program merely 
proved to be the latest annoyance to Fox affiliates. Over the course of 1993, 
tensions had continued to build between the two entities due to conflicts over a 
number of issues. Many affiliates had grumbled about giving up their late night 
time slot to begin with. Several felt they were being forced by Fox to give up 
highly rated syndicated programming – and what they were receiving in return 
was a scheduling nightmare.860 The frustration affiliates felt over The Chevy 
Chase Show was just the most recent of a string of annoyances: Affiliates had also 
recently expressed dismay over Fox’s plans to provide children’s programming on 
Sunday afternoons.861 In the end, due to their objections, Fox opted to stay out of 
this daypart.862  
The affiliates’ dissatisfaction did not end there: They were also worried 
about Fox’s plans to move into cable, fearing this would siphon viewers away 
from their stations. Fox had to make a number of concessions to its affiliates in 
order to get their approval for the new FX cable channel. For example, affiliates 
received nine minutes per hour of advertising time on FX. They were also given 
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the 12 to 2 p.m. time slot on the cable channel to program as they desired.863 In 
addition, they were to be provided with their choice of either seven-and-a-half 
cents per subscriber or five cents per subscriber plus an ownership stake.864 
 While Fox may have feared losing affiliates, several of the company’s top 
executives actually did head out the door. First Diller left, then Chao was fired. In 
late1992, Joe Roth resigned to start a production company at Disney.865 Though 
Roth came under fire for several box office bombs, including the big-budget 
failures Toys (1992) and Hoffa (1992), he maintained that the film division was 
the third most profitable in Hollywood, trailing only behind the consistent 
industry leaders, Disney and Warner Bros.866 Among the major money earners 
developed late in Roth’s tenure were My Cousin Vinny (1992), White Men Can’t 
Jump (1992), Unlawful Entry (1992) and Home Alone 2: Lost in New York 
(1992).867  
No sooner had Roth left than Fox Broadcasting president Jamie Kellner 
also gave notice. As one journalist put it, Kellner’s departure in January 1993 
made for “a clean sweep of the executive suite that built the weblet into a 
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departure, see Susan Spillman, “Fox Chief Resigns to Be a Producer,” USA Today, 3 November 
1992, 1D. 




primetime contender.”868 With Kellner and Roth gone, a management shake-up 
occurred in both the film and television divisions. Most significantly, Chernin 
transferred from the television to the film division and became head of the motion 
picture studio.869 In addition, Salhany was appointed head of the television 
division, becoming the first woman to head a broadcast network.870  
Kellner’s resignation was especially significant as it was one more sign – 
along with the company’s move beyond its original target audience of 18-34 – 
that Fox was no longer the new kid on the block. The company’s maturing status 
became even more apparent as 1993 wore on and Paramount and Warner Bros. 
each accelerated their fifth network plans. Rumors about these emerging networks 
began to circulate during the summer of 1993 although neither company specified 
their plans until October.871 At that time, Paramount publicly announced its 
intention of partnering with the Chris-Craft station group in the creation of 
UPN.872 A new Star Trek series, Voyager, was to be one of the first programs on 
its prime time schedule.873 The following week, Warner Bros. outlined its plans 
                                                 
868 From “Executive Exodus at Fox Broadcasting,” Adweek, 11 January 1993. At the same time as 
the management shake-up at Fox, there were also several resignations at both ABC and NBC. See 
Brodie, “Topper Turnover Devils Development,” Variety, 8 February 1993, 1, 92. 
869 Coe, “Chernin to Replace Roth at 20th; Observers Expect Sandy Grushow Will be Named to 
Fox Broadcasting Post,” Broadcasting, 9 November 1992, 42. 
870 Thomas Tyrer, “TV Gets 1st Woman Leader; Salhany Succeeds Kellner as Fox Net’s Top 
Exec,” Advertising Age, 11 January 1993, 4. 
871 For a discussion of the preparations, see Robins and Noglows, “Would 5th Web Launch Put Par 
on the Course?,” Variety, 28 June 1993, 1, 37; Flint and Freeman, “Warner Unveils Fifth 
Network,” Broadcasting & Cable, 30 August 1993, 6-7; Benson, “Ted Tangles Warner Web,” 
Variety, 27 September 1993, 1, 78. 
872 The name “UPN” was not used initially. The acronym was adopted the fall of 1994.  
873 Flint, “It’s Warner v. Paramount and Tribune v. Chris Craft,” Broadcasting & Cable, 1 
November 1993, cover, 6-7.  
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for its channel, the WB. Its blueprint included the use of superstation WGN to 
enhance its national reach.874 
Warner Bros. executives chose to look to cable from the outset because 
they recognized there were not enough independent stations remaining to attain 
the necessary national coverage. The shortage of independent stations points to a 
key difference between the circumstances in which the WB and UPN emerged 
and the circumstances by which Fox developed nearly a decade before. As 
Collette and Litman observe in their paper exploring the rationale driving the 
creation of WB and UPN, traditional economic and industrial analyses fail to 
explain why one company – let alone two – would choose to develop a fifth 
network at this time.875 The costs of entry were high, revenue projections were 
grim, and there were doubts either service could attract enough viewers to be 
profitable.876 As they note, “assuming that firms do seek to maximize profits, 
secure market share in existing markets, and reduce risk amid uncertainty, this 
market entry may seem curious.”877 
These authors posit that vertical integration served as an “adaptive 
strategy” for the two studios. In part both Paramount and Warners were acting 
defensively, trying to gain a foothold in the marketplace at a time when entry 
remained possible.878 In other words, the 500-channel universe was within view, 
                                                 
874 Benson, “WB Goes Super Route,” Variety, 6 December 1993, 17, 41. 
875 “The Peculiar Economics of Broadcast Network Entry,” Journal of Media Economics, 4. 
876 Ibid. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Warner Bros. Executive Vice President Barry Meyer also referred to the creation of the WB as 
a defensive measure in Jessell, “Syndicators Face Fifth-Net Squeeze,” Broadcasting & Cable, 15 
November 1993, 23-24. 
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but it didn’t exist yet. There was still time for these companies to establish a brand 
identity in the marketplace with relative ease. Five years down the road, this 
might not be the case: “Come late and you’ll be forced to catch up,” Collette and 
Litman observe. Fail to act now and “you could be pushed to the margins.”879 
Another equally important reason why both companies were proceeding 
with fifth network plans at this time was the imminent demise of fin-syn. All the 
networks were producing more of their own programming in-house. Paramount 
and Warner Bros.– companies which had been two of the top program suppliers to 
the networks for decades – feared they either would be pushed out of the market 
altogether or forced to surrender more back-end rights in order to guarantee 
placement on the networks’ schedules.880 If the networks did bump these studios’ 
projects to more competitive time slots, their programs might lose viewers, 
thereby leading to early cancellation. This would mean the studios likely would 
not have enough episodes of their programs to make their money back in the 
syndication market – and typically the studios did not earn back their investment 
in series during the course of their initial prime time run.   
In order to protect themselves from being pushed off the network schedule 
altogether, Warner Bros. and Paramount felt they had to start networks of their 
own.  A network – as opposed to a cable channel – was still seen as the best 
means of reaching the widest possible audience. Though this audience might not 
                                                 
879 “The Peculiar Economics,” 10. 
880 Such fears certainly seemed justified. For example, in the fall of 1994, NBC announced it was 
moving the Paramount-produced Frasier out of its cushy Thursday night time slot and into a much 
more competitive position on Thursday nights. In Frasier’s place went Madman of the People, a 
sitcom produced by NBC Productions. See Lowry, “Peacock Ruffles Par’s Feathers,” Variety, 16-
22 May 1994, 1, 54. 
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be as large as it used to be, it was still much larger than what could be obtained 
via any other delivery systems on the horizon.  
In deciding to start their own fifth networks, Warner Bros. and Paramount 
demonstrated their faith not in the network system as it actually was, but in the 
network system as it was becoming – a system dependent on turning both the 
television programs and the services they aired on – into brands. The shape these 
services took was strongly influenced by the model proved by Fox.881 In this 
model, distribution was viewed as a means to the end, while the end was the 
programming itself. Rupert Murdoch said as much when he told Broadcasting 
that “all our ambitions are first and foremost to be the creators of software. Where 
it's acceptable we'd like to be purveyors of news…We are only in distribution 
where it's necessary to be in distribution.”882 Jamie Kellner, who went from his 
position as CEO of Fox Broadcasting to CEO of the WB in the summer of 1993, 
had a similar perspective, declaring that “a network can be defined by its 
programming, not by its distribution in the 21st century.”883  
Every step that was taken to enhance a network’s distribution reach and 
the brand identity of its shows was one which had the potential increase the value 
of all of its programming far into the future. And as this programming was 
increasingly owned by the same company which owned the network, the potential 
for earning a profit went up that much more. It was in recognition of these factors 
                                                 
881 As Collette and Litman observe, “all other means of distribution remain inferior options to the 
national networks in terms of scope and potential revenues,” “The Peculiar Economics,” 9. 
882 Don West and Joe Flint, “The Wonder’s Still in the Wireless,” Broadcasting & Cable, 24 
January 1994, 20-23. 
883 “Jamie Kellner,” Mediaweek, 23 January 1995, 32-33. 
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that Paramount and Warner Bros. willingly took their chances on the network 
business and jumped into an out-and-out war to secure the limited number of 
remaining independent stations to become affiliates.884 
It was also in recognition of these factors that Murdoch made several 
major purchases to take Fox to the next level in its development. After the 
company had failed to expand during the 1992-1993 period by airing news and 
late night series, Murdoch took a different tack in trying to grow the company and 
expand its target audience. This “different tack” came in two main forms. First, it 
involved turning to “event programming” via sportscasts – a shift attained through 
Murdoch’s acquisition of NFL rights. Second, it involved increasing the 
company’s presence in distribution by way of an investment in several different 
station groups. This latter move was truly an example of News Corp. being in 
distribution because it was seen as “necessary to be in distribution.” With a 
heightened distribution presence, Fox once again went about trying to alter its 
image and its audience profile. There were far-reaching consequences to Fox’s 
next efforts to broaden its reach. As the next chapter demonstrates, these different 
purchases resonated throughout the industry, affecting Fox’s relationship to the 
Big Three, their affiliates, independent television stations, program producers, 
syndicators and the FCC.  
                                                 
884 The atmosphere was depicted as a “race” or as “war-like” on multiple occasions. For example, 
see Benson and Robins, “Par Takes the Fifth,” Variety, 8 November 1993, 17, 21; “The Wonder’s 
Still in the Wireless,” Broadcasting & Cable. There was much skepticism that either studio could 
effectively start a network, given the limited coverage which remained available via the existing 
broadcast outlets. For examples of such doubts, see “Would 5th Web Launch Put Par on the 
Course?,” Variety; Flint, “Fifth Network: More Smoke Than Fire?,” Broadcasting & Cable, 5 July 
1993, 11-12. 
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Chapter Seven: Fox, Football and Franchise Television, 
December 1993 – August 1995 
The weblet had been banished to the back pages after Warner Bros. and 
Paramount announced their fifth network efforts last year. Fox was no 
longer the eager young upstart, but a stunted network with a long laundry 
list of programming problems and a highly visible late night failure with 
Chevy Chase. In a couple of expensive swoops, Fox re-wrote the rules of 
broadcasting. And the repercussions are likely to be felt for a long time. 
This New World of TV has left some long-time industry honchos, who 
earned their stripes in the old school, feeling somewhat bewildered...  
   Variety, July 1994885 
With little fear of Washington, and with Wall Street sending their stocks 
soaring, network brass were experiencing a sense of déjà vu last week - 
wondering whether the year was actually 1985, the last time the Big Three 
began to fall like dominos to new owners… 
Variety, September 1994886 
 
From December 1993 to August 1995, Fox accelerated its efforts to attain 
parity with the other networks. This equality would come in a variety of ways, 
including expanded broadcast coverage, increased advertising revenues, and the 
acquisition of sports rights. Most importantly, it would come by attracting a 
broader viewership. To attain this elevated status, Murdoch returned to his old 
ways of spending. He did so eagerly, determined to allocate the dollars necessary 
to take Fox to the next level. In the process of spending – most notably, on the 
rights to the NFL, on an investment in the New World station group, and in the 
                                                 
885 Benson, “TV’s Traumatic Times: Summer’s Sweeping Changes Reinvent the Business,” 18-24 
July 1994, 1, 51. 
886 Noglows and Robins, “Will Web Tide Ebb?.” 
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creation of several new divisions – Murdoch not only made Fox competitive with 
the Big Three but demonstrated how to do business in the neo-network era.  
The Fox model for how to do business had a number of important 
components, including an emphasis on niche-oriented programming, the use of 
event programming as a means of branding, and a strong integration of the 
company’s production and distribution arms. As the mid-1990s approached, Fox’s 
expansion efforts would become greater in size and scope. Fox’s growth during 
this time established the terms by which the Big Three could eventually develop 
into the Big Six – a Big Six whose holdings included both networks and studios.  
Meanwhile, with the economy continuing to improve and with fin-syn on 
the way out, the entire industry remained on the upswing. The manner in which 
the media industries developed during this time was in no small way a result of 
the efforts of Fox. In this chapter, I explore how other companies attempted to 
emulate Fox’s broadcasting model. This emulation took two different forms: 
There were the new program services, UPN and the WB, which adopted the 
scheduling, marketing and distribution strategies which had been refined and 
eventually abandoned by Fox as it outgrew “weblet” status. And then there were 
the networks, which adopted the programming, marketing and distribution 
strategies that were being taken up by Fox-the-emerging-network. 
This chapter illustrates how others sought to become more like Fox even 
as Fox sought to solidify its status as distributor and program producer. First I 
describe how Fox’s fortunes started to turn around with the acquisition of sports 
rights. Then I show how Fox pushed the station sales business into frenzy with its 
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investment in several broadcast groups. This discussion is followed by an analysis 
of the implications of these deals for both Fox as well as the larger media 
business. Fox’s deals caused a new level of instability for syndicators, affiliates 
and the networks. These investments had larger ramifications for Fox as well. 
Most notably, the ire the company drew from its network competitors upset its 
friendly relationship with the FCC, causing it to be placed under scrutiny by the 
commission for the first time.  
Though Fox may have been placed in a defensive position in Washington, 
it was on the offensive on television sets across the country. In the fall of 1994, 
the company began its most lucrative season yet. With The X-Files becoming a 
break-out hit and The Simpsons getting a second wind with its syndicated launch, 
Fox reaffirmed the profitability of the niche-oriented prime time franchise. The 
company’s success with such programs reinforced the value of the Fox way of 
doing business. In addition, it motivated several networks and studios to pursue a 
similar structure and programming strategy, thereby feeding into the “merger 
mania” of 1995. Before talking about the boom period of the mid-‘90s, however, I 
must first go back and describe the deals which enabled Fox’s fortunes to look up 





TACKLING THE NFL, FOX-STYLE 
Murdoch has said that money, and assured losses, are no matter - he's 
prepared to make a loss-leader deal as a signal to Fox affiliates that Fox is 
in the network business for the long haul. Fox has pressure to reinforce 
that signal with the emergence in recent months of two new proposed nets 
from Warner and Paramount, both of which are pursuing Fox affiliates… 
Broadcasting & Cable, December 1993887  
I think the NFL as clearly as any other event marked the point in time 
when Rupert Murdoch decided he was not content to be the fourth 
network. He wanted to be the number-one network. The pieces that have 
been put in place since then are all related to aggressive competition and 
the goal of becoming number one… 
Fox executive Preston Padden, October 1994888  
As the last chapter demonstrated, by late 1993 the Fox network was in a 
precarious position. Its initial efforts at developing prime time programming 
targeted to the 18-49 demographic had been largely unsuccessful. The Chevy 
Chase Show was a humiliating failure. Affiliates were growing vocal about their 
displeasure with these miscalculations along with the company’s move into cable. 
Several key executives had either left or were on their way out. The press was 
starting to question whether Fox had lost its way even as Warner Bros. and 
Paramount were preparing to launch program services targeting its core audience. 
Fox had to take action and demonstrate to its own affiliates as well as the press 
and industry at large that it was serious about competing with the Big Three. 
                                                 
887 McClellan and Flint, “Fox is Wild Card in NFL Negotiations: While CBS and NBC are 
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At the end of December 1993, Murdoch did precisely that, taking the first 
in a series of steps which would push Fox into the next phase of its development. 
For a record price of $1.58 billion, he signed a four-year contract for the right to 
broadcast NFL games.889 With this deal, Fox took away a franchise which had 
been held by CBS for 38 consecutive years. The transaction had several other 
consequences as well, not the least of which was that it reinforced that Murdoch 
was in charge and was going do whatever it took to make Fox a legitimate 
network.890 As the section which follows demonstrates, the acquisition of the NFL 
rights served several important production, distribution, and marketing functions 
for Fox. Furthermore, by attaining these rights, Fox continued to alter both its 
public image and its corporate culture.  
This was not the first occasion Fox had pursued the rights to the NFL but 
it was the first time the league took the company’s bid seriously. In 1987 – before 
Fox had launched its prime time line-up – the weblet tried to purchase Monday 
Night Football. Though Fox offered more than ABC for the rights, the NFL 
turned it down.891 It was too much of a risk for the NFL to take on an unproven 
program service. Shortly thereafter, CBS and Fox competed for rights to the NFL, 
with CBS coming out the winner. Following this transaction, Fox went to the 
                                                 
889 In addition to acquiring the rights for NFC division games, Fox also acquired the right to air 
the 1997 Super Bowl. The price broke down to $395 million per year. See Mandese, “How Fox 
Deal Aids NFL Global Aim,” Advertising Age, 3 January 1994, 4. 
890 In his own words, he wanted Fox to have more “credibility.” See Foisie, Figuring the Pluses, 
Minuses of Fox-New World,” Broadcasting & Cable, 30 May 1994, 10-11. 
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Expected to Accuse CBS Inc. of Antitrust Violation in NFL Talks,” Wall Street Journal, 30 
September 1988. Diller said knew their chances of getting the rights were “slim” in “Diller’s 
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Federal Trade Commission with allegations that CBS engaged in anti-trust 
activity.892 The agency ruled in Fox’s favor, concluding CBS did “improperly 
reduce competition” in the process of negotiating for football rights.893  
Fox executives continued to speak of their desire for the NFL rights in the 
ensuing years.894 In the meantime, they did their best to undermine the other 
networks’ football broadcasts. Most notably, in January 1992, Fox joined with 
Frito-Lay to create the “Doritos Zaptime/In Living Color Super Halftime Party” to 
run opposite the Super Bowl.895 This event involved the cast of In Living Color 
performing skits live during halftime. The broadcast was extremely successful, 
attaining a 14.9 rating versus CBS’s half-time rating of 16.7; more than 70% of 
these viewers came from CBS.896 
Less than two years later, Fox made its next play for the NFL rights. This 
time, in a sign of the company’s growing authority and influence, the NFL 
enthusiastically agreed to Fox’s terms. The League found Fox’s pitch appealing 
this time around because it saw its audience was aging. The number of 18-34-
year-olds watching football had declined approximately 40% in the past ten 
years.897 The NFL wanted to go younger and Fox, with its core viewership of 18-
to-34-year-olds was the right entity to accomplish this task. Fox promised to make 
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the NFL appeal to younger viewers. To achieve this, the company invested in 
several technological innovations, such as Dolby surround sound and the use of 
highly sensitive parabolic microphones around the gridiron.898 
While the NFL saw in Fox the opportunity of gaining a younger audience, 
Fox saw in the NFL another means by which it could broaden its audience. As 
noted above, prior attempts to expand its demographic profile had borne little 
fruit; in fact, during the 1993-1994 season, viewership of Fox was down 6% in 
households and 8% in viewers ages 18-49.899 Part of the reason Fox placed so 
much emphasis on broadening its audience to 18-to-49-year-olds is because 
advertisers were believed to be willing to pay up to twice as much for this 
demographic as they would pay for the 18-34 demographic.900 The NFL was a 
different way for Fox to go about its pursuit of this wider audience. At the same 
time, in purchasing the rights to football, Fox saw a way to solidify its dominance 
with males. Even before the NFL deal, Fox led the networks in terms of male 
viewers, with more than 50% of its prime time audience being male as opposed to 
40% at each of the Big Three.901 With football, Fox could build further on this 
base – and target it in another daypart no less. The company hoped it could retain 
these viewers throughout the evening. The fall 1994 schedule was designed with 
this strategy in mind.902 For example, The Simpsons – a long-time ratings leader 
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with men ages 18-49 – was shifted from Thursdays back to Sunday nights in order 
to buttress this effort.  
The acquisition of the NFL rights also served a variety of marketing 
functions for Fox. Most significantly, the deal enabled the company to 
demonstrate it was more than just an entertainment service. Through this one 
expensive acquisition, Fox instantly had a sports division – one of the major 
indicators of a “full-service network.” Murdoch appointed David Hill as president 
of the new Fox Sports operation; Hill was only one of several News Corp. 
executives transferring to Fox at this time.903 In addition, Fox raided the CBS staff 
for other employees. Veteran CBS sportscasters Pat Summerall and John Madden 
were among the most prominent individuals to shift allegiances.904  
These staff changes generated a great deal of press coverage, coverage 
which reinforced the dichotomy between Fox as young and cutting edge with 
CBS as old and stodgy.905 Fox, of course, did its best to exploit these 
                                                                                                                                     
older. The 18-39-year-old group of people who watch football has been declining in numbers. We 
have to turn that around. Hopefully, we'd like to bring some women viewers to it, too. So we have 
to - while being totally professional and not in any way demeaning anything - we have to give it a 
younger appeal. We have to do a much more appealing program. For instance, the networks, while 
varying very much in quality, have really spent nothing on new technology in the last three or four 
years. We'll be starting fresh, and with all the latest equipment imaginable. We did that in Britain 
with soccer - we've absolutely changed the look of a soccer match.” From “The Wonder’s Still in 
the Wireless,” Broadcasting & Cable. 
903 Regarding the appointment of Hill, see McClellan, “Fox Picks Its Prince of the Pigskin,” 
Broadcasting & Cable, 3 January 1994, 14. Other News Corp. execs who took key positions at 
Fox were Les Hinton, Ian Rae, and Piers Akerman. All came from publishing and moved into 
television operations. In January 1993, Hinton became head of the Fox O&Os; Akerman became 
head of Fox’s latest iteration of its news service soon after. Rae took over supervision of A 
Current Affair. All information from Robins and Brodie, “Murdoch’s Makeover: H’wood Frets as 
News Corp. Chief Remakes Fox,” Variety, 12 April 1993, 1, 93. 
904 McClellan, “Fox’s Latest Deals: Madden, Summerall,” Broadcasting & Cable, 24 January 
1994, 10. 
905 See “Editorial: Murdoch’s Great Catch,” Advertising Age, 10 January 1994, 21; Lowry, “CBS 
Gets Black Eye from Edgy Affils,” Variety, 6-12 June 1994, 21, 26. 
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representations. The network initiated a public relations blitz, spending 
approximately $100 million on a marketing campaign “letting hard-core NFL’ers 
know the NFC has moved, but also pitching younger, less football-savvy viewers 
to tune in.”906 The pitch for the promotion was “same game, new attitude,” and 
more than 80 different commercial spots were created to sell the NFL as “hip and 
edgy.”907  
Fox executives tried to portray the program service as many things all at 
once: They wanted to show that Fox was much more than a weblet and thus far 
superior to UPN and the WB, which were both premiering in January 1995. They 
also wanted to reinforce that Fox was like the Big Three in terms of its resources 
and the production values of its programs but unlike them in other, equally crucial 
ways. In particular, Fox’s shows were presented as more distinctive, fresh and 
innovative than those found on the other networks.  
While the NFL provided Fox with an important platform from which the 
company could reinvent itself and redefine its audience, it served other purposes 
as well. With the acquisition of the football rights, Fox made the first in a series of 
major moves toward enhancing its distribution. The company had two key goals: 
to renew its relationship with existing affiliates and, simultaneously, to attract 
new broadcast outlets. The former goal was important because of the atmosphere 
which had developed as UPN and the WB competed to secure affiliates. Fox 
wanted to impress upon its existing affiliates – 141 at the time of the NFL 
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acquisition – that secondary affiliations were unacceptable.908 Secondary 
affiliations were formed when there were a limited number of broadcast signals 
available in a particular locality. When a station formed a secondary affiliation 
with another network, it would have to pre-empt or time-shift some of the 
programs of the primary network. Executives believed such affiliations would 
“dilute” the brand identity which Fox had worked so hard to build.909 In addition 
to using football as a means of discouraging secondary affiliations, Fox hoped its 
acquisition of the sport would make up for the failure of The Chevy Chase 
Show.910 In fact, football was viewed as such a boon by many of Fox’s affiliates 
that the company was able to procure three additional 30 second spots from to 
finance the acquisition.911  
Football also helped Fox in obtaining its latter goal of attracting new 
affiliates. This strategy marked a shift away from the company’s previous tactic 
of pursuing better coverage and channel positioning by turning to cable channels. 
Now, executives wanted to improve Fox’s VHF coverage and channel positioning 
using the more traditional route of aligning with broadcast stations. The NFL was 
certainly a major reason – although not the only reason, as will be discussed in the 
following section – why Fox was able to sign dozens of additional primary and 
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(ironically) secondary affiliates. While most of the primary affiliates which signed 
on were independent stations, many of the secondary affiliates were allied with 
ABC.912 By early May of 1994, Fox had signed more than two dozen additional 
affiliates and increased its national reach to more than 97%.913 This brought the 
company’s total affiliate number close to 200 – a number on par with the Big 
Three.914 In some cases, Fox was able to use the NFL to upgrade its affiliates 
from UHF to VHF.915  
Improving its affiliate roster was rapidly becoming one of Fox’s main 
obsessions.  The reason this was so important was because better coverage meant 
more advertising dollars. Fox wanted to get the same advertising rates CBS had 
received the previous season. As it turned out, Fox ended up doing better than 
CBS had the season before. Whereas CBS earned about $130,000 per 30 second 
spot for the 1993-’94 season, Fox received about $150,000 per 30 second spot for 
the 1994-’95 season.916 Fox profited in other ways. In particular, its O&Os 
showed a 50% operating profit on a 25% revenue gain during the first six months 
of its 1994 fiscal year.917 While this was partly due to a generally improved 
economic outlook and the subsequent upswing in the station business, Fox 
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executives maintained that the bump was primarily due to the addition of 
football.918 
The acquisition of the NFL rights affected far more than News Corp.’s 
balance sheet. For News Corp., the deal represented another step forward in its 
efforts to increase its presence in sports around the world.919 In tandem with his 
purchase of football rights in the U.S., Murdoch approved the purchase of soccer, 
rugby, cricket, golf – and even ping-pong – for broadcast over his growing 
number of cable, satellite and broadcast outlets in Europe, Australia, Asia and 
Latin America.920 He also added to Fox’s U.S. sports holdings, paying $150 
million for the right to broadcast National Hockey League (NHL) games for five 
years.921 With this purchase, Murdoch’s total expenditure on sports was estimated 
to be close to $3 billion.922 As a result of this pact, NHL games received their first 
network broadcast in twenty years. As Variety journalist Michael Williams 
observed, these purchases were “radically changing the rules of the game,” 
altering the methods by which sports were procured, produced and distributed.923  
These deals were not merely an end in themselves, but rather a means to 
larger ends for News Corp. Sporting events functioned as loss leaders, 
establishing a brand for News Corp.’s program services across the globe and 
helping to bring in viewers who (it was hoped) would then stay to watch other 
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programs. Sporting events, added Williams, were nothing less than the 
“locomotives” being “used successfully to promote entire networks and increase 
subscriber bases.”924 News Corp., as the mid-‘90s approached, had a rising 
number of networks and subscriber bases to promote. For example, in June 1994, 
Murdoch acquired a 49.9% interest in German commercial television channel 
Vox; in July 1995 he purchased the remaining 36.4% of Star TV.925 With 
holdings in so many different countries, Murdoch’s company was able to absorb 
losses from one division with profits from another. This proved to be the case 
with football; the $350 million in losses incurred from the high price paid for the 
NFL were more than offset by the $600 million the company earned by selling off 
a small percentage of its ownership stake in the now highly profitable BSkyB.926  
Although News Corp. took an immediate financial hit from football, the 
deal was still seen by the company as a worthwhile long-term venture. As one 
journalist commented,  
While Fox's mammoth $395 million annual NFL rights fee is unlikely ever 
to post a profit on a network ad sales basis, the network’s executives 
believe intangible values of promotion - increased coverage, the impact it 
will have on the asset value of the Fox-owned TV stations (increasing 
their value as much as 15% annually during the course of the four-year 
deal) and enhancing other company values - will more than make up for 
the investment.927 
Yet while News Corp. might have benefited substantially from the NFL 
deal, the same could not be said for the Big Three. At the time Murdoch swooped 
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in, the networks were finally beginning to make headway in their efforts to limit 
their expenditures on sports rights. Both NBC and CBS had placed bids that were 
about 10% lower than they had previously paid.928  The $1.58 billion offered by 
News Corp. – an amount which was several hundred million dollars more than 
that offered by CBS – promptly put a stop to this effort.929 A few days later, NBC 
returned to the NFL and paid in excess of $100 million more than it had paid for 
the same package four years earlier.930 ABC increased its payment for Monday 
Night Football by about two percent.931 
The sums the networks once again were allocating for sports rights were 
soon exceeded by the price they found themselves paying to retain the loyalty of 
their affiliates. The $1.58 billion News Corp. put out for football was only the 
first part of a two-pronged effort by the company to enhance its distribution and 
adjust its audience profile. The second part of this effort involved pursuing VHF-
based stations with better channel positioning. These stations would be attained 
through a process of investing in more than a dozen television stations and also by 
aggressively encouraging network stations to switch affiliations. Through these 
expenditures, News Corp. set off a chain reaction in station purchases and 
instigated a realignment of broadcast affiliates across the country. This 
realignment contributed to a resurgence in the station sales business and caused 
prices to ascend to levels they had not been at since the boom period of the mid-
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‘80s. The consequences of these transactions – the most prominent of which was 
News Corp.’s investment in the New World station group – were far-reaching, 
affecting both the syndication business as well as the networks’ financial well-
being. In addition, as a result of these deals, News Corp. suddenly found its 
previously friendly relationship with the FCC become surprisingly contentious.  
 
A BOOMING STATION BUSINESS ONCE AGAIN 
I believe as much as ever in broadcasting…I believe this so strongly that I 
want to see Fox buying more stations both here and around the world… 
Rupert Murdoch, June 1992932  
While rival networks and lobbyists don't take issue with Fox's tactics and 
at times have jokingly referred to the FCC as the 'Fox Communications 
Commission,' they are growing tired of Fox playing the role of the 
underdog newcomer that needs all the help it can get… 
   Variety, May 1994933 
In the spring of 1994, the broadcast station business was starting to look 
up after a lengthy slump.  With interest rates down and spot revenues up, station 
values were on the rise.934 The first significant signs of improvement came in 
March 1994. At this time, Fox joined with Savoy Pictures to create a new station 
group, SF Broadcasting.935 This venture, in which Fox owned 58%, was put 
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together with the intention of acquiring stations in large and medium sized 
markets.936 Of particular interest were markets with NFC teams.937 The group was 
to be run by Tom Herwitz, an executive whose prior experience included stints as 
assistant to Mark Fowler at the FCC and as Vice President and General Manager 
of the Fox-owned WTTG-TV in Washington D.C.938 
The investment in SF Broadcasting was relatively minor compared to what 
came two months later. At the end of May 1994, Fox announced a deal whereby, 
in exchange for $250 million in preferred stock and $250 million in a seven-year 
loan, it would acquire a twenty percent ownership stake in New World 
Communications.939 As a result of this deal, the twelve New World stations – 
eight of which were currently allied with CBS – became Fox affiliates.940 The 
initial affiliation agreement was for ten years. 
According to one Fox executive, “football was the bait” that caused New 
World chair Ronald Perelman to bite.941 There were additional incentives, 
however. New World was looking to heighten the output of its production 
division and Fox promised several means of accomplishing this. Fox guaranteed it 
would order a minimum of two series pilots and two made-for-television movies 
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from New World Entertainment.942 In addition, New World was attracted to Fox’s 
more limited schedule relative to the Big Three. The extra hours available for 
programming could be filled at least in part by New World’s own product.943 The 
rest of the time could be occupied by syndicated programming. The lion’s share 
of the money from ad sales for this programming would go to New World rather 
than a network.944 To New World executives, the immediate losses resulting from 
affiliation changes would be made up for in the long-term by the enhanced value 
of being a vertically integrated company with its own library of programming.945 
To further strengthen the production division, New World hired former NBC 
Entertainment head Brandon Tartikoff to supervise the development of 
programming.946 
There were also several potential benefits of this deal for Fox. Most 
significantly, Fox raised its VHF coverage substantially, going from 25 to 40%.947 
Furthermore, the company accomplished this without having to pay additional 
compensation to these affiliates; New World bought Fox’s argument that the extra 
time it would have available on its schedule would more than make up for the loss 
in network compensation.948 Meanwhile, though these stations would function in 
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many ways like O&Os, Fox circumvented FCC attribution rules by holding a non-
voting interest in the stations and keeping its ownership stake under 25%.949  
The New World-Fox contract had wide-ranging consequences. First, it set 
off what Time called “the most sweeping affiliation shake-up in network 
television history.”950 Instantly, several Fox stations were looking for new homes. 
While the Big Three as well as the WB and UPN were looking for new affiliates. 
These efforts were complicated because, in nine out of twelve markets in which 
New World operated, there were only three VHF stations – and now Fox had one 
of them.951 Cumulatively, according to Variety, affiliate changes compelled 
“viewers in roughly 40% of the country this fall [of 1994] to go looking for their 
favorite shows on other channels.”952  
The second consequence of the deal was that it gave the station business 
the final push it needed to become red hot.953 Station prices began a climb which 
would continue for the next several years. Even stations in smaller markets were 
viewed with greater interest by the networks than they had been before.954 In spite 
of the growing value of stations, many were not purchased outright at this time. 
Rather, the Fox-New World arrangement spurred a new trend in which the 
networks favored strategic alliances over outright purchases. Although this pattern 
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had started in 1993 when Paramount and the Chris-Craft station group united to 
form UPN and Warner Bros. and the Tribune station group joined to form the 
WB, the Fox-New World deal was distinctive because it was motivated by a 
desire to circumvent FCC ownership rules.955 CBS quickly imitated Fox, making 
a similar arrangement with Westinghouse’s Group W station group.956  
The third result of the New World-Fox deal came in the syndication 
world. Station groups were increasingly being envisioned as sources of 
programming. Fox, of course, had long turned to its own O&Os for product. Now, 
this process intensified.  In addition, larger station groups gained further leverage 
over program suppliers due to their ability to clear substantial portions of the 
country.957 Syndicators which were not aligned with O&Os or major station 
groups were thus squeezed in two ways: Not only did they have difficulty getting 
clearances, but even if these clearances were obtained, there was less space on the 
stations’ schedules for outside product because they were producing more in-
house.958 To make matters worse, syndicators had to scramble in one more way. 
Namely, due to the affiliation shake-ups, the programming strategies and audience 
profiles of dozens of stations changed. The syndicated product which many 
stations had previously licensed often did not suit their new viewership. This 
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forced syndicators to hustle to secure different outlets for their product before 
their competitors did so.959 
The turmoil in the syndication market was matched by the mayhem taking 
place in the network business, marking the fourth consequence of the Fox-New 
World alliance. If the NFL deal disrupted the networks’ cost-cutting strategies, 
the Fox-New World arrangement altogether ceased such efforts. Placed in a 
constant state of fear that they would lose additional affiliates, the networks 
dramatically raised their compensation. By the end of the summer, each network 
had increased compensation from around $100 million to more than $120 
million.960 In exchange for this increase, the networks demanded affiliates accept 
longer-term contracts.961 At the same time, they intensified their call to the FCC 
to modify ownership regulations, arguing this would provide more stability to the 
broadcast business.962 Both Congress and the FCC took this request to heart and 
started debating how much to raise the limits.963 
In the meantime, Fox met with its own unique set of challenges. The New 
World agreement might have helped Fox finally reach an “even playing field” 
with the networks in terms of distribution.964 However, it also stimulated a great 
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deal of hostility between Fox and its affiliates. Affiliates were now distrustful of 
Fox, suspicious that they would be dumped if a better station came along.965 
Consequently, they came into the June 1994 affiliate meeting with a long list of 
demands. Most notably, they asked for longer affiliation contracts and said they 
would be unreceptive to any more late night programming.966 
While Fox’s problems with its affiliates took a turn for the worse, its 
relationship with the FCC soured as well. The New World deal played a part in 
this but there were additional reasons Fox suddenly found itself under increased 
scrutiny from the commission. Fox’s problems on this front began in December 
1993, when the NAACP charged the company with violating the FCC rule barring 
foreigners from owning more than a 25% interest in a U.S. television station.967 
News Corp. did not take the allegations seriously. The company’s attorneys said 
that what had been the case in 1986 remained the case in 1994: Murdoch was a 
U.S. citizen. As such, he was the “de facto controller” through his ownership of 
32.7% of the company’s shares.968  Nonetheless, in April 1994, the FCC 
announced it would look into the matter.969 Few industry analysts expected the 
investigation to come to much. As Variety observed at the time the inquiry began, 
since Murdoch and Diller “first launched the Fox Network in 1986, the FCC has 
done just about everything it could to keep government out of their way. And just 
as it's changed the way America watches television, Fox is changing the way 
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people lobby the FCC and Capitol Hill.”970 The general attitude seemed to be 
“why would anything change now?” 
News Corp. apparently felt similarly. Whenever the company needed 
waivers to long-standing regulations, the FCC had readily provided them. When 
certain rules came into conflict with News Corp.’s growth objectives, the 
company found ways to circumvent the rules – or, on occasion, contribute to their 
repeal. Given this history along with the general sense that the FCC was in its 
back pocket, News Corp. executives likely felt they had little to risk in conceding 
certain points. Hence, in early May 1994, Fox acknowledged publicly for the first 
time that yes, it was foreign owned but said this should not make a difference. 
After all, Murdoch had become a U.S. citizen to meet the commission’s 
requirements.971 And what’s more, should the FCC care if Fox was foreign-
owned, they only need think of all that the company had accomplished in the 
name of competition. News Corp. executives claimed that Fox had not only 
achieved the FCC’s long-standing goal of developing a fourth network, but it had 
also stimulated competition amongst program suppliers, strengthened the UHF 
station business and, most recently, facilitated the emergence of two new 
networks.972 
Considering Fox’s skilled lobbyists and deep pockets, all of this 
hullabaloo might have led nowhere. However, it did lead somewhere due to the 
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commotion the company caused through its various station transactions. The 
attack on Fox was stepped up in June 1994, when NBC sent a memo to the press 
attacking the FCC for the ways it had shown favoritism toward the company.973 
The New World deal, according to NBC, “highlights the absurdity of the fact that 
[Fox] enjoys special treatment.”974 NBC’s ultimate aim was to encourage the FCC 
to ease its regulations for all, rather than continuing to privilege only one.  
In August 1994, however, NBC’s goals shifted. It was at this point that SF 
Broadcasting acquired its first stations – stations which included NBC affiliates in 
Green Bay, Honolulu, New Orleans and Mobile.975 With the exception of the 
Mobile station, all were to become Fox affiliates. These sales compelled NBC to 
file an official complaint with the FCC.976 The company’s immediate mission was 
to prevent Fox from purchasing additional stations.977 NBC also wanted the FCC 
to consider whether Fox was violating the ownership rules. Officially Fox had 
eight stations and 19.42% coverage of the U.S.978  However, if the New World 
and SF Broadcasting stations were included, Fox had 36 stations covering more 
than half the country – a number which far surpassed the 12 station/25% 
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ownership limit.979 NBC demanded the FCC be consistent. Either all of the 
networks should be able to own more stations, or none should.  
While the FCC evaluated the merits of this complaint, Fox invested in yet 
another station group. In October 1994, Fox gave minority-owned Blackstar 
Communications $20 million.980 The money was designed to help Blackstar 
increase its station holdings from three to fourteen. However, some observers 
speculated Fox had other, subtler objectives. According to Variety,  
By allying with an African-American firm, Murdoch seemingly negates 
criticism from some civil rights leaders in the U.S. who have alleged that 
his newspapers are anti-black, that Fox’s minority hiring record is 
abysmal, and that the Fox weblet’s portrayal of blacks in programming is 
stereotyped.981 
Whatever his motivations, the investment in Blackstar proved to be the 
last such arrangement Murdoch struck on behalf of Fox for quite some time. In 
December 1994, the FCC announced it was expanding its investigation.982 The 
commission ordered a new proceeding in order to obtain more info about Fox’s 
ownership status. In addition, the commission planned to evaluate whether Fox 
was in violation of the ownership rules by holding “attributable” interests in 
various companies.983 
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In deciding to proceed with this investigation, NBC accomplished one of 
its aims: It slowed down Fox’s expansion plans.984 Not only was Fox’s purchase 
of four additional stations stalled, but in addition, the company was unable to 
effectively recruit as many of the stronger affiliates it so desperately wanted.985 
Many station owners steered clear of dealing with Fox while it was under the 
FCC’s microscope. This, in turn, opened the door for the other networks, giving 
them more room to negotiate (or renegotiate) their own affiliation agreements.  
Though Fox may have been facing regulatory difficulties, its problems in 
the programming world were easing up. Whereas the company’s efforts at 
reaching out to the 18-49 audience during the 1993-94 season were largely 
unsuccessful, during the 1994-95 season the company had better luck at attracting 
this demographic. One such program to appeal to the 18-49 audience was The X-
Files. As the following section shows, Fox exploited the growing interest in this 
series – in conjunction with the sustained popularity of The Simpsons – to further 
broaden its viewership. While The X-Files was integral to Fox’s prime time 
expansion, The Simpsons was vital to Fox’s growth in other dayparts. Despite the 
distinctions between these two programs, they were equally important franchises 
for Fox. The manner in which Fox produced and distributed these series set an 
industry-wide precedent. Through its handling of each show, Fox reinforced the 
hit-driven nature of contemporary television as well as the benefits of being a 
vertically integrated media conglomerate.   
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIME-TIME ENTERTAINMENT FRANCHISE: THE 
GROWTH OF THE X-FILES, THE SYNDICATION OF THE SIMPSONS 
We've done a fairly respectable job of attracting the upper end of [18-49], 
but now we're working hard to extend our reach…and still not lose what's 
come to be called 'the Fox edge.'….There's potential for trouble when you 
develop a show that appeals only to a niche within that niche… 
Fox executive Sandy Grushow, March 1993986 
X-Files shows that a program can be unique and distinctive, with edge, but 
still be a quality production….The two can go hand in hand… 
Fox Inc. president Chase Carey, January 1995987  
As of the beginning of the 1994-95 season, Fox was officially up and 
running for a full seven days a week. With the exception of Melrose Place, The X-
Files and the sitcom Living Single, all of the series introduced during the 1993-94 
season were cancelled. Once again, Fox relied heavily on hour-long series to 
rebuild its schedule and expand its viewership. These hour-long series included 
dramas, dramas and more dramas. There were family dramas (Party of Five), 
melodramas (Beverly Hills 90210, Melrose Place, Models Inc.), police dramas 
(New York Undercover), supernatural dramas (M.A.N.T.I.S., The X-Files) and 
anthology dramas (Tales from the Crypt, imported from HBO).These shows were 
spread out across the week, with at least one drama playing five of the seven 
nights.  
Along with these new series, Fox tried out a couple of fresh counter-
programming strategies. With NBC reemerging as a powerhouse on Thursday 
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nights with the yuppie comedies Mad About You, Friends and Seinfeld, Fox 
programmers decided to try a different tactic and aggressively pursue black 
viewers with a programming block that included Martin, Living Single and New 
York Undercover. Though Fox had previously developed several programs 
targeted to the African American audience, it had never geared an entire evening 
to this demographic. 
Sunday’s shows, meanwhile, were aimed mainly at 18-49-year-old men. 
Fox hoped to pull in viewers with football and keep their interest with a mix of 
comedy and adventure series. Leading out of football was the hour-long spy series 
Fortune Hunter. This was followed by The Simpsons, which returned to Sunday 
nights after several years on Thursdays. Then came the baseball-themed sitcom 
Hardball, Married…with Children, and the twenty-something sex comedy Wild 
Oats. 
The rest of week included a blend of old and new series. Women were the 
primary demographic pursued on Mondays via Melrose Place and Party of Five. 
Melrose Place had survived a rough patch in the fall of 1992 to become one of 
Fox’s most dependable series. Similarly, the Fox Night at the Movies finally had 
found its audience on Tuesdays. Wednesdays had back-to-back Spelling 
melodramas with Beverly Hills 90210 and Models Inc. while Fridays had the 
science fiction block of M.A.N.T.I.S. and The X-Files.  The week concluded on 
Saturdays with long-time reality stalwarts Cops and America’s Most Wanted. 
Sunday was expected to be a sure thing due to the promotional value of 
football as a lead-in as well as the return of The Simpsons to that evening. 
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However, quite the opposite proved to be the case. Sundays caused Fox 
executives a great deal of angst from day one of the fall season. The first regular 
season NFL game aired on September 4, 1994 and the new prime time line-up 
was introduced on that night as well.988 Football started the evening off strongly 
but the entertainment series did not sustain the momentum. By the end of 
September, Fortune Hunter, Hardball and Wild Oats were cancelled. 
Subsequently, one series after another was introduced in their time slots. In 
October came the supernatural-themed reality series Encounters: The Hidden 
Truth and The George Carlin Show.989 In January, Fox premiered a new version 
of Get Smart and the sketch comedy series House of Buggin’. With no additional 
replacement series left, programmers filled the remaining gaps with a double-run 
The Simpsons and re-runs of the HBO sitcom Dream On. In February, Fox 
dropped these series and took another tack with the legal drama The Great 
Defender and the animated sitcom The Critic, which had previously run on ABC 
for a season.990 Fox relied on this schedule until the summer.991 
Though the newer Sunday series were a disappointment, the evening was 
not a complete wash. The Simpsons was still bringing in the most advertising 
dollars of any Fox series, earning $170,000 per 30 second spot.992 Married…with 
                                                 
988 Pre-season games started being broadcast on August 12. 
989 Encounters actually premiered during the summer of 1994.  
990 Coe, “Fox Shuffles Three Nights; ‘Get Smart,’ ‘M.A.N.T.I.S.,’ ‘Models, Inc.’ and ‘House of 
Buggin’ are Bugging Out to Make Room for New Shows,” Broadcasting & Cable, 13 February 
1995, 19. 
991 In fact, Fox didn’t finally have a successful Sunday night schedule until 1999. The addition of 
two more animated series – King of the Hill and Futurama – worked well with The Simpsons. In 
addition, The X-Files was moved to Sundays permanently at this time. 
992 Robins, “Hot Spots Dot Networks: Upfront Ad-Vantage,” Variety, 29 August – 4 September 
1994, 1, 54. 
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Children, now in its seventh season, also remained dependable. And football was 
the huge success Fox had hoped it would be. In less than nine months, Fox had 
used football as the means by which it created an entire sports infrastructure and 
attained 99% coverage of the country.993 At the same time, Fox’s advertising sales 
for football were further boosted by a Major League baseball strike.994 Ultimately, 
Fox fulfilled its promise to the NFL that it would improve ratings among males 
18-to-34; the Nielsen numbers ended up topping CBS’s 1993-94 performance 
with that demographic.995 In household numbers, Fox’s first season with the NFL 
yielded ratings only 4% lower than CBS had attained in 1993-94.996  Additionally, 
Fox beat out NBC among men ages 18-34, 18- 49 and 25-54 during the 1994-95 
season.997 
These same demographic groups were also turning out in larger numbers 
for The X-Files on Friday nights. Initially, Fox executives had low expectations 
for the show, placing more emphasis on promoting its lead-in, The Adventures of 
Brisco County Jr., with advertisers.998 As late as January 1994, Fox programmers 
did not realize what they had with The X-Files. It was at this time that Fox 
Entertainment Group President Sandy Grushow told affiliates of his dream that 
Fox would one day cultivate a Star Trek-style franchise:  
                                                 
993 Percentage from “First Period: Fox’s NFL on March,” Advertising Age. The new infrastructure 
included new operation control centers and the purchase of new equipment. “Fox Adds Pages to 
Its Technology Playbook,” Broadcasting & Cable.  
994 Silverman, “NFL Stations Sales Slow,” Variety, 15-21 August 1994, 56. 
995 “Fox NFC Telecasts Score a Touchdown,” Advertising Age. 
996 Ibid. 
997 Ratings for the 18-34 demographic were 9.8 for Fox v. 9.5 for NBC. With 18-49 and 25-54, 
Fox beat NBC by .1 in ratings. Thomas Walsh, “Fox, NBC Declare NFL Wins,” Variety, 2-8 
January 1995, 41. 
998 Brodie, “Fox Narrows Down Fall Choices,” Variety, 21 May 1993, 1.  
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As many of you know from your experience with Star Trek, these types of 
shows will strongly appeal to our young demographic. And I have no 
doubt that in time we at the Fox network will grow our own Star Trek 
franchise - or two, or three….It's a genre I've long felt is missing from 
Fox, but belongs to Fox.999 
Shortly after this address, The X-Files blossomed into precisely the type of 
franchise Grushow wanted. By the end of its first season, it was labeled by 
Variety as “Fox’s hottest show.”1000 The X-Files was an all-out success by 
September 1994.1001 A little more than a year after its premiere, the show had 
increased its ratings by more than 30%, rising from a 6.2 rating/9 share to a 9.5 
rating/16 share in households.1002 In October, Fox was promoting it as a potential 
hit in broadcast syndication, likely to attract the same demographics as Star 
Trek.1003 By November, the show was performing so strongly that Fox was 
double-running it on Thursday and Sunday nights.1004 It was particularly popular 
with Fox’s target demographics of 18-49-year-olds and males.1005 By year’s end, 
The X-Files was regularly placing first with men 18-34, 18-49 and 25-54 and 
finishing second among adults and women 18-49.1006  
The performance of The X-Files was notable for a couple of key reasons. 
First, it was part of the general revival of the hour-long drama. As discussed in 
chapter five, dramas were almost entirely absent from the prime time schedule in 
                                                 
999 Flint, “Fox to Fight for Superhighway Access,” Broadcasting & Cable, 31 January 1994, 32. 
1000 Miller, “Big 3 Outfoxed in Summer Fare,” 1-7 August 1994, 39. 
1001 “New Season Shaky,” Variety. 
1002 “Prime Time Demographics for Nov. 29-Dec. 5,” Electronic Media, 13 December 1993, 50; 
de Moraes, “ABC’s ‘Weapon’ Keeps ‘Scarlett,’ CBS at Bay,” Hollywood Reporter. 
1003 Lowry, “Reruns the Rage: Will Overexposure Deplete Backend Value?,” Variety, 17-23 
October 1994, 181, 184. 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 “ABC’s ‘Weapon’ Keeps ‘Scarlett,’ CBS at Bay, Hollywood Reporter. 
1006 Ibid. ABC’s family-friendly “TGIF” line-up placed first with these demographics.  
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the early ‘90s. However, The X-Files, along with less otherworldly fare such as 
NYPD Blue (launched on ABC in 1993) and E.R. (launched on NBC in 1994), 
showed that life remained in this television format.1007 The X-Files was also 
significant in terms of its influence on the science fiction genre – a television 
genre considered all-but-dead with the exception of the various Star Trek spin-
offs. With this series, television sci-fi was reinvented. Gone were images of 
robots and outer space adventures. In their place were FBI agents finding 
examples of the paranormal in small town USA.  The noir imagery, the dark tone 
and the use of police drama conventions all helped made The X-Files distinctive. 
They also contributed to its frequent emulation. By the time the industry trade 
show, NATPE, took place in January of 1995, scores of X-Files clones were in 
development.1008  
The second reason the success of The X-Files is worth noting is because of 
the role it played in helping Fox re-define its image and its schedule. With this 
show leading the way, Fox solidified its seven-nights-a-week prime time slate. 
Even more importantly, The X-Files was precisely what Fox wanted from a show 
at this time: It was hip, edgy, unique and distinctive.1009 But it also attracted a 
broader demographic – specifically, men 18-49 – than did previous dramas such 
as Beverly Hills 90210 and Melrose Place. As Grushow’s comment suggests, The 
                                                 
1007 Lowry and Benson, “New Hours of Power? Jury Split on Syndie Future of Net Dramas,” 
Variety, 24-30 October 1994, 39, 42. 
1008 Flint, “Cop Trend Unabated in New Rosters,” Variety, 9-15 January 1995, 51, 55. 
1009 See Carey quote beginning this section. For similar statements also see McClellan, “Fall TV: 
Advertiser Friendly,” Broadcasting, 1 June 1992, 10-11; Coe, “Fox Seeks Broader Demos for Fall 
Season,” Broadcasting & Cable, 31 May 1993, 14-15. 
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X-Files was a niche-targeted show but avoided appealing “only to a niche within 
[a] niche.”1010  
The X-Files demonstrates both of the fluidity of the word “niche” in press 
and industry discourses as well as the centrality of niche programming to media 
conglomerates. In this emerging neo-network era, it paid – both literally and 
figuratively – to be a niche-targeted program. Michael Curtin argues that niche-
oriented media products are those which are targeted to specific demographic 
groups and “actively pursue intensity.”1011 In this sense, The X-Files is the 
prototypical niche product. Viewers of this program eagerly consumed it in 
several different ways including television show, book, soundtrack, video game, 
motion picture, and videocassette. Of course, many of these products were 
produced by other divisions of News Corp. The book series, which was launched 
in 1994, was published by News Corp. division HarperCollins. Videos were 
released by 20th Century Fox Home Video beginning in early 1996. Fox 
Interactive started releasing video games based on the series in 1998. At every 
opportunity, News Corp. and Fox took advantage of the program’s synergistic 
possibilities. Its popularity in these various iterations, in turn, helped make it into 
the quintessential franchise.  
Indeed, The X-Files was nothing less than a model of the television 
franchise of the 1990s. Star Trek may have been unparalleled in its money-
making abilities for decades, but Star Trek was not the sole property of – and 
                                                 
1010 From Grushow statement beginning this section. See “Broad-Based’ Concepts Trademark of 
Net Pilots,” Hollywood Reporter.  
1011 “On Edge: Culture Industries in the Neo-Network Era,” Making and Selling Culture, 197. 
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profit center for – its producer, Paramount. Star Trek aired on NBC and was no 
more than a marginal success in its network run, barely lasting a total of three 
seasons. It was only after years of play in syndication that Star Trek became a cult 
phenomenon with motion picture, television and publishing spin-offs. The X-Files 
was Fox’s, and only Fox’s, from the outset. It was produced by Twentieth 
Television, distributed globally by Fox International, and spun-off into a book 
series by News Corp.’s Harper Collins division. It brought Fox money through ad 
sales, licensed merchandise, spin-offs, syndication and box office receipts. And 
what’s more, it accomplished all of this during its initial network run.  
To fully evaluate the impact of The X-Files on Fox, it is important to relate 
it to the development of The Simpsons. To a large extent, The X-Files built on a 
process initiated by The Simpsons – a program which, like the Fox network, was 
entering into another important phase of its life in the mid-1990s. Like Fox, The 
Simpsons was maturing. As discussed in chapter five, The Simpsons’ initial role 
had been defining Fox as the young, upstart network. It pushed the limits of what 
television could be while Fox pushed the limits of what a network could be. But 
by 1994, The Simpsons was no longer cutting edge television and Fox was no 
longer the guerrilla programmer. There were newer program services waiting in 
the wings, services which were employing many former Fox staffers and adopting 
prior Fox programming strategies. 
There were other signs that both The Simpsons and Fox were maturing. 
The first wave of writers and producers had departed the series.1012 Though the 
                                                 
1012 Benson, “Affils Still Fox Trotting,” Variety, 1 November 1993, 1, 58. 
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program remained number two with adults 18-to-34, it also regularly placed in the 
top five among men ages 25-to-54.1013 As the audience aged, so did the focus of 
its narratives. The stories became centered more on Homer than on Bart – a 
convenient development given Fox’s own efforts to move beyond children and 
teenagers. Furthermore, the series was no longer drawing the ire of conservative 
groups and educators the way it used to; now the ruder, cruder Beavis and 
Butthead (MTV, 1993-1997) had become the target of such outrage.1014 Whereas 
many conservatives had previously decried The Simpsons’ depiction of the 
nuclear family, now some celebrated its representation of family values.1015 
Similarly, whereas many educators had previously questioned the disrespect Bart 
showed toward school, now some asked how the show’s aesthetics and narrative 
structure could be studied in the classroom.1016 At the same time, the show was 
being frequently cited by television critics as evidence that television had entered 
into its second “golden age.”1017 
The Simpsons may have been aging, but it remained important to Fox 
nonetheless. In September 1994, the show began its off-network run, thereby 
                                                 
1013 Freeman, “War of Words (and Demos) Over ‘Simpsons,’” Broadcasting, 25 January 1993, 
62. 
1014 This point made by Bybee and Overbeck in “Homer Simpson Explains Our Postmodern 
Identity Crisis,” Simile. 
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Simpsons to Teach and Learn Sociology, Teaching Sociology 28, no. 2 (2000): 127-139. 
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bringing another source of revenue to the company.1018 Preparations for the 
syndicated launch had been in the works since late 1992.1019 In December 1992, 
seven Fox O&Os preemptively purchased the rights to the show.1020 The 
following May, three of these O&Os also bought the Buena Vista-produced Home 
Improvement to play with The Simpsons in the access period.1021 With the 
purchase of Home Improvement, Fox executives reinforced their vision of The 
Simpsons as an “adult vehicle” rather than an afternoon children’s vehicle. Some 
stations were skeptical whether an animated show could attract decent ratings 
during the early evening. Fox demonstrated it could.1022 Placing The Simpsons in 
the access period was important to Fox because, with the exception of prime time, 
these were the most profitable time slots. They were also slots which network 
product could not occupy as long as PTAR remained in place. Fox was not the 
only company making a statement with an access sale. Disney, which had been 
among the most aggressive in campaigning for the repeal of the access rule, made 
a point of declaring that Home Improvement was sold to Fox  primarily because 
the FCC refused to deal with PTAR.1023  
These sales were significant for additional reasons. For Disney, they 
fueled a record year for the company’s syndication division. Largely as a result of 
                                                 
1018 Benson, “‘Simpsons’ Surprise Syndicated Success,” Variety, 28 November – 4 December 
1994, 35, 40. 
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the success of Home Improvement, Disney claimed an industry record of $1 
billion in sales from upfront license fees and barter advertising revenue.1024 The 
Simpsons was every bit as lucrative for Fox. With this show, Fox demonstrated 
the potential gold mine available to a vertically integrated media company. To be 
sure, Fox was in a unique position with The Simpsons. The company had already 
made its money back from the show’s prime time run. Everything earned now 
was icing on the cake. What Fox discovered was a lot of icing: By selling the 
show to its own O&Os, money was essentially moved from one division of the 
company to another. Further, all of the profit from advertising sales on the O&Os 
went directly back to Fox.  
Fox was also the beneficiary of a healthy upfront period and strong scatter 
markets. Twentieth Television (the official syndicator of The Simpsons) reported 
returns of approximately $1.8 million per episode for the first syndicated run.1025 
These numbers made The Simpsons the third best-selling syndicated program 
ever, trailing behind only The Cosby Show and Who’s the Boss?1026 With 170 
episodes included in this package, Fox would earn more than $300 million 
through the first round of syndication sales alone.  
Meanwhile, any fears that the show would not play well in access were 
rapidly quashed. In the November 1994 sweeps, The Simpsons placed number one 
                                                 
1024 “Disney on $1 Billion TV High,” Variety. 
1025 This figure includes money generated from both the licensing of the show and national 
advertising revenue received through barter arrangements. “‘Simpsons’ Surprise Syndicated 
Success,” Variety. 
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with men 18-34 and 25-54 and was also the top-ranked off-network sitcom in 
households.1027 The show’s impressive performance in syndication gave another 
boost to the television animation business. All of a sudden, animation looked like 
a savvy long-term investment. As one journalist noted, shows like The Simpsons 
didn’t look dated over time in the same way that live action series often did.1028 
 Fox took advantage of The Simpsons’ move into syndication in every way 
possible. In 1995, for example, the company launched another round of licensing, 
this time geared for more mature viewers.1029 Such cross-promotions provided the 
show with yet another boost in its prime time and syndicated ratings.1030 In the 
wake of this second wave of merchandise sales, the show emerged as Fox’s 
largest licensing property ever.1031  
By 1995, The Simpsons was well on its way to becoming a “1 billion 
dollar asset” for Fox.1032 In other words, this show, along with The X-Files, had 
become Fox’s most valuable entertainment franchises. At this point, it is helpful 
to contrast the use of the word “franchise” as I use it to describe The Simpsons 
and The X-Files with how the word has been used in speaking of the NFL 
franchise. Both of these franchises served very specific – and very different – 
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purposes for Fox. While Fox’s acquisition of the rights to the football franchise 
might have generated more press attention at the time, the company’s ownership 
of The Simpsons and The X-Files franchises were of greater importance for the 
company’s identity as well as its profitability.  
Football, for Fox, was not an end in itself. As discussed above, Murdoch 
purchased the rights to the NFL mainly to increase the company’s distribution. 
With football, Fox gained more affiliates, more advertisers, more viewers and 
more legitimacy. Fox, in acquiring the rights to football, acquired the rights to a 
central symbol of network-era, mass-mediated television. Thus, in gaining these 
rights, Fox was portrayed as reaching parity with the Big Three. However, the 
reason the NFL opted to sell the rights to Fox reveals much about the status of 
network-era, mass-mediated television. More to the point, this era was 
disappearing (if not already gone). Viewers – especially young viewers – were 
looking elsewhere for their entertainment. The NFL hoped Fox would help 
reverse this trend, and to an extent, the company did. However, with the exception 
of an extremely limited number of media events such as the Super Bowl, 
television shares and ratings would never be what they had been in the heyday of 
the network era. There were too many other channels, too many additional 
entertainment options.  
Television had to be something different in the neo-network era to be 
profitable. Fox’s greatest success was in defining how television could be 
different. What enabled this redefinition were niche-targeted prime time 
entertainment franchises such as The Simpsons and The X-Files. Previously, 
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networks made money primarily through a combination of network advertising 
sales and ownership of O&Os.  Now, in this post-fin-syn era, there was a third 
source of revenue. This type of revenue – revenue from programming – had been 
taken from the studios and independent producers and transferred to the networks. 
The most profitable such programming followed the trajectory taken with The 
Simpsons and The X-Files. Namely, this programming was produced and 
distributed by two divisions of the same conglomerate.  Additional revenues came 
as this programming was tied in to other divisions of the company. These 
divisions ranged from publishing to music to movies to interactive to 
merchandising divisions.  
The type of software most capable of doing this was developed for 
specific demographic groups. These demographics could be narrower (teenagers, 
yuppies, African Americans) or they could be broader (adults 18-49). But they 
were no longer assumed to be everyone, the masses. Scholars have long debated 
precisely how mass a medium television was even during the heyday of the three-
network system. Regardless of how mass a medium TV was during the network 
era, it was certainly not a medium for all in the neo-network era. But this is not to 
say television programming could not be profitable. However, profit was derived 
in different ways: It came in the way the programming helped a company market 
itself and define its identity. It also came, as mentioned above, in the degree to 
which this programming sustained an intense devotion from its audience. The 
more intense the interest, the more viewers were willing to consume and re-
consume the products as they were reproduced in other forms over time. As Fox 
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demonstrated with The X-Files and The Simpsons – not to mention other series 
such as Cops and In Living Color – the programs most likely to be re-consumed 
were those which most clearly were not for the masses. To be viewed as “not 
mass” a show had to be distinctive, it had to have edge. It could be deemed trashy 
or it could be deemed quality, but it could not be deemed mainstream. If it 
accomplished this feat effectively, attracting viewers in prime time and holding 
them as it moved through syndication and into video (and later DVD), then it 
could yield unprecedented sums of money for one company. And the first 
company to attain such unprecedented sums was Fox. Thus, while the football 
franchise was distinctive in giving Fox an immediate boost, popular prime time 
entertainment franchises were crucial in sustaining the company over the longer 
term.  
What’s more, as the tremendous financial performance of The Simpsons 
and The X-Files also made clear, the most successful television series could be 
every bit as lucrative – if not more so – than the most successful motion picture 
franchises. This can be seen by comparing the performance of The Simpsons to 
the performance of Fox’s most profitable motion picture during this time: Mrs. 
Doubtfire (1993). This Robin Williams family comedy, which was one of the 
highest-grossing films of all time as well as the second highest grossing film of 
the year, earned more than $200 million in box office rentals during its theatrical 
release alone.1033 Assuming box office income comprises about a third of the total 
income for a motion picture, Mrs. Doubtfire could be expected to bring Fox 
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approximately $600 million in profit.1034 This is certainly an impressive sum. 
However, it is less than what shows like The Simpsons and The X-Files were 
yielding – and would continue to yield – over the course of several years. And this 
is not including less quantifiable items like the promotional value of such 
programs or the degree to which they extended the Fox “brand” around the world. 
Indeed, The Simpsons and The X-Files were vital to News Corp.’s global 
expansion strategies. For instance, when News Corp. started its Australian digital 
satellite service, Foxtel, it was X-Files star David Duchovny (Agent Mulder) and 
Bart Simpson who appeared on screen to count down to the premiere.1035  
Considering the value derived from such programming (and its stars), it comes as 
little surprise that motion pictures were described as “the last item” on Murdoch’s 
agenda when he sat down to speak with his executives.1036 
As this discussion of the production and distribution of The Simpsons and 
The X-Files demonstrates, by the mid-1990s, Fox was playing a substantial role in 
defining the practices and products of network television. In fact, the company’s 
influence went beyond network television, influencing the ways media 
conglomerates were structured and the manner in which they produced and 
distributed television programming. The following two sections examine more 
precisely how Fox’s influence can be seen on the larger entertainment landscape 
during the mid-1990s. First I look at the changing shape of the television 
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business. Second, I survey the wave of mergers and other dramatic changes which 
swept through the media industries as PTAR and fin-syn finally became a thing of 
the past.  
 
WHERE FOX GOES, EVERYONE FOLLOWS: THE REINVENTION OF OLD 
NETWORKS, THE INVENTION OF NEW ONES 
Most of the TV industry snickered when Fox Broadcasting announced its 
plan to launch a fourth network. Eight years later, the laughter has stopped 
and the big question is whether Warner Bros. or Paramount will be 
successful in starting a fifth national network next January... 
The Plain Dealer, August 19941037 
It has become difficult to find anyone speaking out with much passion on 
behalf of household ratings or the necessity of reaching the widest 
possible audience. The target, in fact, seems to be narrowing on all sides, 
with even children and teenagers receding in importance as the networks 
zero in on development designed to reach the broad – and undeniably 
lucrative – 18-54 age grouping, which accounts for about half the U.S. 
population but also has shown itself to be one of the most elusive audience 
segments to reach… 
Variety, April 19951038  
The benefits of the Fox model were becoming increasingly apparent by 
1995. This model had several components – components which both the 
established networks and the emerging weblets tried to emulate. Among the 
characteristics receiving the most attention from these entities were the 
construction of brand loyalty, the promotion a more ‘limited’ schedule, the 
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production of more programming in-house, and the pursuit of material targeted to 
narrower demographics.   
Fox, along with more narrowly targeted cable channels such as MTV and 
Nickelodeon, had long tried to cultivate brand loyalty among viewers. In the 
company’s annual affiliate meetings, both ABC and NBC executives were 
reported to have been “lavish in their praise for what Fox had accomplished – 
namely, a clear-cut image in the marketplace.”1039 Developing programming 
“with edge” was one means of achieving this; having affiliates identify 
themselves by attaching Fox to their channel position was another. One of the 
more recent innovations taken up by Fox as well as a handful of other program 
services involved placing the company’s logo in the lower right hand corner of 
the screen throughout the prime time broadcast.1040 
 In terms of the value of a more limited schedule, all Fox had to do was 
point to its 1995-96 advertising sales. The company had a record upfront season, 
breaking the $1 billion dollar mark for the first time. As Fox president of sales Jon 
Nesvig observed on the occasion, “This is the year we reached parity with 
everyone else… When a 15-hour network hits $1 billion, it’s like being a 22-hour 
network hitting $1.7 billion. It’s the kind of landmark where you get an engraved 
plaque commemorating the moment.”1041 While the other networks had strong 
upfront sales as well – number-one network ABC looked to sell $1.6 billion while 
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number three network CBS projected sales of $1.2 billion – Fox’s numbers were 
the most impressive.1042 What’s more, Fox would reap additional hundreds of 
millions of dollars from the syndication of its programming. For a little while 
longer, the networks remained limited in the amount of programming they could 
have an ownership stake in.  
The networks had been shifting slowly toward producing more of their 
own programming for the past couple of years, however. With fin-syn’s 
elimination in sight, the networks stepped up production in 1993.1043 By the 1994-
95 season, they had all become their own biggest suppliers.1044 As might be 
suspected, this affected independent producers most severely. The number of 
suppliers dropped as did the percentage of programs placed by independent 
suppliers in prime time.1045 According a report issued by the Coalition to Preserve 
Fin-Syn in 1995, from the time that the FCC relaxed the rules, the portion of the 
prime time schedule occupied by product from smaller companies fell by almost 
30%.1046 Network product made up nearly the entire gap.1047 Those independent 
producers which remained in business tended to develop lower cost and less easy 
to syndicate fare, such as reality programming.1048 With circumstances becoming 
increasingly dire for independents, many elected either to partner with larger 
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1045 In 1970, before fin-syn was implemented, there were 55 suppliers of prime time 
entertainment. By the 1991-92 season, the number was down to 26. From Jessell, “Battle Lines 
Drawn, Once Again, On Fin-Syn,” Broadcasting, 8 February 1993, 27-28. 
1046 Stern, “Independents: Syndication Rules Fall Short,” Broadcasting & Cable, 5 June 1995, 36. 
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1048 Benson, “Finsyn Finale Spins Webs of Intrigue,” Variety, 5 April 1993, 1, 196. 
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companies or get out of the business altogether. The fate of long-time indie leader 
Cannell Entertainment was a sign of the times: In 1995, the company was 
purchased by New World, thereby surrendering its status as one of the last 
independent production companies.1049 
With their greater leverage and deeper pockets, the major studios were 
somewhat better off. For the 1995-96 season, they had an interest in 70% of the 
105 series on the schedule.1050 But they had to make more concessions to the 
networks to get placement on prime time. This often took the form of allowing the 
networks to co-produce their series and retain a percentage of the back-end rights. 
The networks, meanwhile, continued to expand their reach and influence. In one 
of the stranger developments in the business, the networks started not only 
producing more programming for themselves, but also for each other. For Fox this 
was nothing new: Twentieth Television was the primary production company for 
Fox even before it had its own network. Thus it had seemed natural for Twentieth 
to provide programming to both the Fox network and the Big Three. For the other 
networks, though, this was a new practice. The trend was augured in with Fox’s 
broadcast of the ABC-produced Class of ’96 (1993). By 1995, this practice was 
becoming more widespread, as an ABC-produced program had played on CBS 
(The Boys Are Back) and a CBS-produced program aired on NBC (Caroline in the 
City).  
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The networks were becoming more alike not only in their programming 
practices but also in their audience profiles. As described above, Fox was trying 
to expand its reach to the 18-to-49 demographic. One way the company tried to 
accomplish this was in the hiring of a new programming president to replace 
departing executives Lucie Salhany and Sandy Grushow. In September 1994, 
John Matoian was brought in to fill that role. A former CBS executive, Matoian 
most recently had served as head of Fox Family Films.  Upon taking up his new 
position, he declared his desire to pursue “less raunch” and “more genteel 
development.”1051 This shift was most apparent in Fox’s move away from 
developing tabloid-style biopics such as Madonna: Innocence Lost (1994), 
Roseanne: An Unauthorized Biography (1994) and Love and Betrayal: The Mia 
Farrow Story (spring 1995). In place of such movies, the company developed 
more science fiction fare. Early titles included an updated version of the 1960s 
series The Invaders (fall 1995) and a highly controversial documentary about a 
government cover-up in Roswell, New Mexico entitled Alien Autopsy: Fact or 
Fiction (fall 1995).1052 
While Fox sought to expand its audience reach, the other networks tried to 
narrow theirs. By the start of the 1995-96 season, all were developing more 
programming targeted to specific niches.1053 CBS, NBC and ABC may not yet 
have begun developing their own X-Files clones (this did not happen until the fall 
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1996-97 season). However, they all acted increasingly as if the 18-49 
demographic was their Holy Grail. CBS, the network with the highest median 
age, had the toughest task at hand. With such older-skewing shows as Murder, 
She Wrote, Diagnosis Murder and Dr. Quinn, Medicine Woman still on its 
schedule, CBS was the least accessible to this group. This became even more 
apparent in May 1994, when CBS earned the dubious honor of being the first 
network to lose to Fox in the 18-49 demographic during a sweeps period.1054 One 
solution CBS executives took for the 1995-96 season involved turning to Beverly 
Hills 90210 creator Darren Star, who developed a new melodrama called Central 
Park West. The company also developed a spin-off of John Grisham’s The Client 
with a series of the same name.  
NBC had been trying to reach a younger audience since the 1992-93 
season with mixed results.1055 By 1995, the network had finally found several 
shows which appealed to 18-to-49-year-olds. Many of these hits were sitcoms. 
Mad About You, Fresh Prince of Bel Air, News Radio, Wings, Frasier, Friends, 
and Seinfeld were among the series which were helping NBC become a ratings 
powerhouse once again. Number-one ABC had the least work to do, as it had 
completed a stellar 1994-95 season, taking the top spot among the networks for 
the first time since 1979. Along with returning hits such as Home Improvement, 
Coach, NYPD Blue and its family-friendly Friday comedy block, ABC had 
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several promising new series, including The Drew Carey Show and a re-vamped 
Ellen.1056 
While the Big Four increasingly developed programming for the same 
demographic group, the newly formed WB and UPN remained much more 
specific in their focus. Both of these emerging program services turned to former 
Fox talent, executives and programming strategies in the development of their 
early schedules. Also like Fox, both were prepared to sustain heavy losses at the 
outset.  Each company estimated it would spend about $300 million during its 
first four years of operation.1057  
Recently departed Fox programmer Lucie Salhany quickly moved on to 
become president and CEO of UPN.1058 At launch time, UPN was seen as having 
the edge over the WB due to its greater broadcast clearance as well as its 
possession of the Star Trek franchise. As such, the company promised advertisers 
a seven rating and got it.1059 Using Star Trek as its anchor, UPN targeted males 
ages 18-49 with a blend of sitcoms and dramas. On Monday, January 16, 1996, 
UPN began broadcasting its prime time schedule with a special two-hour episode 
of Star Trek: Voyager. The following week, the regular schedule took shape with 
Voyager starting the evening, followed by two comedies, Pig Sty and Platypus 
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Man. Tuesday’s programming consisted of two more dramas, Marker and The 
Watcher. UPN executives hoped that former 21 Jump Street heartthrob Richard 
Grieco would replicate the magic of that Fox program with Marker. 
Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be the case.  
The WB copied Fox’s programming and distribution strategies even more 
extensively than UPN.1060  WB CEO Jamie Kellner brought in several former Fox 
Broadcasting executives, including Fox’s first president Garth Ancier and 
marketers Bob Bibb and Lewis Goldstein.1061 Ancier announced his intention of 
relying heavily on comedies, as Fox had done during its early years. Ancier 
turned to former Married…with Children co-creator Ron Leavitt along with 
Wayans brothers Shawn and Marlon.1062 Two of the first programs to run on the 
WB were The Wayans Bros and Leavitt’s Unhappily Ever After. Both series – 
along with the Robert Townsend sitcom Parent ‘Hood and the soap opera spoof 
Muscle – premiered on Wednesday, January 11, 1995. WB was much more 
conservative about its ratings guarantees than UPN had been, promising only a 
three rating (which it didn’t get).1063 
While Ancier copied Fox’s early programming strategies, Kellner imitated 
its early distribution tactics. For example, where the WB could not find a 
broadcast affiliate, he turned to cable for distribution.1064 In addition, he sought to 
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brand the WB early on through a process of “WB-ification.” As Bibb and 
Goldstein described this strategy, “We are going to promote the WB-ification of 
WB affiliates just as we did the Fox-ification of Fox affiliates….We are basically 
targeting the same old Fox demos and we want to convey to the affiliates’ viewers 
the same attitude of hip awareness of this culture’s hipocracy.”1065 
Whereas Fox had struggled early on to define its demographic, Kellner 
and Ancier were quite clear about who they wanted to pursue: 12-to-34-year-olds. 
This made them target a somewhat younger audience than Fox ever had. This 
strategy was partly due to Kellner’s experiences with the Fox Children’s Network 
and partly due to the particular resources available to Warner Bros. As noted in 
chapter five, during Kellner’s time at Fox, he argued forcefully for the importance 
of attracting younger viewers. These viewers, widely perceived to be the most 
open minded in terms of their viewing patterns, would grow up with the WB. The 
programming could then age as the viewers did. Another means by which the WB 
hoped to build up a youthful audience base was through the creation of its own 
daytime children’s network.  As Kellner observed, “Our job in building this 
network is to help build a franchise in cities across America, and the fastest way 
to get the market started is to get kids watching it.”1066  Thus, the company 
prepared to launch the “Kids’ WB” in the fall of 1995 with three hours of 
programming on Saturday and one hour every weekday morning.1067 The Kids’ 
WB planned to rely heavily on Warner Bros.-produced fare. Among the first 
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series were Freakazoid!, early Warner Bros. Sylvester and Tweety cartoons, and 
classic episodes of Merrie Melodies. 
As plans for the Kids’ WB solidified, rumors circulated that Fox would 
exit the children’s market. Upon initial consideration, this seemed to be a bit of a 
dramatic response, especially considering FCN’s leading position in the children’s 
television business. From 1992 through 1995, FCN was the top-rated 
programming source for children ages 2-11 and 6-17.1068 The Fox Kids Club had 
more than five million members and FCN broadcast nineteen hours per week of 
programming.1069 In terms of both audience reach and advertising, FCN was 
number one.1070 As of the February 1995 sweeps period, FCN’s ratings were 
nearly equal to the combined scores of ABC and CBS; its dominance played a 
major part in driving NBC out of the children’s television business altogether.1071 
According to one CBS television executive, “we're fighting [with ABC] for third 
place because Fox is so far ahead and there is no second place.”1072 
By the spring of 1995, FCN showed little sign of slowing down. It sold 
more than $200 million in the children’s upfront season for 1995-96.1073 The top 
seven programs with kids ages 6-17 were on FCN.1074 X-Men was a hit and 
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Mighty Morphin Power Rangers was a pop culture phenomenon.1075 Further, Fox 
was preparing to disperse revenues to its affiliates for the first time.1076 With such 
outstanding results, it might seem illogical that Fox would be thinking of exiting 
the kids’ business. However, a few important developments made FCN a less 
viable enterprise. First, when Fox modified its prime time demographic profile, it 
lost many of the cross-promotional opportunities it had with FCN. Second, 
following the affiliate shake-ups in 1994, many former Fox stations felt little 
desire to keep FCN. Further, several of the new Fox affiliates were already 
committed to other syndicated programs.1077 Third, Fox anticipated losing not 
only the WB as a supplier but also the producer of Mighty Morphin Power 
Rangers, Saban Entertainment. This was because Saban had struck a deal to 
provide programming to UPN, which was also preparing to enter the children’s 
business with a one hour programming block on Sundays.1078 Though FCN 
depended less on the WB by 1995 and only had a couple of series with Saban, the 
prospect of more competition couldn’t have been attractive.  
There was additional competition coming from another place: cable. 
Original cable programming was generally on the rise, and children’s 
programming was one of the primary growth areas. A couple of statistics reveal 
the extent to which cable was in an expansion period: Cable programmers had 
increased their spending on first-run and off-network programming from $985 
                                                 
1075 Tobenkin, “Sea Changes for Syndicated Fare; Battle for Young Viewers Heats Up Among 
Fox, Warner Bros. and Disney,” Broadcasting & Cable, 25 July 1994, 52-54. 
1076 Flint, “High Hopes for Fox Affiliates,” Variety, 19-25 July 1995, 96. 
1077 ‘Syndicators in Fear of NW Daytime Block,” Variety. 
1078 Coe, “Network Battle for Kids is Joined by UPN and WB,” Broadcasting & Cable, 24 July 
1995, 47-50. 
 324
million for the entire 1980-1989 period to more than $3 billion dollars for a single 
year.1079 With subscriber growth now fairly stable, original programming was 
perceived as a key means by which to gain additional viewers. By 1995, there 
were several program services providing fresh children’s fare with production 
values on par with the networks. The Disney Channel (Timon and Pumbaa), 
Nickelodeon (All That) and starting in late 1992, Turner’s Cartoon Network 
(Space Ghost Coast to Coast) were among the most widely distributed of these 
services.  
 Fox’s own long-in-the-works cable service, FX, finally went on the air on 
June 1, 1994. It too had several original series – though their quality was much 
lower than had been anticipated based on Murdoch’s promises for the service.1080 
Described by Variety as “public access on a huge budget,” FX’s original series 
were mostly inexpensive variety and reality shows. The Collectibles Show, Pet 
Department and Breakfast Time were among the first programs to air.1081 The rest 
of the schedule was filled with re-runs of old network series. As might be 
expected, many of these programs were from the Fox library, including Vegas, 
Batman and Dynasty. Four months later, Fox launched another cable service, 
FXM. This channel was dedicated exclusively to the screening of films from 
Fox’s motion picture library.1082 
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Though FX may have been a long way away from making a profit, the 
Fox network was in its best shape ever. The increased national coverage did 
indeed result in more income for Fox; operating income for the television division 
rose 65% to $144 million for the six months of News Corp.’s fiscal year ending 
December 31, 1994.1083 Affiliates were benefiting as well; Murdoch estimated 
they had increased in value more than $3 billion dollars since Fox began 
broadcasting in 1986.1084 In one more sign that the company had reached parity 
with the other networks, Fox officially became part of the “Big Four” Emmy 
rotation.1085 Nine years earlier, the other networks had protested the decision by 
the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences to license the show to Fox. They 
had said Fox would cheapen the value of the awards. Yet for the 1995 Emmys, 
Fox made tens of thousands of dollars more for the sale of its 30-second awards 
spots than ABC had made for the sale of its spots the year before.1086 
The Fox entertainment division’s benefits to News Corp. were likewise 
unquestioned by now. Nearly all short-term debt which had plagued News Corp. a 
few years prior had been eliminated. As such, Murdoch could continue looking 
for new growth opportunities for News Corp. During the mid-‘90s, this took the 
form of financing the creation of several additional divisions at Fox Filmed 
Entertainment. Among the new labels to be launched were Fox Family Films, Fox 
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Searchlight, Fox 2000, Fox Animation and Fox Interactive.1087 These investments 
reaffirmed both his confidence and increasing dependence on Twentieth Century 
Fox. As one journalist explained, he had reason to: “In the past five years, most of 
News' earnings growth has come from the electronic media side of the company. 
In 1990, more than 90% of the company’s profits came from print products. In 
1994, almost 50% of the company’s $1.2 billion in income is derived from 
electronic media.”1088  As electronic media became a larger part of the overall 
company, News Corp. declared its financial condition had “never been 
healthier.”1089  The company’s stock price was not even affected by the FCC’s 
investigation into its foreign ownership status. Perhaps Wall Street knew that the 
commission ultimately would back down. As will be described in more detail 
more shortly, this did in fact prove to be the case. 
At the same time News Corp. once again found itself home free in the 
regulatory arena, other companies started to take advantage of the greater 
regulatory freedom offered as a result of the repeal of fin-syn and PTAR. Among 
the first two companies to do so were Disney and CBS. Their actions in July of 
1995 set off a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the media industries, the 
magnitude and frequency of which had not been seen for nearly a decade. One 
key consequence of these deals was that several companies began to look more 
like what News Corp./Fox had looked like for nearly a decade. The first signs of 
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this impending storm came during 1994, when executive shake-ups occurred at 
the highest levels of several different media companies. As the next section 
discusses, what started as turmoil in the executive ranks developed into a 
transformation of the media industries at large. 
 
THE DAWNING OF MEGAMEDIA?1090 
Rupert Murdoch has done as much or more than any other individual in 
recent history to advance the causes of the medium and the public interest. 
To laud his accomplishments at this point is to gild the lily; not to 
recognize them would be myopic. If Murdoch was ahead of the curve in 
1985 we wouldn't be a bit surprised; he's been out in front most of the time 
during his exceptional career, generally to the benefit of the common 
weal… 
Broadcasting & Cable, March 19951091  
Last week was more than the week that was. It was the week that 
foreshadowed how the future will be - in broadcasting and in 
telecommunications as a whole. It was the beginning of the Megamedia 
Age...   
Broadcasting & Cable, August 19951092 
The turnover in the executive ranks began in April 1994, when Disney 
COO and second-in-command Frank Wells died in a plane crash.1093 This event 
set off a chain reaction which would affect the entire media business.1094 Disney 
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president of production Jeffrey Katzenberg long had expected to be promoted to 
Wells’ position at Disney. Upon being denied this promotion, he left. Joe Roth 
quickly took over Katzenberg’s former post, while Eisner set about searching for 
Wells’ replacement. Less than two months later, Katzenberg joined with Steven 
Spielberg and David Geffen to create Dream Works SKG.1095 The implications of 
this union did not go unnoticed. Bernard Weinraub of the New York Times, for 
example, labeled the venture as “the biggest merger of talent since Charlie 
Chaplin, Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks and D.W. Griffith founded the United 
Artists movie empire in 1919.”1096 Meanwhile, after a rocky few years as chief 
executive officer at Sony, Peter Guber resigned to return to producing.1097  
Fox also had its fair share of churn. In July 1994, Fox Inc. was split into 
two divisions. Peter Chernin was appointed head of the television and feature film 
production division; Chase Carey was chosen to oversee all other television-
related businesses including the network, cable channels and O&Os.1098 With the 
arrival of 1995, Murdoch decided to take yet another stab at news, appointing 
former CBS executive Joe Peyronnin as head of the latest incarnation of this 
division.1099 This appointment, along with a recent partnership formed between 
Fox and Reuters, seemed clear indications that a news service would actually 
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come to fruition this time.1100 Peyronnin’s departure from CBS came during a 
restructuring at that network. For example, in 1994, Peter Tortorici replaced out-
going CBS entertainment president Jeff Sagansky; Sagansky promptly took over 
Guber’s former slot at Sony.1101 Tortorici was not at the company for long before 
he too resigned, to be replaced by former Warner Bros. Television president 
Leslie Moonves.1102   
More shuffling of executives would come during the summer of 1995 as 
the result of a wave of mergers and acquisitions throughout the media industries. 
The first sign of things to come came in March 1995, when Seagram purchased 
MCA-Universal.1103 This deal led to the ouster of chairman Lew Wasserman and 
president Sidney Sheinberg, two executives who had been in charge of the 
company for decades.1104 Then, in the final week of July 1995, the flurry began. It 
started on July 31, 1995, when Disney announced its purchase of Cap Cities-ABC 
for $18.5 billion, thereby creating the country’s largest entertainment 
company.1105 The Disney-ABC merger came as a surprise to many journalists and 
industry executives.  Both CBS and NBC long had been rumored to be for sale if 
“the price [was] right.”1106 But few expected ABC to be on the market – or if it 
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was, that anyone would pay the price being sought. Certainly no one thought 
notoriously penny-pinching Disney would ante up the necessary sum.1107  
Less than a week after Disney announced its purchase of ABC, 
Westinghouse confirmed its long-in-the-works purchase of CBS for $5.4 
billion.1108 What at any other moment would have been an enormous transaction 
was eclipsed by the Disney-ABC merger. The announcement of these two deals in 
less than a week propelled the already elevated price of media stocks even higher. 
Rapidly rising prices seemed to matter little to buyers looking to expand quickly. 
Among the other major deals which took place during the summer of 1995 were: 
the purchase of Outlet Communications by NBC, the acquisition of the Silver 
King station group by a TCI-Barry Diller union, and the merger of Time Warner 
with Turner Entertainment.1109 The Time Warner-Turner merger was a 
particularly significant deal, creating a media company second in size only to 
Disney-ABC.  
According to one journalist reporting at the time of the announcement of 
the Disney-ABC deal, the “beginning of the Megamedia Age” was afoot.1110 The 
Disney-ABC deal, in particular, was seen as signaling a new era for media 
conglomerates. In one sense this was true. The size and scope of this merger was 
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Two Take Control of Silver King Station Group; Stock Jumps 79% on News,” Broadcasting & 
Cable, 28 August 1995, 6-7.For more on the Time Warner-Turner deal, see McClellan, “Time 
Warner, Turner Join Mega-Merger Bandwagon; Handshake on Deal Said to Be Done, But 
Observers Caution There are Pitfalls,” Broadcasting & Cable, 4 September 1995, 10-11. 
1110 “The Dawning of Megamedia,” Broadcasting & Cable. 
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unparalleled. However, what resulted from this merger – namely, the creation of 
one entity in possession of both a motion picture studio and a network – was 
nothing new. Over the previous ten years, News Corp. had put together precisely 
such a corporate structure from scratch. Because this structure was built 
gradually, and often without much publicity, the magnitude of the effort often had 
gone unnoticed and uncommented upon by the press. Journalistic coverage had 
been confined mainly to reports of immediate events – purchases, executive 
changes and earnings statements, for example. Larger analyses had rarely taken 
place. 
One of the most striking things about the Disney-ABC merger was the 
extent to which journalists framed this event as the first of its kind. Disney-ABC 
executives did little to challenge such assertions. Certainly their stock prices could 
only be helped by such publicity. In addition, these specific companies had little 
fear in terms of negative repercussions in Washington. With a newly-elected 
Republican Congress at work rewriting a strongly deregulatory Communications 
Act, Disney and ABC executives likely had little doubt the merger would proceed 
smoothly. In contrast, News Corp., which was only finally starting to come out 
from under the shadow of a long, expensive investigation by the FCC, was not 
about to draw attention to its prior accomplishments. Thus, while the press 
portrayed other companies as in a mad rush to catch up with Disney-ABC, in fact 
they were trying to catch up with News Corp./Fox. This wave of mergers and 
acquisitions would continue into the next decade. By the mid-2000s, every 
network would have a studio sibling. 
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Though the Disney-ABC deal attracted the majority of the press, there 
were important issues to consider in regards to the Westinghouse-CBS deal as 
well. These issues were more extensively remarked upon by journalists. Most 
significantly, the Westinghouse-CBS transaction reaffirmed the importance of 
diversification. During most of his time in charge, CBS majority shareholder and 
CEO Larry Tisch had remained steadfast in his determination to keep CBS a 
“pure play broadcaster.”1111 He had sold off CBS’s stake in other assets such as 
CBS Records years earlier. While CBS remained on the sidelines, NBC, ABC, 
and Fox had all expanded into cable. As previously discussed, like the other 
networks, CBS had been given the opportunity to create a new cable channel 
through its retransmission consent negotiations. Unlike the other networks, CBS 
failed to create one. The purchase of CBS by Westinghouse seemed a repudiation 
of this broadcast-only strategy.1112 It became clear through this latest wave of 
mergers that being confined to only one sector of the media business was a short-
sighted move which placed a company far behind its competitors and made it 
vulnerable to takeover.   
Those companies which did remain confined to one sector of the 
marketplace – whether due to choice or limited resources – had faced difficult 
times even before this latest round of mergers and acquisitions. I already 
discussed the state of independent producers in some detail above. They were not 
the only ones struggling during the mid-1990s. The emergence of UPN and the 
                                                 




WB all but destroyed what was left of the independent station business.1113 Few 
stations remained unallied with a network by 1995. As UPN and the WB 
programmed more hours of the day, smaller syndicators found themselves with 
fewer available outlets for their product. The situation was made worse because 
many of the larger station groups were increasingly developing much of their 
programming internally.1114 Cable services were often not a viable option either, 
as they either developed their own programming in-house or turned to the largest 
suppliers for their programming. 
The status of talent in this changing environment remained uncertain as 
well, though there were some ominous signs of what was in store for individual 
actors, producers, directors, writers and the like. For example, in May 1995, FX, 
in its bid to elevate its profile, purchased the syndication rights to NYPD Blue 
from sister company Twentieth Television.1115 Fox executive Greg Meidel 
promised this was “not a sweetheart deal.”1116 Their claims seemed to be borne 
out by the high price paid by FX, estimated to be in excess of $30 million dollars 
for 100 episodes.1117 However, the series’ co-creator and executive producer 
Steven Bochco didn’t think so. In 1999, he filed a suit against Fox, accusing the 
company of self-dealing.1118 He alleged that by failing to shop the program 
                                                 
1113 This sector of the broadcasting industry had already lost a lot of lobbying power due to the 
departure of Fox affiliates from INTV. In 1993, INTV discontinued holding a separate annual 
convention and merged with NATPE – see Flint, “Eye on INTV: Hedlund on Ups, Downs in ’92,” 
Broadcasting, 18 January 1993, 35-37. 
1114 “Station Groups Bite Hand That Needs ‘Em,” Variety. 
1115 Flint, “Fox’s FX Puts Collar on ‘NYPD Blue,’” Variety, 15-21 May 1995, 248. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 Ibid. This meant Fox paid between $300,000 and $350,000 per episode. Twentieth planned to 
separately sell a syndication package of the series to broadcast outlets for weekend play. 
1118 Lynette Rice, “Bochco Sues, Feels ‘Blue’ Over Alleged Self-Dealing: He Claims Fox Sold 
Cop Show Cheap to FX,” Hollywood Reporter, 14 September 1999. 
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around to other interested buyers, Fox prevented NYPD Blue from earning as 
much as it might have. This would be only one of many lawsuits to arise between 
talent and media conglomerates as consolidation continued and such practices 
became more widespread.1119 
To an extent, this in-dealing made sense given the ever-mounting costs 
incurred in producing and marketing series. At the time FX purchase NYPD Blue, 
the average price for an hour-long drama was between $1.2 and $1.5 million; the 
average price of a sitcom was between $600,000 and $800,000.1120 Assuming the 
production company and distributor of this programming was not owned by the 
same entity and thus could not pass money from one part of the company to 
another, a producer could expect to take a loss of between $400,000 and $750,000 
for dramas and between $200,000 and $400,000 for sitcoms.1121 With such large 
figures at stake, it was logical companies would want to vertically integrate and 
exploit the benefits of such a structure.  
One side effect of this, though, was that the smaller fish suffered.  Media 
analyst Neil Gabler argues that talent agents were among the first people to see 
the extent to which the tide was turning against individual talent and smaller 
operations in favor of the studios.1122 He sees this as a primary reason why two of 
Hollywood’s most powerful and influential talent agents – CAA’s Ron Meyer and 
                                                 
1119 For example, similar allegations were made against Fox by Alan Alda (M*A*S*H) and David 
Duchovny (The X-Files).  
1120 Robins, “Top-Drawer Talent Taps Web Wallets,” Variety, 22-28 May 1995, 1, 110. Rising 
costs were similarly plaguing the motion picture business. In 1994, motion pictures reached their 
highest cost yet. The average budget for films financed by MPAA members was $34.3 million; the 
average P&A cost was another $16.1 million according to Leonard Klady, “H’Wood: Land of the 
Rising Sum,” Variety, 12-19 March 1995, 14. 
1121 Ibid. 
1122 “The Revenge of the Studio System,’ New York Times. 
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Michael Ovitz – left the company in the summer of 1995 to become top 
executives at MCA and Disney, respectively.1123  
While many in the industry and the press may have expressed some 
concerns about the possibly detrimental consequences of the continued move 
toward media consolidation, politicians did not seem to share such apprehensions. 
The same week the Disney-ABC and Westinghouse-CBS mergers were 
announced, the FCC repealed PTAR in a 5-0 vote.1124 Also in this same eventful 
week, the House voted 305-117 in favor of a telecommunications reform bill 
approving the reform of the Communications Act of 1934.1125 One part of this bill 
raised the television station ownership cap from 25 to 35%. The FCC and the 
Senate had already signed off on this change; it was only a matter of time before it 
would be enacted.1126  
This news had little effect on the station sales business, which was already 
booming. Excluding major deals such as Westinghouse-CBS and Disney-ABC, 
1995 was already the best year for station deals since 1985.1127 Stations were 
                                                 
1123 Ibid. Also see, “MCA Deal Meyered in Plot Twists,” Variety; Robins and Peers, “Goliaths 
Reel at Disney Deal: Mega-Mouse Merger Triggers Takeover Fever,” Variety, 21-27 August 
1995, 1, 78-79. 
1124 The repeal was effective August 30, 1996, with a transition period to occur in-between. Flint 
and Wharton, “The Last PTAR Story You’ll Ever Read!,” Variety, 31 July – 6 August 1995, 1, 46. 
1125 Stern, “House Advances Telcom Reform,” Broadcasting & Cable, 7 August 1995, 10-11. 
1126 The FCC approved the change in December 1994. See “FCC Raises Roof on TV Ownership,” 
Broadcasting & Cable. The Senate approved it in June. See Stern, “Dereg Rolls in Senate: 81-18,” 
Broadcasting & Cable, 19 June 1995, 6-7. This became official when President Clinton signed the 
Telecommunications Act into law on February 8, 1996. For more details on the Act, see Patricia 
Aufderheide, Communications Policy in the Public Interest: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 1999). 
1127 Donna Petrozello, “$4.4 Billion and Counting: Even Without Mega-Deals, Year-to-Date 
Station Trading Total is Billion Higher Than 1994’s,” Broadcasting & Cable, 4 September 1995, 
6-7. 
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selling for twelve to fourteen times cash flow – numbers which only a few years 
earlier media analysts thought would never be seen again.1128  
News Corp. also had its own cause for celebration during this last week of 
July 1995. After months of wrestling with the FCC over how to deal with Fox’s 
status as a foreign owned company, the commission let News Corp. off the hook. 
In the same meeting in which they repealed PTAR, the commission unanimously 
ruled that, although technically Fox had been in violation of the law, it had not 
acted deceptively but rather in the public interest.1129 The commission said it 
would be “inequitable” to require Fox to be restructured since the agency’s rules 
in 1985 were unclear. As such, Fox was provided with a permanent waiver.1130 In 
evaluating the outcome of this issue, one journalist labeled the commission “the 
new, huggable FCC.”1131 Another observed with some cynicism that 
Suddenly, an investigation that had imperiled Murdoch's ownership of the 
Fox network - a probe he once dubbed a “witch-hunt” - had become a 
family affair. And the five commissioners did nothing to change the mood, 
voting unanimously to endorse a resolution that could soon free Murdoch 
to resume terrorizing the established American networks, as he has done 
for the past two years.1132  
The FCC’s decision was unsurprising considering the extent to which the 
political winds had been moving in News Corp.’s favor during the previous 
                                                 
1128 Ibid. 
1129 The FCC had previously ruled (in May 1995) about Fox’s technical violation; the July 1995 
meeting took place for Fox to make the case for a retroactive waiver, which it received. See Doug 
Halonen, “FCC’s Ruling a Huge Lift for Fox, Murdoch,” Advertising Age, 8 May 1995, 2. News 
Corp. had made minimal restructuring efforts prior to the July meeting according to West, “Fox 
Moves to Put Its FCC House in Order,” Broadcasting & Cable, 15 May 1995, 8. 
1130 Halonen and Keith J. Kelly, “Fox Triumphs in FCC Ruling,” Advertising Age, 31 July 1995, 
2. 
1131 Erik Larson, “The New, Huggable FCC: The Federal Communications Commission Finds 
Murdoch Violated Federal Law – Then Gives Him a ‘Kiss,’” Time, 15 May 1995, 65. 
1132 Ibid. 
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several months. In December 1994, in response to the FCC’s investigation, 
several Republicans in Congress “sent signals” that foreign ownership restrictions 
of television stations should be relaxed.1133 Not only was this an indication of 
News Corp.’s influence, but also a sign of how dramatically times had changed 
from the early 1990s, when widespread paranoia had run rampant in the industry 
due to the investment of several Japanese and European companies in Hollywood. 
This paranoia had gradually declined largely due to the difficulties which these 
“foreign” companies were reported as having with their newly purchased studios. 
As it turned out, companies such as Sony and Matsushita found it much harder to 
realize their envisioned synergies between hardware. These Japanese owners 
found themselves faced with unfamiliar corporate cultures and conflicting 
business practices. Sony stuck with Columbia-TriStar, incurring extensive losses 
in the process. However, Matsushita cut its losses and sold Universal to Seagram 
in 1995. 
In addition to gaining congressional support on the foreign ownership 
issue, News Corp. soon received backing from one of its primary competitors. In 
early 1995, NBC dropped its opposition to News Corp.’s expansion efforts. 
Skeptics argued that NBC’s abrupt reversal was due to its need for access to News 
Corp.’s satellite services in Asia. Initially NBC had planned to have CNBC and 
NBC Super Channel carried on the Apstar 2 satellite.1134 However, when the 
satellite exploded upon launch in late January, NBC was forced to turn to the only 
                                                 
1133 Wharton and Flint, “FCC Unlikely to Revoke Fox TV Licenses,” Variety, 12-18 December 
1994, 31, 36. 
1134 “Peacock Backs Off from Fox,” Variety. 
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other satellite provider – Star TV. No journalists reported a direct causal link 
between the Apstar 2 explosion and the resolution of NBC’s difficulties with 
News Corp. Yet many noted the close timing between when the satellite blew up 
(the end of January) and when NBC and News Corp. resolved their differences 
(mid-February).1135 At the same time NBC obtained carriage of its services on 
Star TV, the company also pledged to work with Fox on campaigning for 
telecommunications reform.1136 
The détente reached between NBC and News Corp. underscores the 
growing interdependency between major media companies as they continued to 
expand their investments and increase their reach around the globe. As the 1990s 
wore on and overseas markets became ever more vital for their bottom lines, 
conglomerates increasingly recognized the importance of finding ways to 
cooperate with each other. Currying favor with News Corp. became particularly 
important, as Murdoch’s company was well ahead of the curve in terms of its 
investments in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Yet as of 1995, even News Corp. 
had only started to figure out how to penetrate these markets. The primary method 
the company was using to gain further entrée abroad was simple: Exploit its 
Hollywood product – especially its niche-oriented television programming – on 
cable and satellite systems around the world. This product would be a primary 
means by which Fox established its identity overseas. Even as News Corp. moved 
into this next phase of its development, other companies continued to remain a 
                                                 
1135 See Stern, “NBC Drops Opposition to Fox,” Broadcasting & Cable, 20 February 1995, 7; 
“Peacock Backs Off from Fox,” Variety; Janine Stein, “NBC’s  Asian Channels Get Big Boost on 
Star TV,” Electronic Media, 27 February 1995, 53. 
1136 Stern, “NBC, Fox Make Peace,” Broadcasting & Cable, 27 February 1995, 60. 
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couple of steps behind. Their energy for the remainder of the 1990s would be 
focused on integrating newly created or recently purchased networks into their 
other media holdings. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
Now that we know the information superhighway won’t be all smooth 
sailing, guess who may be around for a while? Yes, the television 
networks. For 1994, ABC, CBS and NBC are headed toward posting their 
highest collective operating profit in at least five years - perhaps in more 
than 20 years. And this prosperity appears to be based not on one-time 
events or accounting gimmicks, but on their steady improvement in 
business fundamentals… 
Broadcasting & Cable, March 19941137 
 
Five years ago the nets thought this was a mature, dying business…We're 
the ones who saw it as a growth business and contributed predominantly to 
turning it back into a growth business…  
Fox Inc. president Chase Carey, January 19951138 
 
From 1985 to 1995, the definition of what constituted a network changed 
from an economic, regulatory, technological and programming perspective. Early 
in this time frame, doubts about the long-term viability of the broadcast networks 
were rampant. However, by the time “merger mania” hit in the summer of 1995, 
the broadcast business was in as good a shape as it had been in years. Prospects 
were so promising that media conglomerates were rushing to purchase or create 
their own networks. The result was that where once there had been three 
broadcast networks, there were now six. However, the business practices and 
media products of these networks differed substantially from those which had 
existed during the three-network era of the 1950s through the 1980s. 
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 Over the course of this study, I have argued that Fox, along with its parent 
company, News Corp., had a leading role in defining the shape of this new media 
landscape. Under the guidance of such individuals as Rupert Murdoch, Barry 
Diller and Jamie Kellner, News Corp. and Fox recognized changing regulatory, 
technological and economic conditions and adapted to them. For example, News 
Corp. effectively exploited the deregulatory direction being taken by the FCC 
when it purchased the Fox studio and the Metromedia television stations. Fox 
readily worked with cable services and MSOs to further its own programming and 
distribution objectives. This latter tactic was indicative of the company’s decision 
to view media fragmentation not as a threat but rather as an opportunity. News 
Corp./Fox further took advantage of this fragmentation by expanding vertically 
and horizontally. This integrated structure enabled it to profit by financing and 
circulating programming through its many cable, satellite, network and home 
video divisions around the world.  
Cumulatively, Fox and News Corp.’s influence was significant, ranging 
from questioning long-standing government policies to providing a model for how 
to integrate broadcast networks and motion picture studios, to demonstrating the 
economic and marketing value of niche-oriented television programming for 
media conglomerates. Throughout this ten-year time frame, the Fox network 
played a major part in heralding the neo-network era. In this era, broadcast 
networks served a completely different but equally important set of industrial and 
programming functions.  
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From the emergence of the television networks to the launch of Fox 
Broadcasting in 1986, a network could be defined according to a specific set of 
regulatory, technological, economic and programming criteria. From a regulatory 
standpoint, a network offered more than fifteen hours of programming via at least 
twenty-five stations across a minimum of ten states. If the program service 
qualified as a network according to these terms, its ownership of programming 
was severely limited and its ability to participate in syndication was restricted. 
These regulations required broadcast networks and motion picture studios to 
remain in the hands of two different sets of media companies. Though the Big 
Three networks faced certain regulatory restrictions, they also benefited from 
government policies. The FCC’s policy of localism combined with technological 
limitations perpetuated the status quo. The slow distribution of UHF-equipped 
television sets, combined with the sluggish pace at which cabling took place, 
helped the networks retain their dominant position. Meanwhile, a combination of 
economic and technological constraints further benefited the networks. Most 
significant on this count was the monopoly of AT&T over the network 
interconnection process. AT&T’s pricing system ensured that the networks would 
remain the only viable broadcast services for decades. 
With these technological, regulatory and economic conditions in place for 
nearly thirty years, a system persisted in which the networks thrived. The income 
they generated from their seven O&Os and the sale of national advertising proved 
satisfactory to their shareholders. Meanwhile, syndication profits went to the 
studios and a select number of independent production companies. With so few 
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program services available, the networks had to exert minimal effort in building 
brand identities. The networks’ stranglehold over television distribution allowed 
them to operate as America’s “mass” medium.  
In most instances, programming was pitched as being for “everyone.” 
There were exceptions, of course. Fox’s demographic orientation was 
foreshadowed, for example, by CBS’s cancellation of its “rural sitcoms” such as 
Green Acres and The Beverly Hillbillies in the early 1970s. At this point, the 
network turned to more “relevant” and “quality” fare such as All in the Family 
and The Mary Tyler Moore Show.1139 Similarly, ABC decided to schedule “jiggle” 
programming such as Three’s Company and Charlie’s Angels in order to build its 
younger audience. However, though there were occasions during which the Big 
Three developed and scheduled demographically-targeted programming, this 
strategy was selectively used for particular time slots on a limited number of 
evenings. Only in a handful of circumstances was prime time programming aimed 
at certain demographic groups such as teenagers or African-Americans. A 
systematic, schedule-wide pursuit of niche audiences did not take place on 
network television prior to the emergence of Fox.  
Network television was defined in these ways until the mid-1980s, when 
Fox along with cable, home video and a deregulatory FCC affected this 
environment. As of the mid-1980s, it became more and more difficult to define a 
network. From a regulatory standpoint, the meaning was repeatedly modified, 
especially with regard to the fin-syn rules.  While at first the FCC defined a 
                                                 
1139 Jane Feuer, “MTM Enterprises: An Overview,” MTM ‘Quality Television,’ eds. Feuer, Paul 
Kerr and Tise Vahimagi (London: BFI Publishing, 1984), 1-31.  
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network as an entity broadcasting more than fifteen hours of prime time 
programming, later the definition was adjusted to refer solely to “established” 
networks, thereby exempting Fox. Ultimately the fifteen-hour rule was thrown out 
altogether and with it went this definition of a network. This was followed soon 
after by the repeal of both fin-syn and the consent decrees which governed 
network behavior. With the elimination of these legislative and judicial restraints 
went the last limitations on network-studio integration.    
Yet even before vertical integration was feasible from a regulatory 
perspective, Fox and later, the WB and UPN, were already engaging in such 
strategies with the help of several recent technological developments including 
cable and satellite. Fox bypassed the AT&T feed by using satellite technology. 
The company further enhanced its distribution by signing deals with MSOs in 
smaller markets. Because most of the program service’s early affiliates were 
UHF-based stations, Fox also depended heavily on the diffusion of UHF-
equipped television sets.  
At the same time that Fox exploited opportunities in the technological and 
regulatory contexts by which a network was defined, the company also affected 
the long-extant network business model. Years before the other networks, Fox 
received income from its role as a producer of prime time programs. Hit shows 
such as The Simpsons and In Living Color started their syndicated run and 
brought Fox hundreds of millions of dollars long before the Big Three had 
permission from the FCC and the judiciary to enter into the syndication business. 
By operating as both a producer and a distributor, Fox pushed the media 
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industries toward greater consolidation. With more Fox programming available 
for syndication, smaller syndicators were squeezed out. In addition, as Fox – and 
later, the networks – developed their own in-house production divisions, 
independent producers were increasingly marginalized.  
By having control over both program production and network distribution 
before its broadcast and studio competitors were able to, Fox/News Corp. showed 
how niche-oriented television franchises could be every bit as profitable as big-
budget studio event films. As Hollywood budgets continued to spiral even further 
out of control – a fact well publicized during the summer of 1995 due to the 
release of Universal’s budgetary nightmare, Waterworld – television seemed like 
a safer investment. This was especially true as television networks increased their 
presence in cable and explored the synergies available between cable and 
broadcast outlets. The growing popularity of television series on home video and 
DVD during the late 1990s further demonstrated the extensive economic potential 
of successful network series.  
Fox may have profited from its investment in television programming 
prior to CBS, NBC and ABC, but it did not neglect the traditional sources of 
network revenue in the process. Rather, the company simultaneously generated 
revenues from its station group and from the sale of commercial spots during 
prime time. Again, however, in these areas as well, Fox altered the standard 
means by which the networks operated. The company evaded foreign ownership 
regulations and also circumvented ownership limits by keeping its investment in 
several television stations below what the FCC defined as attributable interests. 
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For example, by having less than a 25% stake in the New World and SF 
Broadcasting stations, Fox was able to add to its station group holdings while 
evading FCC regulations. Such tactics, combined with the company’s extensive 
expenditures on sports games, contributed to a booming station business and set 
off a war with the other networks for affiliates.  
Fox’s influence could be seen in other areas as well.  Through its alliance 
with affiliates in creating the Fox Children’s Network, Fox showed additional 
cross-promotional opportunities available to broadcasters. FCN also demonstrated 
the economic value of turning to younger viewers to launch a new program 
service. Through its use of its station group as a laboratory for testing new 
programming, Fox played a key role in stimulating a new era in low-cost, high-
rated reality television. In addition, by turning to its station group for 
programming, Fox cut into the market for syndicated programming, thereby 
causing a shift in the off-network marketplace. Through its allocation of a two-
hour block of time for affiliates on the FX cable channel, Fox found a relatively 
inexpensive means of moving more extensively into cable while retaining a strong 
relationship with its affiliates. Through its more limited prime time schedule of 
fifteen hours versus the networks’ twenty-two hours of programming, Fox spent 
less on programming than its network competitors. As a consequence, Fox had to 
deal with fewer program failures overall, and thus could better limit its losses in 
prime time. 
Fox may have offered fewer hours of prime time programming, but its 
impact on the evening schedule was extensive nonetheless. The company’s 
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aggressive targeting of such demographic groups as children, teenagers and 
African Americans aligned nicely with advertisers’ interest in pursuing specific 
niche audiences. Even when Fox expanded beyond its initial 18-to-34-year-old 
audience, it remained focused on targeting specific demographics. By 1995, the 
broadest audience any of the “Big Four” pursued was generally the 18-to-49 
demographic. No company made their number one priority the pursuit of the mass 
(or “household”) audience. It was now about niches, and sometimes “niches 
within niches.” This was the dominant philosophy in place as the two newest 
networks were assembled. Both the WB and UPN took up Fox’s interest in 
pursuing narrower demographics even as Fox tried to attract a slightly broader 
audience of 18-to-49-year-olds. While the company remained as demographically 
oriented as ever, a somewhat wider viewer base offered Fox a chance of further 
enhancing advertising revenues and increasing its station values. 
Along with the WB and UPN’s pursuit of the core Fox audience of 18-34-
year-olds, teenagers, children, and African Americans, these new weblets also 
relied heavily on Fox's strategy of developing a strong brand identity with viewers 
from the outset. As Fox – and many cable programmers – had long realized, in a 
multi-channel universe, a strong marketing strategy was as important as a 
workable programming schedule. It was crucial for viewers to be aware of what a 
program service offered in order for them to be able to find the channel and keep 
watching it.  
As the WB and UPN launched, the question of "what was a network" 
surfaced with increasing frequency in the press. As discussed in chapter seven, 
 348
using traditional regulatory, technological, economic and programming 
definitions, neither of these new entities was a network. One could as easily label 
MTV, Nickelodeon and USA as networks. This point was also made by USA 
president Kay Koplovitz in 1995. Koplovitz challenged assertions by WB and 
UPN executives that their services were fifth networks.  She maintained that, 
given USA’s national penetration of 70% as well as its increasing reliance on 
original programming, her cable channel was "the real fifth network."1140  
To a large extent, this claim was legitimate. By the mid-1990s, many cable 
programmers had finally begun regularly producing original series. What's more, 
the money spent on this programming was reaching the level spent on network 
programming. This meant cable services were producing more "network-quality" 
programming – shows with production values and talent levels on par with their 
broadcast competitors. This fact, combined with the diffusion of cable to nearly 
three-fourths of U.S. households, meant that almost as many people were being 
exposed to programs on widely distributed cable services such as USA, TBS and 
ESPN as were being exposed to programs on UPN and the WB.   
Such points certainly gave credence to Koplovitz's claims. Yet if USA was 
"the real fifth network," a few nagging questions arise. For example, if a cable 
program service was just as valuable as a broadcast network in this era, why did 
nearly every major motion picture studio spend the next several years acquiring 
their own broadcast network? Why did Viacom-Paramount and Warner Bros. 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars to launch new networks? Why did Disney 
                                                 
1140 Dempsey, "Koplovitz Claims USA is the 'Real Fifth Network,'" Variety, 4-10 September 
1995, 25, 27. 
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and Viacom-Paramount spend billions of dollars to purchase two of the Big Three 
broadcast networks? All of these entities had extensive cable holdings of their 
own. Why were these cable services not sufficient? What did broadcast networks 
offer that was not available from cable? Why in a fragmented media world did 
broadcast networks remain so important?  
 The answers to these questions can be derived from analyzing the history 
of the Fox network. Fox showed how and why owning a broadcast network was 
so vital to the operations of media conglomerates. The word “broadcast,” like the 
word “network,” meant something distinctive by 1995. And Fox had much to do 
with this changed meaning as well. A broadcast network was distinct from a cable 
network in a several important ways – ways which indicate why media 
conglomerates spent billions to purchase or create their own broadcast program 
services. First, broadcast networks continued to reach far more viewers than did 
cable networks. Cable penetration at its broadest was 70%. The Big Four reached, 
aggregately, more than 99% of the U.S. audience. UPN and the WB approached 
the reach of the Big Four by aligning with cable MSOs and borrowing a tactic 
used by syndicators in double running programs as needed.  A greater reach 
meant the broadcast networks had a greater opportunity to attract more viewers. 
More viewers meant more ratings, which, in turn, meant broadcasters could 
charge advertisers more than cable could.  
A second point working in the broadcast networks’ favor was that they 
still had the best channel positioning. This was a point that, though rendered less 
important in the remote control era, was still an issue. When viewers turned on 
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their cable boxes, the default starting point was channel one. Similarly, when 
viewers looked at their TV Guides, program listings began with the lowest 
channels. These factors meant the well-positioned broadcast networks had the 
best chance of attracting the most viewers. 
The third way broadcast networks remained different from cable networks 
was due to their ability to attract larger numbers of viewers. This strength was 
largely a function of their greater reach and better channel positioning. It was also 
due to the networks’ having been in business for several decades, a fact which 
provided them with well-established identities with viewers as reliable sources of 
entertainment, sports and news programming. While the broadcast networks may 
no longer have been a mass medium, they were still a "most" medium, seen by 
more people on a regular basis than any other audiovisual media.  Though 
broadcasters were now more focused in their audience profiles, they were 
nonetheless much broader than most cable services. For example, Nickelodeon 
pursued children, MTV sought teenagers, and BET targeted African Americans. 
The broadcast networks thought more broadly than this, aspiring for 18-to-34-
year-olds or 18-to-49-year-olds (and the larger advertising revenues associated 
with these wider demographics).  
The fourth distinction between broadcast and cable networks resulted from 
how each group was depicted by the press. The media continued to represent the 
Big Four – and increasingly, the Big Six – as separate from cable services. This 
was partly due to tradition, partly due to technological and regulatory 
divergences, and partly due to variations in programming practices. In terms of 
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programming practices, the Big Six scheduled different original entertainment 
series to run every night of the week. Though, as noted above, cable was 
increasing its output of original programming, new entertainment series only 
played on any specific cable service for one or two nights a week at most. Further, 
while the Big Six might re-run an episode of a show a few times, cable often re-
ran any episode of its original series a dozen times or more.  
All of these factors contributed to broadcast networks remaining 
distinctive from – and more valuable properties than – cable networks. On top of 
all of these advantages, broadcast networks pulled income from more revenue 
streams. While cable services made money from advertising sales and subscriber 
fees, broadcast services generated income from advertising sales, ownership of 
station properties, and increasingly, ownership of network-aired programming.  
The broadcast networks’ ability to access to the largest possible audiences 
combined with their increased ability to own the rights to programming placed 
them in an advantageous position. More specifically, the broadcast networks were 
able to launch their entertainment programming on a size and scale unparalleled 
by their cable, satellite and video competitors. The result was that, in the same 
way a theatrical release served as a launching pad for big-budget motion pictures, 
a network television run served as a starting point for entertainment programming. 
A network run established a "brand name" with the public. This brand then 
continued to be funneled through the other holdings of the media conglomerate – 
its home video, cable, merchandising, publishing and interactive divisions.  
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These structural components facilitated the development of the television 
franchise. Fox’s ability to vertically and horizontally integrate before the other 
networks and studios enabled it to explore the possibilities of the television 
franchise first.  It first did so with The Simpsons, a show which it financed, co-
produced and distributed.  When The Simpsons became a hit both Fox as well as 
several divisions of News Corp. benefited. During its prime time run, Fox profited 
from the show via advertising sales on Fox Broadcasting, by licensing 
opportunities, and by the “halo effect” the show provided to its entire schedule.  
When it moved into syndication, the benefits of owning and distributing 
programming became even more apparent as other Fox divisions reaped millions 
more from syndication sales as well as home video and DVD sales. Meanwhile, 
Fox exploited cross-promotional opportunities between the show and the Fox 
Children’s Network, BSkyB placed the program in key time slots on its program 
service, and the image of Bart Simpson was used to launch further News Corp. 
broadcasting and satellite ventures abroad.  
During the mid-1990s, The X-Files took franchise television one step 
further. This show, like The Simpsons, was not only an economic boon to Fox in 
and of itself but also a means of promoting other Fox and News Corp. divisions. 
For example, News Corp.’s Harper Collins division published a series of X-Files 
books, the FX cable channel aired The X-Files in syndication (even as original 
episodes continued to air on Fox), and the Fox motion picture division released a 
spin-off of the series in theaters. Each of these ventures boosted awareness of the 
X-Files “brand” at the same time they helped the specific divisions involved. At 
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the same time, the popularity of the X-Files helped Fox alter its image with 
viewers. No longer was it the “upstart” or “guerrilla” weblet, a program service 
focused mainly on teen dramas and raunchy sitcoms. Now it was a more 
respectable network, with more “serious” dramas as well as sports and Hallmark-
produced movies of the week.  
The success of shows such as The Simpsons and The X-Files reinforces the 
economic and marketing value which popular prime time television series could 
have for both a network as well as for entire media conglomerates. What became 
apparent as these programs began to be distributed through the various divisions 
of Fox and News Corp. was that broadcast network programming offered several 
advantages over big-budget motion pictures for media conglomerates. A hit series 
with 100-plus hours of material could gain a conglomerate entrée into overseas 
markets in a way that a two-hour motion picture could not. Whereas the revenues 
from a theatrically-released motion picture were split with an exhibitor, 
companies such as Fox kept all of the advertising revenue from their national 
sales along with all of the income from their owned-and-operated stations.  
Into the 2000s, other media companies followed in Fox’s footsteps and 
developed their own lucrative television franchises. These programs similarly 
were produced and distributed by the network and then circulated in other ways 
through the various divisions of their conglomerate parents. Touchstone-ABC’s 
Alias and CBS’s CSI were two such network franchises. The “franchise 
mentality” for television became more prominent as the networks and studios 
further integrated their holdings from 1995 to 2004. This process was further 
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accelerated due to the repeal of fin-syn in the fall of 1995. Following Disney's 
purchase of ABC in 1995, Viacom acquired CBS in 1999. The WB and UPN 
expanded their schedules during the late 1990s until they had a full week's worth 
of prime time programming. Meanwhile, General Electric turned down numerous 
offers for NBC. As a sign of how dramatically the media environment had 
transformed, in 2003 GE-NBC became the first conglomerate to purchase a 
motion picture studio after a broadcast network when it acquired Universal, along 
with the USA and Sci-Fi cable channels, from Vivendi. With the completion of 
this deal in 2004, every broadcast network had a studio sibling. Thus concluded a 
process begun nearly twenty years earlier, when News Corp. became the first 
company to own both a motion picture studio and a broadcast network.  
Part of the reason Universal became such a desirable property for GE was 
because it produced the lucrative Law & Order franchise. By purchasing 
Universal, GE-NBC avoided having to wrangle over ever-rising license fees for 
the program and its spin-offs. Now it could generate income from all possible 
revenue streams. By 2004, NBC-Universal truly seemed to be the house that Law 
& Order built. We can see the culmination of the “franchise” mentality being 
reached with this series: With four hours of Law & Order airing in prime time 
every week on NBC (the original Law & Order, Criminal Intent, Crime & 
Punishment, Special Victims Unit) and more than a dozen more hours airing on 
NBC’s sister station, USA, occupied hundreds of hours of television time 
annually. As with Fox shows such as The X-Files and The Simpsons, it also 
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generated numerous spin-offs, including a DVD series, a coffee table book of Law 
& Order crime scenes and several CD-Rom video games. 
As the studios and networks integrated their assets, filmed entertainment 
holdings increasingly became the focal points of these new media conglomerates. 
Gradually these companies shed part or all of their investment in other divisions 
such as music (Universal), video retailers (Viacom), and consumer stores (Warner 
Bros.). In selling off such divisions, they repudiated the strategy of being 
integrated entertainment companies espoused during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Instead they elected to pursue the path taken by News Corp., a path that 
placed a priority on audiovisual media in general and network television in 
particular.  
My study has focused on the initial steps taken by media conglomerates in 
pursuing the "News Corp./Fox model." However, much of this activity took place 
following the 1985-1995 time span that has been the focal point of my analysis. 
Additional work needs to be done in looking at how the business practices and 
media products of conglomerates continued to change from 1995 to 2004. As I 
suggested in chapter one, this 1995-2004 period marks a third phase of New 
Hollywood, a period distinct from the time under examination here. There has 
been even less scholarly discussion of this time period than there has been of the 
time under investigation in my study. In conducting such an analysis, there are 
several new developments which must be considered, including the impact of the 
information superhighway (as well as the rhetoric surrounding this growth); the 
increased investment by U.S.-based media companies into overseas markets, 
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especially in Asia; the networks’ continued redefinition as cable increased its 
output of original programming; and the rapid diffusion of the DVD.  
The last decade also needs to be evaluated more extensively from a 
regulatory perspective. While there has been a fair amount of work on the impact 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, much less analysis has taken place in 
assessing the implications of the media consolidation which has occurred during 
the same time span. Yet there have been many significant economic and cultural 
consequences to this consolidation. Additional analysis could be undertaken in 
which the language and ideas of political economics are incorporated more 
explicitly into the discussion of these changes. In The Political Economy of 
Communication, Vincent Mosco identifies three “entry points” for discussion 
communication practices and processes: commodification, spatialization, and 
structuration.1141  
Mosco, drawing from the work of Anthony Giddens, describes 
structuration as “a process by which structures are constituted out of human 
agency, even as they provide the very ‘medium’ of that constitution.”1142 Using 
this definition as a starting point, researchers could more extensively evaluate the 
relationship between individual agents and institutional agents in affecting change 
in the media industries as well as in larger social processes. The impact of specific 
individuals on the media industries could be better evaluated if research such as 
mine was supplemented with interviews with key industry players. Thus far, 
journalists have provided most of the discussions of the influence of individuals 
                                                 
1141 (London: Sage, 1996.) 
1142 Ibid, 212. 
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such as Rupert Murdoch and Barry Diller. With the exception of Todd Gitlin’s 
Inside Prime Time, there have been few occasions in which scholars have 
interviewed industry figures in order to analyze the processes of media 
production.1143 Such approaches could offer much in terms of better 
understanding the degree of authority which specific individuals exercise on the 
structure of particular media companies as well as the media industries at large. 
One final area in which there could be additional research involves 
relating the developments in the media industries over the last twenty years to 
larger social, cultural and economic changes. It would be helpful to connect the 
rise of niche television programming to the growing popularity of niche products 
in general. Among the issues which could be explored more extensively are the 
impact which the proliferation of niche media has on social relations and the ways 
in which the fragmentation of media culture affects how different groups connect 
(or fail to connect).   
Michael Curtin poses one way of relating the emergence of niche media to 
larger social and economic patterns. Incorporating and adapting work by David 
Harvey, Curtin argues that the changing organization of the culture industries is a 
function of a shift from a Fordist mode of mass production and mass consumption 
to a “neo-Fordist” era of “flexible accumulation.”1144 He maintains that Fordism 
did not disappear but rather exists “side-by-side” with such neo-Fordist traits as a 
physical reorganization of the workplace designed to speed up labor processes 
                                                 
1143 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983.) 
1144 See “On Edge,” 182, 186. For more by Harvey, see The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1990). 
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and enhance productivity; adjustments in labor markets, including the 
proliferation of subcontracting, part-time employment and casual labor; new 
modes of flexibility in the arena of state policy such as deregulation and 
privatization; and geographic mobility of financial capital, production processes 
and people.1145 In addition to these traits, which he pulls from Harvey’s work, he 
adds a fifth key characteristic of the neo-Fordist era: New modes of marketing 
and distribution. 
Curtin asserts that these new modes of marketing and distribution draw 
attention to “the contested terrain of popular culture.”1146 This is the case because 
companies are now perpetually searching for “narrowly defined” and 
“underserved” markets.1147 In other words, the oppositional becomes increasingly  
commercially viable. This can be seen, for example, in the growth of African-
American sitcoms on Fox in the early 1990s. Such programs as In Living Color, 
Roc and South Central regularly dealt with issues relating to the struggles of the 
African-American working class.  
These ideas pose several different ways to conduct additional research on 
Fox and the development of the media industries in the 1990s. First, more thought 
could be given to Fox’s ability to appeal to particular subcultures or marginalized 
groups such as teenagers, the working class and African Americans. It is worth 
considering how much of Fox’s success was due to its ability to tap into emerging 
trends in popular culture. Second, further research could be done on how the rise 
                                                 
1145 Ibid, 186-187. 
1146 Ibid, 187. 
1147 Ibid, 190. 
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of niche television programming was similar to or different from the rise of other 
niche-targeted media products such as movies and music. Both alternative music 
and independent cinema were taking off at the same time that Fox was developing 
– a point which gives additional credence to Curtin’s argument that a larger 
socioeconomic shift was underway.  
Third, more thought could be given to how companies such as News 
Corp./Fox, Time Warner, and Viacom have continued to negotiate their roles as 
producers and distributors of both mass market and niche-oriented goods.  From 
the mid-1980s through the mid-2000s, such media conglomerates have become 
more global in their reach at the same time they have become more diversified 
and fragmented in their development of media products. It is worth considering 
how much these processes are interrelated for such companies as well as the 
extent to which they are necessary for their continued survival and expansion. 
With these suggestions, I have only tapped the surface of what can be 
accomplished in contemporary media industry analyses. Clearly this is a fertile 
area for research, and one that has only begun to be explored.  
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*1990 and 1993 numbers do not include Fox affiliates. 
*After 1993, the number of independent stations is not reported because the 
numbers are negligible. UPN and the WB snatched up most of the remaining 
independent stations as affiliates.  
                                                 
1148 Data compiled from “Land Fires Up Indie TV Stations,” Variety; “Independent Television: 
The Good Gets Better,” Broadcasting; “The ‘Other’ Independents: Sharing the Success of Fox,” 
Broadcasting; Halonen, “INTV: All’s Well 1 Year After Fox Exit,” Electronic Media, 25 January 
1993, 4. 
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Table 1: Top Companies in Electronic Communications, 19831149 
1983    Revenue (in millions) 
1. General Electric   26.797 
5. Westinghouse     9.533 
8. Coca-Cola        6.829 
10. Sony Corp.          4.748 
12. CBS        4.540 
14. Gulf + Western       4.243 
16. Warner Communication       3.425 
17. ABC        2.949 
18. Time Inc.         2.717 
24. MCA Inc.       1.585 
28. Disney       1.339 
39. Capital Cities           .762 
50. Metromedia         .533 
65. Tele-Communications      .347 
67. Viacom                   .316 
72. Turner Broadcasting       .225 
 
                                                 
1149 Adapted from Broadcasting’s annual Top 100 in Electronic Communications report. Includes 
only publicly owned companies. Numbers on left show overall ranking. See “Top 100,” 16 April 
1984, 58, 60. 
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TABLE 2: TOP COMPANIES IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 19861150 
 
1986    Revenue (in millions) 
1. General Electric   36.725 
4. Westinghouse   10.731 
5. Coca-Cola      8.669 
7. Sony Corp.      8.180 
9. CBS       4.754 
11. Capital Cities/ABC    4.124 
12. Gulf + Western     3.781 
13. Time Inc.      3.762 
15. News Corp.      3.163 
19. Warner Communications    2.848 
21. Disney      2.722 
22. MCA      2.441 
37. Viacom        .919 
47. Tele-Communications Inc.     .645 
52. Turner Broadcasting      .556 
70. Tri-Star Pictures       .254 
                                                 
1150 “Top 100,” Broadcasting, 11 May 1987, 54, 58. 
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TABLE 3: TOP COMPANIES IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 19891151 
 
1989    Revenue (in millions) 
1. Capital Cities/ABC     4.957 
2. General Electric   54.574 
3. CBS       2.962 
4. Time Warner   10.779 
5. TCI        3.026 
6. Sony    18.343 
7. Viacom      1.436 
8. News Corp.     6.397 
9. Turner Broadcasting    1.065 
12. MCA      3.382 
16. Paramount      3.392 
17. Westinghouse   12.844 
22. Disney      4.594 
    
 
                                                 
1151 “Top 100,” Broadcasting, 4 June 1990, 48-49. Revenues include both entertainment and non-
entertainment-related holdings for each company. 
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TABLE 4: TOP COMPANIES IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 19921152 
 
1992       Revenue (in millions)1153 
Broadcasting1154 
1. Capital Cities/ABC   4.266 
2. CBS     3.503 
3. General Electric   3.363 
4. News Corp. 1155   1.480 
5. Westinghouse     .725 
 
Programming 
1. Viacom     1.865 
2. Turner Broadcasting   1.641 
3. Paramount     1.216 





                                                 
1152 “Top 100 Companies,” Broadcasting & Cable, 21 June 1993, 37-39. 
1153 Only entertainment-related revenues were listed in the charts this year.  
1154 During this year, there was no single “top 100” list. Rather, Broadcasting & Cable separated 
companies into categories and then ranked them. The categories, in the order listed by 
Broadcasting & Cable, include: Broadcasting, Programing, Technology, and Cable. 
1155 For the second year in a row, News Corp. had higher income from television-related activities 
than two of the three networks. The income rankings were: 1) Capital Cities/ABC ($619.3 




1. Sony    3.098 
(Includes Columbia-TriStar) 




1. Time Warner   5.590 
2. TCI     3.574 
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TABLE 5: TOP COMPANIES IN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, 19951156 
 
1995            Revenue (in millions)1157 
1. Disney      23.82 
(Includes ABC/CapCities) 
2. Time Warner     18.71 
(Includes Turner Broadcasting) 
3. Viacom        1.79 
(Includes Paramount) 
4. News Corp.       7.98 
5. Sony        7.66 
6. TCI         4.94 
7. Seagram Co.       7.66 
(Includes MCA-Universal) 
8. Westinghouse       4.58 
(Includes CBS) 
10. General Electric Co.      3.36 
                                                 
1156 From McClellan, “Time Warner, Turner Join Mega-Merger Bandwagon,” Broadcasting & 
Cable.  
1157 Ibid. This article was published immediately following the announcement of the Turner-Time 
Warner merger. The numbers are based on combined 1994 revenues of the recently merged 
companies. Revenues in this chart only pertain to entertainment-related assets. 
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